Myth of Independence

The Myth of
Independence
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

Reproduced in PDF form
By: Sani H. Panhwar
Member Sindh Council PPP
CHAPTER 1
The Struggle for Equality
On 19 May 1954, after some hard negotiations, Pakistan and the United States
of America concluded the Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement and entered
upon a period of association euphemistically called a 'special relationship'. For
over twelve years, the United States provided Pakistan with considerable
economic and military assistance. In 1959, misunderstandings arose in the
relations between the two countries and have since grown and multiplied,
especially after the Sino-Indian conflict. Relations have followed a chequered
course, sometimes bearing on economic matters and sometimes, more
profoundly, on political issues. The pendulum has swung from one extreme to the
other, from association to estrangement. There was a time when Pakistan was
described as the most 'allied ally' of the United States and, to the chagrin of other
'client States' of Asia, it was asserted by President Ayub Khan, in an address to
the United States' Congress in 1961, that Pakistan was the only country in the
continent where the United States Armed Forces could land at any moment for
the defence of the 'free world'. When, during the U-2 episode, in an attempt at
refined diplomacy, the United States prevaricated with ambiguous statements,
Pakistan, more royalist than the monarch, openly admitted that the aircraft had
taken off from Pakistan and that, as a staunch ally of the United States, Pakistan
was within its rights to allow it to do so.
In less than a quarter of a century, Pakistan's relations with the United

States and India have completed a cycle in each case. Vigorous efforts have
been made to drag Pakistan away from the posture of confrontation to co-
operation with India and, in this very process, relations with the United States
have changed dramatically from those of the most 'allied ally' to the point at
which it is alleged that there is 'collusion' between Pakistan and the United
States' principal antagonist—the People's Republic of China. Plow these twin
cycles have been completed offers an exciting study of the interplay of a host of
related factors: national ethos, geography, a turbulent past, and hoary traditions.
The pride and passions of an ancient people stirred by nascent Asian nationalism
are involved. The story ranges over a wide horizon: from religion to economics,
from geography to politics, from history to myth, from race to genocide. In this
web the United States has been entangled at almost every point. This book
attempts to examine one facet of this many-sided situation.
Although, in the recent past, relations between Pakistan and the United
States have been characterized by a series of vicissitudes, only the United
States' decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan—a country to which
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it is technically still bound by the obligations of a Mutual Defence Treaty and an
association in the defence alliances of CENTO and SEATO— finally put a stop to
the special relationship. On Wednesday 12 April 1967 a State Department
spokesman announced in Washington:
We have concluded an extensive review of our policy with regard to the

provision of military equipment to India and Pakistan and have decided that we
will not resume grant of military assistance which has been suspended since
September 1965. We are therefore closing the U.S. Military Assistance Advisory
Group (MAAG) in Pakistan and the U.S. Military Supply Mission in India
(USMSMI). This process is expected to be completed by July 1, 1967, in both
cases.
We have also decided to remove present U.S. Government restrictions on

the kinds of spare parts, which may be sold to India and Pakistan for previously
supplied equipment. Henceforth we will be prepared to consider, on a case-by-
case basis, all requests for export permits covering the cash purchase of spare
parts.
The United States will continue to keep its military sales policy under
careful review to ensure that it is not contributing to an arms race between India
and Pakistan. We strongly hope that both countries will make progress in
resolving the problems and differences that divide them and that they accord an
increasing priority in the allocation of their resources to agricultural and industrial
development
This decision was of far-reaching consequence to the future of the sub-

continent and of Asia as a whole, which is now replacing Europe as the principal
source of crises affecting the gravest issues of war and peace. For centuries
Europe was the centre from which conflicts radiated. This is not to say that Asia
was free from trouble while Europe remained in the grip of revolutions and
upheavals. History has not, so far, blessed any part of mankind with absolute
tranquillity. What has happened is that the eye of the hurricane has shifted to
Asia, where a cruel war is being fought in Vietnam, on the outcome of which
hinges the fate of people everywhere. That ravaged country is engaged in a life-
and-death struggle, for the moment confined to Vietnam; but it is quite possible
that, when it reaches a certain critical point, the war will pass its present frontiers,
turning the land mass of Asia into an immense battlefield and, perhaps,
spreading its consuming names beyond.
How close the world could come to the brink of a total conflagration was
seen at the time of the recent war in the Middle East. The crisis preceding that
war threatened to undo the detente between the Soviet Union and the United
States. That this did not happen and the Soviet Union stepped back should not
mislead us into thinking that the Soviet Union will always step back, so
jeopardizing its claim to world leadership. The fighting between the Arab states
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and Israel put west Asia and south-east Asia together in the same furnace of
war, making people fear that their joint sparks might set fire to the whole world. In
both the origin and termination of this five-day war there was a direct connection
traceable to Vietnam. But for the United States' deep involvement in Vietnam and
the Soviet Union's increasing concern with that war, the crisis in the Middle East
would neither have erupted so suddenly nor ended so abruptly. Thus no major
political event, particularly in Asia, can be divorced from the Vietnam war with
regard both to origin and result.
The one-dimensional approach to diplomacy is wrong. Although it is a

natural propensity of people to think in terms of their own situation, the global
situation defies this limited approach. World developments have now become so
complex and interconnected that no important decision tolls the bell for one
people alone. The panoply of politics is no longer parochial in nature. The
actions of all nations, and particularly of the Great Powers, are influenced by a
multitude of considerations covering a vast field.
Significant decisions which seem to affect Pakistan only have, in reality, a

wider relevance. The escalation of the war in Vietnam would become a simple
matter if it concerned Vietnam and the United States alone, but every step in the
escalation has to be measured in terms of responses not only of Vietnam and the
United States but also of China and the Soviet Union among other states.
America's decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan has to be
considered in the wider perspective of its Asian implications. The stakes are very
much higher than they appear to be, and this has to be recognized in the
protection of larger national interests.
If international events are looked at from one angle only, the United
States' decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan would seem to be an
abrupt and arbitrary act. If, however, world issues are objectively analysed, not in
the context of bilateral relations but globally, the decision appears to be neither
abrupt nor arbitrary. It is essential to examine both this important decision and
the future course of American-Pakistani relations in a comprehensive and
objective manner in order to determine how we stand now and how we may yet
stand with the other nations of the world. Attempts to foresee the future can help
the formulation of accurate political judgements and the enlightenment of our
people as to the kind of problems or hazards that might have to be faced in a
world which moves uncertainly between co-existence and co-annihilation.
Ever since man left his caves to seek and fashion more favourable
conditions of life, he has been in conflict with his fellows;
all have been moved by the same impulses and all have striven towards the
same or similar ends. With the growth of civilization the struggle for existence
has found its highest expression in relations between states. Aristotle observed
that: 'It is evident that the state is a creation of nature, and that man is by nature
a political animal. And he who by nature and not by mere accident is without a
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state is either above humanity or below it.' Behind the development of culture and
science lies the human urge, expressed by means of the state, to improve the
conditions of life within the collective unit. The conflicts that arise between
groups, each seeking its own interest, are the ingredients of history. The
organized group in its highest form, the nation-state, is the most predatory, as it
is the most exacting towards the individuals that compose it. The conflicts within
such groups and the conflicts between them create a form of protest, which is the
struggle for equality. This began with the dawn of civilization. Records remain of
the early cradles of conflict in the Tigris-Euphrates valley and in the Indus valley
civilization about 4000 years before the birth of Christ. The civilizations that
followed—Egypt, Babylon, Greece, Carthage and Rome—all have known the
same struggle. Ancient Persia and Byzantium, the Empire of the Ottomans, the
colonial outposts of the British and the French Empires, and Nazi Germany have
all played their role in the same drama—greed urging domination and colliding
with the struggle for equality. Whenever, in this drive for domination, the flames
were momentarily extinguished and the sword replaced in its sheath, the struggle
still continued under different names and in different forms. Domination has been
justified as the survival of the fittest; it has been given the name of the White
Man's Burden; it has been glorified by theories of the exclusive responsibilities of
the Master Race. Today that ancient struggle is epitomized in the creed of
democracy against dictatorship.
Oppressed people everywhere, bound by the chains of colonialism, were

urged, not so long ago, to participate in the struggle against Nazism in order to
free humanity from tyranny. Immediately after the defeat of Nazism, many
nations in Asia gained their political independence. After nearly two centuries of
enslavement, India and Pakistan were among the principal states in our Asian
continent to become free in that sense. Twenty years of independence have
revealed to the people of Pakistan and India the sharp difference that really
exists between independence and sovereign equality. The struggle to attain
sovereign equality continues undiminished. Foreign domination has been
replaced by foreign intervention, and the power to make decisions radically
affecting the lives of our peoples has been curtailed by the cannons of neo-
colonialism. The war against Nazism has been followed by the cold war between
the United States and the Soviet Union, which was further intensified by the end
of Mao Tse-Tung's long march to victory in 1949.
Since Independence, Pakistan's foreign relations have evolved in stages;

partly influenced by changing conditions and partly by sentiment and subjective
judgements which invariably influence the thoughts of new nations. To arrive at a
true and unbiased appreciation of Pakistan's role in the sub-continent, in Asia
and in the world, it is necessary to examine relations with states not on an ad hoc
basis, but on that of a deeper consideration of world events and the objective
facts that influence relations of nation-states, large and small. Political theorists,
particularly in Pakistan, are inclined to make policy assessments out of
immediate developments and jump to hasty and arbitrary conclusions. Difficulties
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arise from our habit of reaching rigid conclusions and persisting in them. It is
necessary to make a departure from old habits of thought for the sake of a
clearer appreciation of facts. Indeed, the true implications of recent happenings
can only be judged if every major development is viewed in its proper place in the
vast jig-saw puzzle of international power politics. My narrative must therefore
begin at the beginning—the Partition of the sub-continent shortly after the defeat
of Hitler's Third Reich.
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CHAPTER 2
Global Powers and Small Nations
Since the end of the Second World War, a new political situation has developed
which, perhaps because it is so evident, is not always seen in its correct
perspective and its implications sufficiently understood. Up to 1939 it could be
said that the Great Powers were:
1. The United States of America

2. The United Kingdom
3. France
4. Germany
5. The Soviet Union
6. Japan
7. Italy
The traditional method of conducting foreign affairs in the nineteenth and the first
half of the twentieth centuries was by means of regional alliances formed to
maintain a balance of power among the grouping of the Great Powers with the
assistance of the smaller nations. Peace was preserved by maintaining this very
delicate balance, and peace was disturbed only when the balance, at any given
time, tilted in favour of one group or the other. In those days, the smaller nations
could influence the policy and the alignment of Great Powers by indulging in
various political permutations and combinations.
All this has changed today with the emergence of Global Powers which, in
addition to having all the attributes of Great Powers in the classical sense, are at
the same time much more powerful and play a larger role in determining the
destinies of people all over the world. The emergence of these Powers in the last
twenty years has changed the whole concept of conducting affairs of state. The
task of smaller nations, in which category all the developing nations fall, in
determining their relationship with Global Powers and in furthering their national
interests has become more complex and difficult. The small nation which does
not understand the new rules of diplomacy is doomed to frustration, a sense of
helplessness, isolation and, perhaps, eventual extinction. As a developing nation,
Pakistan must understand how to conduct its affairs in this new situation.
What is a Great Power today and what was a Great Power only a few
decades ago is a distinction worth examining. In the imperial age the area of
influence and control of a Great Power was regional rather than global.
Alexander the Great sought to conquer the world, but his world was a small one.
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The Roman legions swept across Europe and parts of Asia and Africa, but there
was more to the world than the lands where the mandate of Rome prevailed.
Charlemagne held sway over Europe, but the political Europe of his day did not
extend very far east. Ghengiz Khan's hordes galloped across Asia and parts of
Europe, but their conquests were of no lasting consequence to the world at large.
Napoleon dreamt of a world order that met its doom in the ashes of Moscow.
Hitler was moved by a similar ambition, but he too was driven back from the
gates of Moscow.
From Alexander to Hitler, many a conqueror set out to subjugate the world
but failed. Enormous territories in more than one continent did come under the
yoke of one imperial Power or another, but not for long. The sun did not set on
the vast British Empire, but even at the height of their power the British had to
contend with the ambitions of other imperial Powers— notably, those of Spain,
France, and Germany—so that the world neither fell under the hegemony of any
one imperial Power, nor was divided by a pact between two Super-Powers. At
the end of the Second World War, when the Axis Powers were shattered, the
Allied armies had the world at their command; but, even before hostilities had
ended, the conflict of interests between Allied Powers and Soviet Russia became
apparent. The authority of the old imperialist Powers like Britain, France, and the
Netherlands had diminished to such an extent that they were soon forced to
relinquish their overseas empires. Into this void stepped the only two Powers
which had emerged strong and victorious out of the Second World War—the
United States and the Soviet Union. Inexorably filling the political vacuum, they
pushed forward their areas of influence both in the east and in the west. In the
west, they reached and confronted each other in Berlin and central Europe. In
the east, the Soviets extended their influence to the Pacific; while the United
States moved into Japan and the Philippines, and temporarily bolstered up the
dying French Empire in south-east Asia. Since, traditionally, the United States
had not been an imperialist Power in the sense of physically occupying foreign
territories— except for the Philippines and some dependencies in the
Caribbean—and since the Soviet Union, by reason of its doctrine of Marxism,
also could not justify physical possession of foreign territory, a new type of
struggle emerged. This was the beginning of neo-colonialism. It no longer
became necessary to control the destinies of smaller countries by any jurisdiction
over their territories.
The main purpose of imperialism was to exploit the resources of the

colonies. Vast territories were divided and distributed among the imperial
Powers, which then drained the resources of the subject peoples. With the end of
imperialism in its classical form, only the system of exploitation underwent a
transformation. As the colonial Powers withdrew from their colonies, the policy of
divide and rule became obsolete and was replaced by that of unite and rule to
meet the challenge of new times, although to achieve the same objective. The
changed conditions necessitated a change in the method. In the past the
colonies were exploited separately by each imperial Power. Now that these
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Powers have vacated their possessions, it has become necessary for them to
merge the resources of the former colonies into groupings for better collective
exploitation. As the position of the exploiters has changed, so also it has become
necessary to change that of the exploited. Previously the imperial Powers went
separately about their missions of exploitation. Now that they have joined
together for their common advantage, it becomes equally necessary for them that
their former colonies should pool their resources to facilitate exploitation. The
new situation calls for corresponding adjustments both in the former colonies and
in the former colonizing countries to make market conditions more suitable for
exploitation. Larger markets generate greater exports and imports on terms
favourable to the advanced nations of the West. They encourage increased
consumption of goods and a more systematic exploitation of resources. They
facilitate the manipulation of prices internationally. There are many advantages,
most of them accruing to the former colonial Powers. The security interests of the
free world are better served, but economic exploitation remains the principal
concern. This is the inevitable adjustment in the transition from colonialism to
neo-colonialism, which is why our independence remains a myth.
The West, which in the past showed little sympathy for the struggle of
subjugated people to unite, has suddenly found the unity of former colonial
peoples to be desirable; so much so that in many places it is being imposed on
erstwhile colonies. Everywhere co-operation has become a key word. We are not
opposed to unity: indeed, we want the unity of Afro-Asian countries, but a unity
voluntarily achieved, on terms of equality, and without foreign interference. Unity
must be achieved for the benefit of the people concerned and not for the benefit
of foreign Powers and their agents. It should be put in the service of the people
and not at the command of foreign forces. Our people must have the freedom to
make their own decisions in favour of unity. This kind of unity is opposed by
foreign interests, which seek to impose unity for purposes of exploitation in the
economic and military fields. There is a fundamental difference between unity
willingly forged by a people and that forcibly imposed, which is only a
continuation of the Roman peace. Unity which seeks to end exploitation is
invariably resisted by foreign Powers determined to retain their privileges in one
form or another or fearful of losing them. It goes without saying that the West
does not want the unity of, or co-operation between, states that want to assert
their independence and control their resources in their own interests. In such
cases every effort is made to divide and weaken them. Indeed, in Vietnam the
United States is bleeding itself white to prevent the unity of the North and the
South. The same applies to Korea. Sometimes circumstances may conspire to
make it expedient to support the division of non-Communist states, as was
reluctantly done in the sub-continent and not so reluctantly done in the Middle
East. These are, however, exceptional cases; such divisions being tolerated or
supported, as the case may be, to prevent greater catastrophes or to comply with
exceptional interests. The formula of unite and rule obviously cannot be applied
everywhere, but as a general proposition it is irrefutable. Most commonly it is
applied to the pliable underdeveloped nations, especially 'committed' states with
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leaders who make their countries readily susceptible to economic and military
exploitation. In the selection of the pliable states it must be remembered that the
classification of aligned and non-aligned nations is no longer a yard-stick. It has
become obsolete. Indonesia and Ghana are non-aligned, but both are now
committed to the West. The changing realities have made the classification more
flexible, but essentially only the pliable states, whether aligned or non-aligned,
fall within the category of those whose unity is desirable. The Western Powers
seek to impose unity where it serves their purposes; unless division will serve
them better, as in the case of Syria and Egypt. The efforts to keep the Indo-
Pakistan sub-continent united and the subsequent manoeuvres to create
federations in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East have to be interpreted in this neo-
colonial context. Since the end of the Second World War the West has tried to
create artificial federations in former colonies, even to the extent of bringing
together under one order princes divided by centuries of feud. This was
attempted in India and achieved in Malaysia and more recently in the Persian
Gulf.
The end of imperialism and the emergence of Global Powers have

changed the whole concept of a Great Power. Its interests are now
fundamentally global and its instrument of expansion is ideology instead of the
gunboat. The aim of a Great Power is no longer to subjugate the world in the
conventional sense, but to control the minds of men and gain the allegiance of
the leaders of underdeveloped nations, through economic domination and other
devices, without necessarily interfering directly. In the age of neo-colonialism the
physical occupation of territories by a Global Power is not necessary, as the
objectives of its global policy can be achieved by indirect exploitation and various
kinds of inducement. The multitude of powerful but invisible devices and
agencies operating more or less through remote control now bring the same
result that physical subjugation used to in the past. Modern means of
communications make it possible for Great Powers to dictate and direct the daily
lives of people all over the world without having to exercise a day-to-day overt
control. In this modern lust for ideological and neo-colonial supremacy, the Great
Powers have entered into an alarming global rivalry in every corner of the world.
What factors make a Global Power? It is not the extent of territory alone
nor the material resources and economic wealth; it is not only a question of
scientific and technological excellence; it is not only a matter of ideology; it is in
fact, a combination of all these elements. India and Brazil are large in territory,
but neither is a Global Power. Czechoslovakia and Belgium might be able to
develop sophisticated weapons, but neither can aspire to be a Global Power. The
Great Powers of yesterday, such as France and Britain, are now only marginal
Global Powers. Now and for as long as it can reasonably be predicted there will
be only three genuine Global Powers: the United States of America, the Soviet
Union, and the People's Republic of China. Europe as a continent is capable of
becoming a fourth Global Power, but this would need an accommodation
between Eastern and Western Europe and, among other conditions, the political
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and institutional collaboration between France, Germany, and Britain. The
emergence of a European Europe as a Global Power would help to stabilize
peace and is desirable, but it does not appear to be an immediate possibility.
The question before the smaller nations of today is how they should
conduct their affairs in such a manner as to safeguard their basic interests; to
retain their territorial integrity and to continue to exercise independence in their
relationship with the Global Powers as well as with the smaller nations. The
relationship between the Global Powers and the smaller countries is on an
unequal footing, whereby the former can exact a multitude of concessions
without responding in sufficient, let alone equal, measure. No small nation can
possibly bring a Global Power under its influence on the plea of justice or
because of the righteousness of its cause. In the ultimate analysis, it is not the
virtue of the cause that becomes the determining factor, but the cold self-interest
of the Global Powers which shapes their policy, and this self-interest has better
chances of prevailing in an endless and unequal confrontation between a Global
Power and smaller nations.
Should the smaller nations therefore obediently follow the dictates of

Global Powers and exchange their independence for material gains and
promises of economic prosperity? The answer is an emphatic 'No'. Caught in the
nutcracker of the global conflict the underdeveloped nations might in despair
conclude that they can only marginally influence the status quo, that in reality
they have no independent choice but to trim their policies to the requirements of
one Global Power or another. This is an unnecessarily pessimistic view, a
negation of the struggle of man, expressed through the nation-state, to be free.
The force of freedom must triumph because it is stronger than any other force for
which man will lay down his life. It is still possible for the smaller nations, with
adroit handling of their affairs, to maintain their independence and retain flexibility
of action in their relationship with Global Powers.
It would be inexpedient, and perhaps dangerous, for smaller nations to

identify themselves completely with the total interests of one Global Power to the
exclusion of the others. Common interest and the pattern of events may make it
necessary for a small nation to be more closely associated with one Global
Power than with another, but, even so, it is not impossible for it to maintain
normal relations with the others on the basis of honourable bilateral relations.
When the national interests of a state clash with the interests of a Global Power,
it would be preferable to isolate the area of conflict in the direct dealings with that
Great Power. A workable equilibrium should be sought independent of the point
on which vital interests differ, provided, of course, that the segregation of
conflicting interests is not only possible but is scrupulously reciprocal. Every
reasonable effort should be made to put into action preventive diplomacy to avoid
Global Power interventions which subject the weaker nations to suffer from
punitive diplomacy. If this, however, is not found to be feasible, it is better to
make the position clear by taking a stand against encroachment. It is preferable
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to have one sharp crisis and a firm position than to permit procrastination to
create conditions of permanent crisis. In such a situation, every subsequent crisis
will do greater harm to the smaller Power until eventually the Global Power
overwhelms it. So, if insulation is not possible, it is better to take a positive
position and evolve a new pattern of understanding.
Pressure is both a worm and a monster. It is a worm if you stamp on it, but
it becomes a monster if you recoil. In 1962 Burma took a firm line with the United
States when it considered it had no honourable alternative course. For a brief
period there were strains in its relations with the United States, but now relations
are better. Both states had to find a new relationship the moment it was
understood that inroads would not be tolerated. Cambodia, similarly, has
demonstrated commendable firmness in dealing with the global interests of the
United States. More recently both Burma and Cambodia have taken a firm line
with China as well. Indeed, during the height of the cultural revolution, the latter
threatened to withdraw its ambassador from Peking. Had it not been for the
intervention of Chou En-Lai, this might well have happened. If it had taken place,
Cambodia would have had the dubious distinction of severing diplomatic
relations with two of the three Global Powers.
A policy of drift is fatal. Confrontation with a Global Power should be

avoided; but if it becomes unavoidable, it should be faced instantly and firmly.
Delay or irresolution inevitably results in piecemeal compromises, which in turn
injure the national interests of the small nation. However, before resorting to
confrontation, every reasonable effort should be made to avoid a direct
diplomatic clash by insulating the points of conflict. In striving for such an
arrangement as a first measure, the state concerned will not be compromising its
stand. On the contrary, it will prove that the cause is so dear to it that, even
against the opposition of a Global Power, it will be pursued more practicably in
accordance with the situation, instead of getting bogged down in sterile
controversy, resulting in mounting tension without the national aim being
achieved. Once a working accommodation is achieved by the insulation of points
of conflict, persuasion and indirect efforts will become more effective. It is safer
and more prudent to avoid a head-on collision with a Global Power. It is wiser to
duck, detour, step aside, and enter from the back door. It is futile to try to win
over or implore a Global Power to change its policies by continued direct efforts
on the plea of justice or alignment. Reminders of services rendered in the past
are of no avail. Neither cringing nor sycophancy, neither sentiment nor argument,
carry any weight in such dealings. The simple fact of the matter is that, in the
long run, a Global Power is not likely to be outwitted, so it is better for a small
nation to take a realistic attitude and evolve both policy and strategy on rational
rather than on subjective lines. The objectives of such a nation will stand a better
chance of being realized by the application of indirect pressure exerted by the
collective voice and solidarity of the smaller nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin
America (now known as 'the Third World'), together with diplomatic pressures
from those Global Powers and quasi-Global powers whose interests are in
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accord. By combining the support of such Powers as can give it with the support
of the underdeveloped nations, the state concerned can bring about situations
which make it imperative for the Global Power in question to modify its position in
its own independent interest. It is largely by the compulsion of these outside
forces that the state concerned can bring about a change in the Global Power's
attitude on the points of difference. In other words, it is necessary for small states
to maintain a dialogue on their conflicting interests with all Global Powers,
irrespective of their positions; to do all within their resources to influence them
without getting entangled to the point of interference and ultimata.
With the points of conflict set aside, a small nation can have normal and
friendly dealings with Global Powers on all matters except on the actual issues of
conflict. This would enable the State in question to enjoy a rational latitude in
maintaining better relations with those Global Powers whose interests coincide
with its own. In such an event, the Global Powers whose interests are in
opposition cannot take exception to that state's more cordial relations with the
Global Powers whose interests are in accord. Nor would this justify the Power
with whose interests its own are in conflict in interfering in or adversely
influencing the small state's national interests, since no preconditions would be
made for normal relations.
How should smaller nations regulate their relations with the two
Communist giants? There are many doctrinaire and political reasons for the Sino-
Soviet schism. One is perhaps to be found in the contending interests of the
Global Powers. Had it not been for the dispute between China and the Soviet
Union, it might not have been impossible for the Communist World, represented
by the Soviet Union and China, and the Capitalist World, represented by the
United States, notionally to divide the world into different spheres of influence. In
such a dispensation, China would have acquired a secondary position. Unlike
Britain, however, China is not reconciled to playing a secondary role. The threat
of the. partition of the world has, therefore, been averted by the equality that
China seeks with the United States and the Soviet Union. This political fact of life,
this global clash at the summit, is of supreme significance to the rest of the world.
The external policy of any country must be based on a realistic assessment of
the current power conflicts. These add tension to tension, but also offer
opportunities, which small powers can ill afford to ignore, for the protection of
their own vital interests and, indeed, sovereignty.
The conflicts of the Global Powers are not only ideological but also a
struggle for hegemony. The original confrontation between the United States and
the Soviet Union has now been succeeded by that between the United States
and the People's Republic of China, with the Soviet Union occupying an
intermediary position. In this balance of power between the three titans, the
Soviet Union, willy-nilly, appears to be getting pushed into a midway position, at
once advantageous and hazardous. Because its claims to leadership of the
Communist countries, especially those of eastern Europe, are based on ideology,
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only at the cost of international Communism can the Soviet Union allow its
ideological differences with the People's Republic of China to reach a point of no
return. The widening breach between the two Powers has weakened the Soviet
position in eastern Europe, where complex and profound changes are taking
shape, without affecting China's influence in Asia. Failing an ideological
rapprochement with China, the Soviet leadership will be caught between twin
pressures: menaced from the west by the liberals and harassed on the east by
the Chinese traditionalists. Neither can the Soviet Union allow its detente with the
United States to reach a point leading to the Soviet Union's identification with the
Captain of Capitalism. In drawing this conclusion the importance of ideology is
not being overstated. On occasion, national considerations might well supersede
ideological considerations, but this will never be admitted; on the contrary, as
these trends become more apparent, greater lip-service might be paid to
ideology as an instrument for achieving national objectives. Thus, although the
Soviet Union retains a modicum of flexibility in its relations with the United States
and China, sometimes taking a position more in accord with the United States
and sometimes, though rarely now, with China, it cannot pursue this path
indefinitely and make it a feature of its permanent policy, without jeopardizing its
position in world affairs.
Although the People's Republic of China and the United States have
become arch-antagonists, and the Vietnam war has brought them to the brink of
an international war, it should not be assumed that their relations will always
remain in a state of hyper-tension. The United States' interests are world-wide,
like those of the other Great Powers, but its primary interests remain in Europe,
where it has to compete with the vital interests of the Soviet Union. China's main
dispute with the United States, apart from the Vietnam war, is over the future of
Taiwan. There would not be much argument as to whether Germany or Taiwan is
more important to the security of the United States. Were it to come to a choice
or a show-down, undoubtedly it is Germany and the future of Europe which
would get priority from the Americans. From defence considerations alone, the
loss of Taiwan would not endanger the United States' security interests as vitally
as the loss of Germany. In a number of Asian states in the Pacific region, the
United States has an array of defence facilities encircling China and is in physical
possession of a string of strategic islands facing the coastline of China.
Moreover, there is the Seventh Fleet which would continue to patrol the Pacific
and other Asian waters. Thus, the loss of Taiwan and other off-shore islands
would not be of paramount importance to the strategic requirements of the United
States' interests in Asia. Similar advantages are not available in Europe in
comparable measure and variety. America has to rely primarily on her ground
forces and nuclear missiles.
The conflicting interests of the United States and the Soviet Union are not
confined to Europe. In terms of importance, the Middle East takes second place.
There, as in Europe, the United States' chief rivalry is not with China, but with the
Soviet Union. The strategic Middle East, with its oil wealth, the Suez Canal, and
14
the problem of Israel, is again more important to the United States than the future
of Taiwan, Both in terms of interest and commitment, the Middle East—as the
crossroads between Africa, Asia, and Europe—takes precedence over south-
cast Asia in America's global objectives. Following the Second World War, the
United States took the place of Britain and France in this region. The Persian
Gulf area produces 27 per cent of the world's petroleum and has proven global
reserves of 60 per cent. American firms have a gross investment in the region of
$2 billion. There is nothing comparable in respect of American interests to be
found in the south-east Asian peninsula. On the other hand, the Soviet Union has
continued to extend its influence in the region by supporting the Arab cause
against Israel and in rendering massive economic and military assistance to the
Arab states, beginning with its dramatic participation in the construction of the
Aswan Dam.
The stakes of the Soviet Union and of the United States are undeniably
very great in the Middle East and second only to their interests in Europe. So far
as the United States is concerned, Israel is both a subject of international
concern and an intensely important domestic problem. So great are American
interests in this region that, although the Soviet Union's own interests are
considerable, it nevertheless modified the position it took at the start of the crisis
in the Middle East war for fear that the United States would protect its stakes at
whatever cost. Notwithstanding the short-term American successes in the war of
June 1967, in the Middle East as in Europe, the Soviet Union and the United
States are vying with each other for supremacy.
There is little doubt that the Soviet Union was embarrassed in the recent
Middle East conflict. The setback then suffered had to be put right; hence
Premier Kosygin's hurried journey to the General Assembly, President
Podgorny's quick visits to Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad, and the immediate
replenishment of military equipment to Arab States. These were part of a
determined effort by the Soviet Union to retrieve its position not only in the Arab
states, but in the world generally.
It would be a dangerous over-simplification to assert dogmatically that, on

account of the prevailing area of understanding between the United States and
the Soviet Union in Europe and because of the setback to the Soviet position in
the Middle East, the detente between the two Global Powers has now become a
permanent fact of international life. Even if the Soviet Union should want such an
understanding, the contradictions in the international situation simply do not
permit it.
The United States has no territorial disputes with the People's Republic of
China, whereas there are territorial differences between the Soviet Union and the
People's Republic of China. Another important factor in causing a change in the
existing Global Power positions is the stark fact that, militarily speaking and in
terms of industrial and technological development, it is the United States and the
15
Soviet Union which are evenly poised. These have attained such fearful military
power as to be capable not only of destroying each other but the rest of the world
with them. China has not yet attained a similar degree of military prowess. The
balance of terror between the United States and the Soviet Union places China in
a position to tilt the scales in favour of the one or the other. If China were to be
destroyed by the United States, the vacuum thus created would endanger the
Soviet Union's security. It therefore follows that despite the differences between
China and the Soviet Union, it is not in the Soviet Union's basic national interest
to carry its disputes with China to the ultimate end. Similarly, despite the United
States' detente with the Soviet Union and its antagonism to China, because of
American and Russian rivalry in Europe and the Middle East and because of the
territorial and ideological differences between the Soviet Union and China, it is
not in the United States' national interest to carry its struggle against China to a
point of no return. It is therefore conceivable that, despite the sharp and
seemingly irreconcilable differences between the United States and China and all
that has recently happened in the Middle East to display the United States-Soviet
Union detente, a situation may still arise in which China and the United States
jump over existing obstacles and arrive at a working arrangement uncongenial to
the Soviet Union. Equally, circumstances may throw a bridge across the gulf
dividing China and the Soviet Union and compel them to reassert their unity
against the Anglo-American Powers in the face of one reversal after another,
beginning with the failure to hold the Second Afro-Asian Conference and
culminating in the Middle Eastern debacle. These reverses are made all the more
grave by the shadow that Vietnam casts over Sino-Soviet interests.
The international milieu is in a state of flux as the power centres shift and
the East-West ideological struggle is partially overtaken by the North-South
polarization, which arises from the appalling economic disparity between the rich
and the poor nations. The rigid polarization of the last decade is giving way to a
process of decentralization of power. The speed of change is more rapid than we
imagine and it is accelerating. Great changes are taking place everywhere and
the greatest of these are in Asia. In this fluid state of affairs it would be fatal to be
dogmatic about the future course of international events. At present the United
States is engaged in a conflict—just stopping short of war—with China; such a
situation cannot last forever. Judging by existing trends, which point towards a
collision course, the likelihood of a change in the wind of events appears to be
remote. It would be safer to predict that the understanding between the two
Super-Powers, dramatically demonstrated by the Middle East conflict and
tenaciously pursued by President Johnson in his summit discussions with
Premier Kosygin at Glassboro, will continue to grow at the cost of China and in
favour of a settled international status quo policed by the Soviet Union and the
United States. This might well happen; but in the exciting kaleidoscope of power
politics all possibilities have to be taken into account. The intriguing thing about
international politics is that it contains no law which rules out any kind of change
resulting from the interplay of objective interests.
16
More and more people are coming to believe that the United States and
the Soviet Union are now engaged in ending the dangerous phase of the cold
war. They do not always appreciate, however, that a diminution of the
confrontation might precipitate more serious problems and lead to a series of
armed conflicts in different parts of the world. The cold war has persisted for over
two decades mainly because the Soviet Union and the United States tacitly
renounced war as a means of settling their disputes. The world has become
acquainted with the traditional pattern of the cold war and its limitations. People
feel increasingly secure in the knowledge that it will not explode into open
violence. The waning of the cold war in one form or another could generate
genuinely dangerous situations. Into the void might step a Great Power unafraid
of the consequences of modern warfare as a means of ending exploitation. To
prevent this, the established Great Powers, weary of war, might make
compromises and admit reforms ending neither in the perpetuation of the unjust
status quo nor in the capitulation of genuine interests. But as long as nations
exploit one another, as long as there is dictatorship and suppression of civil
liberties, as long as people are denied their rights and the poor are plundered,
the cold war will remain and might even culminate in a real war between the
Great Powers, between one ideology and the other. Oppressed people will never
abandon their search for a redeemer and if none is found to assume the mantle,
the people in bondage will redeem themselves and achieve an egalitarian order
free of domination and want, tyranny and exploitation. In the last analysis, it is
better to live under the familiar shadow of the cold war than to experience the
nightmare of racial war towards which we appear to be moving inch by inch.
There was a time when the Soviet Union and the United States were the
world's principal adversaries. Ten years ago few would have anticipated their
present relationship. Similarly, it cannot be ruled out that a time will not come
when the United States and China will have to seek a modus vivendi. If this does
not happen, it could precipitate the destruction of the world, or, at any rate, of
Asia. There are no permanent enemies. The existing conflict between the United
States and China must one day give way to sanity. From the mid-thirties to the
mid-forties Nazi fascism was the cause of conflict. From the mid-forties to the
mid-fifties the Soviet Union and the United States were locked in their cold war.
From the mid-fifties we have witnessed the increasing antagonism between the
United States and China, an antagonism that cannot last for ever. To be more
cautious than Professor Toynbee, who dared to forecast that history would take
an unprecedented turn, I am willing, at least, to predict that there will be a turn in
events in the middle seventies. If the past is any index to the future, it is doubtful
whether the intensity of the United States-China confrontation can endure
beyond the seventies. As in the case of the confrontation between the United
States and the Soviet Union, the China-United States confrontation is not likely to
end in victory and defeat, but in the erosion of the sharp edges of conflict.
17
We may draw the lesson that the smaller nations must not be carried
away by the present Global Power differences and indulge in excesses on behalf
of one against the other so as irretrievably to undermine their own futures. They
should, rather, uphold just causes by working for de-colonization and by offering
resistance to aggression, uninfluenced by the position of the Global Powers. The
smaller nations would do well to assume an increasingly non-committal position
in the Global Power antagonisms. It would be myopic for them to identify
themselves completely with one Power against another. This does not mean that,
in furtherance of its national interests, a small nation should not take a position
more in accord with one Great Power than another; but it certainly means that
the small state should avoid taking predetermined positions on all international
issues on the basis of identification with one Great Power as against another, for
the sake of fleeting material benefits or because its regime in power believes that
it is being propped up by a Power without whose support it would be liquidated
by its own people.
In practical terms, the smaller states should evolve a policy to maintain

normal bilateral relations with all the Global Powers, devoid of interference, in a
perfectly understandable gradation based on enlightened national interest. If
these relations are to be productive and consistent, the terms of association
should be such as not to favour one against the other in strictly ideological
matters or in defence commitments; otherwise, their relations will assume the
character of multilateral undertakings. As Great Powers have global obligations,
it is difficult to have bilateral relations with a Great Power in matters of defence
without becoming involved in a chain reaction resulting in multilateral obligations.
Such agreements cut across the benefits of bilateralism and lead to conflicts with
other Global Powers. The terms of bilateral relations should in no way vitiate the
scope and content of similar relations with other Global Powers. In other words,
under no circumstances should bilateral relations assume the character of
multilateral obligations, as would happen if the terms of the different bilateral
relations were to conflict on fundamental issues and become irreconcilable.
It is essential for the nations of the Third World to continue to develop

friendly bilateral relations not only with the Global Powers but also with the quasi-
Global Powers such as Britain, France, and Germany. France, invested with the
additional degree of power which stems from the possession of nuclear
weapons, maintains the confidence of the French-speaking states of Africa. Her
voice commands respect in other African countries and among the states of Asia
and Latin America. In the latest crisis in the Middle East, France has regained
her position among the Arab states and made atonement for the wrongs she
inflicted on them during the Suez war of 1956. That the France of 1968 is not that
of 1956 was acknowledged by President Nasser when he praised General de
Gaulle for his country's constructive role in the Middle East conflict. France has
acquired for herself a special position not only in Europe but also among the
nations of the Third World. By virtue of her far-sighted foreign policy, she has
developed closer understanding with the Soviet Union and the People's Republic
18
of China. Her correct appraisal of the Vietnam war and the general situation in
Asia has further enhanced her stature, while her external policies have opened
new opportunities for a more progressive change in the international equilibrium.
By her unwavering support of the principles of self-determination, courageously
implemented against her metropolitan interests in Algeria, she has left a salutary
impression on the nations of the Third World.
Franco-German collaboration, which began promisingly under Konrad

Adenauer, has since received some reverses. If this collaboration is
consolidated, it could become a powerful factor in Europe and be a bastion of
peace for the rest of the world. At present, West Germany, as a component part
of a divided state, seeks the unification of its nationhood. For this supreme
objective, and for its defence, it is excessively dependent on the United States.
Its foreign policy has therefore become immobile. It lives in constant fear of
betrayal by its principal ally, as any basic understanding between the Soviet
Union and the United States must be largely to the disadvantage of the Federal
Republic of Germany. Since the formation of the coalition Government, under
Chancellor Kiesinger, there is again a revival of the movement towards France
and an approach to Europe more in accord with the thoughts of General de
Gaulle. It would, however, be premature to expect any major departure in
German foreign policy before the General Elections scheduled for 1969, unless
some fundamental understanding is reached between the United States and the
Soviet Union at what the Federal Republic would regard to be its cost.
Great Britain has now ceased to be a powerful force in Asia, but she
continues to play an important marginal role in support of the United States'
global interests. Her provocative 'East of Suez' policies have caused much
avoidable trouble in west and south-east Asia. After the Middle East conflict, it is
doubtful whether the United Kingdom will ever again be able to assert herself'
East of Suez'. She will have to make the choice between the welfare of her
people and the over lordship of others.
The Commonwealth has passed the point of mutual benefit. It has become
a vestigial institution and the sooner it is decently and voluntarily dissolved, the
better it will be for Britain and for the Asian and African nations of the
Commonwealth. All the collective frustrations of Asia and Africa and the inability
of the Commonwealth to find a release for these feelings reflect themselves in
the relations with Britain and cause unnecessary complications. As inter-
Commonwealth disputes have no outlet within the institution, they mount one on
top of another to increase misunderstandings. Today, relations between Britain
and South Africa are better because they are on a bilateral basis. When South
Africa was in the Commonwealth, Britain's relations with that country were
strained because of the tensions which the multilateral combination of the
Commonwealth generated against it. Not only would Britain's bilateral relations
with all the members of the Commonwealth improve, but the voluntary liquidation
of the Commonwealth would permit Britain to enter Europe unburdened by past
19
legacies and would free the states of Asia and Africa to play a more natural and
meaningful role within their own continents and in the cause of Afro-Asian
solidarity. There would be no anomalous overlapping of obligations and
responsibilities, which only increase individual and collective burdens and dilute
the natural aspirations of the peoples of Asia and Africa. Britain's place is in
Europe and the sooner Britain finds it the better it will be for Europe and for world
peace. Britain began from Europe and to Europe she must now return. At present
her tentacles are spread far beyond her capacity. She must readjust herself to
the call of the times and reorientate her policies, primarily in respect of Europe.
The decision to reduce British military commitments in Asia is a step in that
direction.
Underdeveloped nations always find it a difficult and anxious business to

make adjustments in their relations with the Global Powers. It is much easier for
them to co-ordinate their policies in their mutual interest in improving their
bargaining positions vis-à-vis the Global Powers and to strengthen their
solidarity. It must remain a constant endeavour of the underdeveloped nations to
increase their mutual co-operation, which, being a relationship between equals,
is incapable of causing damage to the vital interest of any member of the
community.
Afro-Asian solidarity must be pursued resolutely within and outside the

United Nations. There are bound to be reverses like the failure to hold the
second Afro-Asian Conference and the crisis in the United Nations itself. So
extensive a movement for freedom and justice cannot fail to encounter
innumerable impediments, but the challenge should strengthen the resolve for
unity, which is sure to emerge in the course of time. Once the lean years of the
United Nations are over, that organization can, in fulfillment of its early promise,
still become the vehicle of progress and the shield of protection for the
underdeveloped nations of the Third World. At present the United Nations is
besieged by crises, its chief difficulty being the test it faces in the Middle East.
Some people believe that if it fails to pass this test, it will die like the League of
Nations, but it has been pronounced dead before and has managed to survive.
Once it surmounts the present troubles and reorganizes itself, it should be able to
reassert its influence and offer an effective forum to the nations of Asia, Africa,
and Latin America for influencing the course of international events and setting
into motion the power of public opinion in support of their legitimate struggles. If,
however, it sinks under the weight of present problems, there will emerge
another United Nations, more faithful and vigorous in the service of oppressed
peoples and exploited nations. Thus, there will always be an international forum
for the expression of truth and for the defence of justice. The world cannot be
turned into the real estate of the Super-Powers. With all its weaknesses, the
United Nations is an improvement on the League of Nations, and if it
disintegrates, a more efficacious world forum will come into being on its ruins.
As the weapons capable of destroying whole continents are brought
20
nearer to technical perfection, it becomes all the more imperative for the
underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America both to understand
each other more comprehensively and in a spirit of solidarity, and to work actively
for a better understanding between all developed and underdeveloped nations.
The cliché that the world is shrinking is none the less true; for the speed of
communications has rendered distance of no consequence in the calculation of
decisions affecting international peace or leading to international war. The impact
of important decisions is felt beyond the frontiers of any single country or people.
The reverberations of such decisions today extend to the four corners of the
world.
The North-South polarization of the underdeveloped nations' struggle for a

better economic relationship with the developed nations makes it incumbent on
the underdeveloped nations to articulate their common objectives in order to
strengthen their collective bargaining capacity. The North-South struggle,
however important it may be for the future welfare of the underdeveloped
nations, is overshadowed by the East-West polarization, which has the power of
inciting ideological passions. This East-West polarization is the expression of the
will to dominate the economic and social conditions of the world and therefore
carries within itself the menace of a universal holocaust capable of reducing
civilization to a heap of ashes. It is therefore necessary for the continents of Asia,
Africa, and Latin America to arrive at a new and equitable understanding with the
continent of Europe, in accordance with the requirements of contemporary
events.
After the havoc wrought by the Second World War, Europe was sick and
exhausted. Today it shows every sign of rejuvenation and its once war-weary
people appear to be destined for a happier and fuller life. The nations of East and
West Europe, having laid aside the implements of war, are now engaged in an
effort at greater co-operation. The softening of bipolarity has introduced greater
flexibility in East-West relations and created new political and economic fluidity.
This encouraging movement for European solidarity has aroused fresh hopes of
finding a solution to the remaining European problems. The chances of breaking
the stalemate seem better under European auspices free from external
intervention. To what extent the two Superpowers would permit, or be able to
control, the increasing cooperation between the nations of Eastern and Western
Europe remains to be seen; what is clearly discernible is that the mood for such
co-operation within Europe exists. This makes it all the more necessary for the
nations of the Third World to make a fresh approach to the Europe that is
emerging.
A new kind of relationship is evolving between Europe and Asia. In the

past, on account of European domination of Asia, the two continents had more
differences than mutual ties. It was inevitable that, in a relationship based on
inequality and exploitation, discords should mount between the peoples of these
two regions. With the passing of the age of physical domination, a new depth has
21
come in the relations between Europe and Asia. In the phase of altering
relationships, the peoples of Asia and Europe are beginning to explore the
similarities that unite them rather than the differences that divide them. Absurd
notions like that of the 'White Man's Burden' and the moral responsibility of a
'superior race' to civilize the 'barbarians' are exercising a diminishing influence on
the mentality of Europeans and their behaviour towards Asia. Vestiges of old
attitudes still remain, but are fast disappearing. The emphasis is now shifting to
the common denominators and to the importance of the geographical contiguity
of Asia and Europe. It must not be forgotten that the major migrations to Europe
took place from Asia; thus there is a certain intermingling of races and cultures.
Both continents have been the cradles of civilizations and from both have spread
religious thought, philosophy, science, and political ideas. Both continents have
been the scene of terrible wars and destruction. Europeans and Asians alike
should therefore be the more deeply conscious of the need to establish a just
international peace. The future holds a bright promise for greater collaboration
between Asia and Europe in making the world a better place to live in. This
opportunity should be seized imaginatively and put to good use. The years ahead
will reveal the depth of common interest. It will become more apparent when the
Great Powers redefine and readjust their objectives in the changed context of
development in Europe and Asia; when hegemonies meet with united resistance;
when fresh ground is broken in science and the general composition of events
flowing from economic and social conditions.
The importance of a universal, intercontinental understanding and

association is in no way diminished by the assertion that geography continues to
remain the most important single factor in the formulation of a country's foreign
policy. If a nation is incapable of adjusting itself to its next-door neighbour, it will
find it much more difficult to arrive at an understanding with nations situated far
away. A nation's maturity and flexibility in international relations is born of the
maturity and flexibility of its behaviour towards its immediate neighbours. Indeed,
international co-operation would be greatly facilitated if all neighbours were able
to arrive at a good understanding among themselves. Territorial disputes, which
are the most important of all disputes, arise among neighbours and create
tension in relations between neighbouring states. As with individuals the most
complex international situations arise in the conduct of relations between states
with common frontiers. Both by virtue of their proximity and the wide scope of
their mutual relations the foreign policies of neighbouring states not only tend to
intensify and aggravate differences between themselves, but they also present a
varied range of day-to-day problems. It is in this sphere, therefore, that a nation
manifests its general ability. Although in this century distance does not efface
ethnic and spiritual bonds, nevertheless geography, in its physical sense,
remains the most potent factor governing the importance of relations between
neighbouring countries. Many relations can be changed or influenced, but not the
reality of the presence of a geographical neighbour. This is a permanent factor in
the shaping of foreign policy.
22
In the conduct of foreign policy, the benefits of cultivating good relations
with countries in general, can often be neutralized by a country's failure in
relations with its neighbors. A nation's political philosophy and its social system
are subject to modification and change. Technology, material resources, and
political structures are all susceptible to change, but the physical facts of
geography are immutable. At any given time, the foreign policy of a country must
therefore represent a synthesis of variable factors with those that are fixed. Thus,
in the difficult task of formulating foreign policy and in facing international
pressure as well as the aggressive intent of adversaries, account needs to be
taken of a variety of highly complex factors, such as a nation's political
philosophy, its economic system, its cultural traditions, and its geographical
location.
This chapter has attempted to present in simple terms a very complicated

problem, and its purpose will have been served if it has succeeded in
demonstrating that the changed political situation in the world—the emergence of
three Global Powers and the struggle for the domination of men's minds all over
the world—requires great vigilance on the part of statesmen of the smaller
nations who control the destinies of their people. Their method of approach to the
Global Powers in the conduct of their foreign policy and their solidarity among
themselves will ultimately determine whether the nations they guide will retain
their independence and self-respect in the world of tomorrow.
23
CHAPTER 3
American Attitudes towards Partition and Indian

Neutralism
Situated in Asia and being an underdeveloped country, Pakistan has to adjust its
foreign policy to the world situation on the basis of progressive, enlightened
national interest infused with a desire for universal peace and justice. Pakistan is
an ideological state or, to be more precise, a state with an ideology. To the
Muslims of the sub-continent it is a God-inspired country; the expression of the
idea of justice and equality translated into reality by the process of self-
determination. Pakistan has specific international responsibilities in accordance
with its nature; it must of necessity take up such a position as will permit it to
contribute to the fullest extent in the discharge of its inner obligations, to the
consolidation of world peace and the realization of equality amongst all peoples
and nations; and will at the same time permit it to deal with its own problems.
Fired by the zeal to end domination and to achieve equality, the Muslims
of the sub-continent struggled for a separate state and were successful in
attaining Pakistan. Although there are some who still regret the division of the
sub-continent, it is quite evident that without partition none of the Muslim peoples
of pre-Partition India would have been able to protect the values they hold to be
supreme and regard as indispensable to a world freed from domination.
Practically the whole of India had been united in ancient times during the
reign of Emperor Asoka, and later at the apogee of the Mughal Empire when
Aurangzeb's fiat prevailed from one end of the sub-continent to the other. In both
cases it was an imposed unity. Polyglot India remained a rich diversity of
conflicting cultures held together by imperial orders. It was not a case of culture
and unity flowing from the fountainhead of a single nationality. Indeed, the
concept of nationality or nationhood, such as we know it, evolved much later. The
British, too, gave unity to India which, like that of Asoka and Aurangzeb before
them, was imposed on the land. This later imperial unity was remarkably
heterogeneous in nature, for parts of the country were directly ruled and parts
were ruled by princes bound to the British Crown by treaties. Even so, it was only
during the British period that the concept of nationality began to germinate in the
consciousness of Indians. In a period of a hundred and fifty years it could not be
expected to take unshakeable root. British rule, however, did arouse a feeling of
national consciousness, not in one single indivisible entity, but in two powerful
different communities, each with its own distinct culture, religion, and aspirations.
24
After the British conquest of the sub-continent, it remained their jealously
guarded preserve for over a century and a half. Except for the French and the
Portuguese who held minor possessions, the coastline of the sub-continent was
sealed off from other Powers. At one end, the Himalayas reached the skies and
ensured the isolation of the country as effectively as the oceans. Whatever
traditional contacts existed beyond the Himalayas were broken by the
conquerors to complete the isolation of 'the brightest jewel in the crown'. The
British saw India as a land of mystery and superstition, of strange contrasts, of
religions and warring chieftains. It was the heaviest burden the white man carried
in his mission to civilize the world. Having eliminated the other colonial powers,
the British went ahead alone to complete their humanizing mission. The war of
1857, called 'The Indian Mutiny', led to the barbaric suppression of the spirit of
the people. The reprisals were so severe that for succeeding decades the writ of
imperial Britain remained undisturbed by any popular uprising. The Khilafat
Movement was the next genuine universal revolt against British domination. This
Muslim movement was adroitly exploited by Mr. Gandhi for launching the
demand of the Congress for National Independence. For many years the
Congress, under the able leadership of Mr. Gandhi, held the field. The struggle
for independence and the Indian National Congress became synonymous terms.
It was much later that Mr. Muhammad Ali Jinnah, under the banner of the Muslim
League, launched the movement for self-determination of the Muslims of the sub-
continent.
The British were hostile to the Muslim demand for partition. Mr. Jinnah,
known as Quaid-i-Azam, had to face the dual opposition of the British and the
Indian National Congress in his struggle to attain Pakistan. The age of
colonialism with its prescription of 'divide and rule' was giving way to the era of
neo-colonialism, which required the enforcement of the new formula of 'unite and
rule'. The changed conditions and the corresponding demands of neo-colonialism
required the unity of the sub-continent for the maximum exploitation of larger
markets and for defence against the incursions of Communism. It was feared that
to divide the sub-continent would be to 'divide and lose'; that access to the vast
raw-material markets would be impeded, and the defence of the region
weakened against the age-old Russian ambition to control the subcontinent and
the Indian Ocean. On the basis of this appreciation, the British resisted partition
to the end.
If the British had left India 'united' as one state, there would be today four
or five national states in the sub-continent. The choice was not between leaving
India as one united country or divided into two, but between leaving India divided
as two nations, or letting it burst into fragments of not fewer than four or five
states. The creation of Pakistan has contributed to the crystallization of an Indian
nationhood. Were it not for the hatred for Pakistan prevalent in India, India would
have found it extremely difficult to restrain her polyglot provinces from breaking
away. As it is, despite the animus against Pakistan, India has been just about
25
able to maintain her unusual degree of unity. This is a factor of great significance
and one that foreign Powers would do well to remember in their endeavour to
bring about an effective reconciliation between India and Pakistan. Instead of
creating an indivisible sub-continent to face 'the Communist menace' more
effectively, the splinters might fly off in all directions to destroy the objectives of
certain Global Powers. In plain language it means that the effort to absorb
Pakistan might lead to the end of India as it stands today. Such a disintegration
would immediately invite all the disastrous consequences the West is seeking to
avoid by pressing Pakistan to confederation with India.
People who do not understand the ethos of Pakistan and whose concept
of nationhood is fixed on stereotyped territorial considerations have missed the
spirit that inspired the Pakistan Movement, the great struggle for equality in which
the Muslims chose freedom to unity. Such people are apt to rush to judgement
on the economic and defence viability of Pakistan, indeed on its very existence.
Looking at the country from a distance, and without an adequate knowledge of its
foundations, they conclude that it would have been infinitely more advantageous
to their global interests if the sub-continent had remained together. They fail to
appreciate that it is the existence of Pakistan, equally poised as an indivisible
nation at either end of the sub-continent that keeps India in one piece. If the
evenly balanced scales of Pakistan tilt one way or the other, India's equilibrium
cannot remain unaffected. How much more disagreeable would this not be for
those foreign interests which look askance at the partition of the sub-continent
into two nations?
For a fuller assessment of the problems of Pakistan and its domestic

situation it is necessary to revert to the evolution of events in the sub-continent
and of the Great Powers' approach to the two countries both before and after
Independence. An appropriate starting point would be the attitude of those
Powers to the sub-continent at the moment when India and Pakistan were at the
threshold of freedom.
Germany had already been destroyed and France, humiliated by her

defeat, was not immediately in a position to regain her global importance. With
the assistance of the Allied Powers, she sought to retake her colonies in south-
east Asia and in Africa. China had been badly mauled by Japan; nevertheless,
Chiang Kai-Shek had taken an interest in the independence of India but had
been rebuffed by the British, who regarded his efforts as unwarranted
interference in the affairs of their Empire. The Generalissimo and his wife visited
India and held discussions with Indian leaders, after which, on 12 February 1942,
Mr. Nehru spoke of the affinities between the ancient Indian and Chinese
civilizations and outlined a plan for a federation embracing India, China, Persia,
and other smaller countries, with the object of maintaining their independence
and contributing to world peace. Mr. Churchill described Generalissimo and
Madame Chiang Kai-Shek's visit to India in the following words:
26
The object of their journey was to rally Indian opinion against Japan and to
emphasize the importance for Asia as a whole, and for India and China in
particular, of Japanese defeat. The Indian Party leaders used the occasion to
bring pressure upon the British Government through the Generalissimo to yield to
the demands of Congress.
The War Cabinet could not agree to the head of a foreign State
intervening as a kind of impartial arbiter between representatives of the King
Emperor and Messrs. Gandhi and Nehru
Mr. Churchill prevailed upon the Generalissimo 'not to press the matter at a time
when unity was imperative'.
The Soviet Union had emerged as a victorious Great Power, but it had
virtually no contact with the sub-continent and its knowledge of the political
situation was incomplete. Moreover, it was more concerned with the future of
Eastern Europe and Germany. Such interest as it had in Asia was largely
confined to the northern parts of Iran, the territories of Japan, and to the fortunes
of a China beset by an internal power struggle between the Chinese Communist
Party and the Kuomintang. This does not mean that the Soviet Union was not
interested in India, but rather that there were other matters demanding prior
attention. The first essential was to face the challenge of the cold war, the focal
point of which was Europe. Britain had won the war but come out of it greatly
diminished in strength. She continued for a while to be the spokesman of the
West more for historical reasons than for those of power realities. Much before
the end of the war, it was apparent that the United States would assume the
responsibility for the leadership of the West, with Britain falling behind. As early
as 1913, Mr. Walter H. Page, the United States Ambassador to Great Britain,
wrote to President Wilson: 'The future of the world belongs to us. ... These
English are spending their capital. . . . Now what are we going to do with the
leadership of the world presently when it clearly falls into our hands? And how
can we use the English for the highest uses of democracy? In 1920 an American
writer Ludwell Denny, concluded in his book entitled America Conquers Britain:
'We were Britain's colony once. She will be our colony before she is done: not in
name, but in fact. Machines gave Britain power over the world. Now better
machines are giving America power over the world and Britain. . . . What chance
has Britain against America? or what chance has the world?'
After the Second World War there could be no doubt of the ascendancy of
the United States. However, for some years America leaned on Great Britain for
advice and diplomatic initiative, and for a period of time Britain became to the
United States what Greece had been to Rome. In this period of transition, Britain
was liquidating its Empire in India. The United States had no definite contact with
the Indian situation. It relied heavily on Britain for information and advice. It is
true that the United States was keen to see an independent India and, on
27
occasion, irritated the British by pressing them to proclaim Indian independence
at an early date. It would not be accurate to say that the United States was
opposed to partition as such, but it may certainly be said that the United States
preferred a united India and was sympathetic to the Congress demand for an
undivided India. America also agreed with the British assessment of the dangers
to Western interests of a partitioned India, but was not sufficiently familiar with
the details and nuances of the Indian political situation to take a definite position
on partition. The United States was well aware of the country's political and
geographical importance and hoped to see China and India built up as two strong
Western bastions.
Many overtures were made to the leaders of the Indian Congress in the
period of the early and mid-forties and, on 21 July 1941, it was announced that
representatives were to be exchanged between the United States and India. In
December 1941, during Mr. Churchill's visit to Washington, Mr. Roosevelt
discussed the Indian problem with him at length. Later, at the end of February
1942, President Roosevelt instructed Averell Harriman to sound Mr. Churchill on
the possibilities of a settlement between the British Government and the Indian
political leaders. In response to Mr. Harriman's visit, Mr. Churchill wrote to
President Roosevelt on 4 March 1942:
We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion Status

after the war, carrying with it, if desired, the right to secede, should be made at
this critical juncture. We must not on any account break with the Muslims, who
represent a hundred million people, and the main army elements on which we
must rely for the immediate fighting. We have also to consider our duty towards
32 to 40 million Untouchables and our treaties with the Princely States of India,
perhaps 80 millions. Naturally we do not want to throw India into chaos on the
eve of invasion
Later, the rapid Japanese advance in south-east Asia prompted President

Roosevelt to press Mr. Churchill harder on the question of independence for
India. Mr. Churchill has described the United States' pressure in the following
words:
The United States had shown an increasingly direct interest in Indian

affairs as the Japanese advance into Asia spread westwards. The concern of the
Americans with the strategy of World War was bringing them into touch with
political issues, on which they had strong opinions and little experience. Now that
the Japanese were advancing towards its frontiers, United States Government
began to express views and offer counsel on Indian affairs. . .
On 11 March 1942 President Roosevelt sent his views on the Indian

question to Mr. Churchill. Citing the example of the origins of the Government of
the United States, he suggested the setting up of what might be called a
temporary Government in India, headed by a small representative group,
28
covering different castes, occupations, religions and geographies—this group to
be recognized as a temporary dominion Government. The principal thought of
President Roosevelt's scheme was that 'it would be charged with setting up a
body to consider a more permanent Government for the whole country'.
During the Cripps Mission to India Colonel Louis Johnson, President

Roosevelt's Special Envoy to India, who remained closely in touch with the
deliberations of the Mission, said in a press interview on 22 April 1942, inter alia:
Only by throwing back the invader can India hope to take her place among
the great States of the World. We in the United States are watching with
profound interest the development of India and China, because we realize that in
Indian and Chinese hands lies the destiny of Asia; the union of these two great
Asiatic blocs in the cause of liberty may well be the greatest political
development of ten centuries.
It was during this time that President Roosevelt sought to establish direct
contact with the leaders of the Indian National Congress and sent an invitation to
Mr. Nehru to visit him in Washington, but the Congress Leaders were so
infuriated at the non-acceptance of their total demands by the Cripps Mission that
Mr. Nehru declined to visit Washington. On 26 April 1942 Mr. Gandhi made a
prophetic observation:
If the British left India to her fate, as they had to leave Singapore, non-
violent India would not lose anything. Probably the Japanese would leave India
alone. The American troops must go with the British. We know what American
aid means. It amounts in the end to American influence, if not American Rule,
added to British.
Again, on 17 May Mr. Gandhi wrote that 'America could have remained out of the
war, and even now she can do so if she divests herself of the intoxication her
immense wealth has produced. A week later he declared: 'Leave India in God's
hands, in modern parlance, to anarchy, and that anarchy may lead to internecine
warfare for a time or to unrestrained dacoities. From these a true India will rise in
place of the false one we see.
It might be mentioned that many still believe that once the demand for
partition was accepted, it would have been better to divide the country and
remove those elements of foreign supervision which inevitably remained in the
civil service, the armed forces, the police, and the judiciary. The withdrawal of
foreign elements might have led to greater bloodshed, but it would have drawn a
clearer and more natural line between India and Pakistan. It would not have
tormented the people of Pakistan with iniquitous boundary awards and, above all,
the fraud perpetrated on the people of Jammu and Kashmir by an Instrument of
Accession aided and abetted by a Head of State who was a foreigner and who
viewed the problems from the vantage point of his country's interest.
29
In December 1946 at the time of the Indian Congress and Muslim League
meetings in London, Mr. Dean Acheson, Acting Secretary of State of the United
States, wrote:
I am confident that if the Indian leaders show the magnanimous spirit

which the occasion demands, they can go forward together on the basis of the
clear provisions on this point contained in the Constitutional Plan proposed by
the British Cabinet Mission last spring to forge an Indian Federal Union in which
the elements of the population will have ample scope to achieve their legitimate
political and economic aspirations
A few months before the emergence of India and Pakistan, the Truman
Doctrine was proclaimed and this was followed, on 21 June 1947, by the
Marshall Plan to bolster the nations of Western Europe against the threat of the
Soviet Union. The principal purpose of the United States' foreign policy, to
contain Communism, had taken definite shape. The Truman Doctrine was
designed to assist Greece and Turkey against Soviet penetration and internal
Communist subversion. The Marshall Plan was conceived to prevent Communist
penetration into Western Europe and, in 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization was established to strengthen the defence of Western Europe
against the Soviet Union's military threat. In this period of tense and ferocious
confrontation with the Soviet Union Mr. Richard P. Stebbins wrote that 'The
partition of the sub-continent between these two mutually antagonistic nations
had disrupted its economic and politico-strategic unity and aggravated beyond
measure the task of governing its discrete fragments.
The views of one or more writers, however eminent, do not constitute the
policy of a government, but what can be inferred without fear of contradiction is
that Western interests required a united India in order to face the Soviet Union
more effectively and to retain large markets for economic exploitation. However,
in spite of external machinations, the Muslim demand for self-determination
became so irresistible that neither the British nor the Indian National Congress
could prevent the birth of Pakistan, the embodiment of the principle of self-
determination.
At the time when India and Pakistan became independent, the old British
Empire was crumbling. The colonial system of direct territorial domination was
being replaced by economic and financial controls in conjunction with the
maintenance of a large number of military, naval, and air bases in every country
(Indian Annual Register, 1946, vol. 2, p. 88. Richard P. Stebbins), The United
States in World Affairs, 1950, 1951, p. 317.tinent, intensive armament
preparations and a network of military alliances. This was the beginning of the
hegemony of the Global Powers. The young states of India and Pakistan came
into contact with the United States for the first time in this unfamiliar pattern of
Great Power politics. In those days the main objective of America's Asian policy
30
was to obtain the participation of India and China in the promotion of the United
States' interests in Asia. Immediately after Independence President Truman
extended an enthusiastic invitation to Prime Minister Nehru to visit the United
States, and Pandit Nehru when he went was given a splendid reception. During
the course of his visit, and subsequently, considerable efforts were made by the
United States Administration to establish a special relationship with India. When
in 1949 India agreed to remain in the British Commonwealth, The New York
Times hailed this decision as 'an historic step, not only in the progress of the
Commonwealth but in setting a limit to Communist conquests and opening the
prospect of a wider defence system than the Atlantic bloc' In the autumn of that
year Prime Minister Nehru told the United States' Congress that India would not
be neutral in a war 'for freedom and justice', and the New York Times wrote with
appreciation that 'Washington's hopes for a democratic rallying point in Asia have
been pinned on India, the second biggest Asiatic nation, and on the man that
determines India's policy— Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. Again, in August
1950, the same paper called Nehru 'in a sense the counter-weight on the
democratic side to Mao Tse-Tung. To have Pandit Nehru as ally in the struggle in
Asiatic support, is worth many divisions.
China, the other pillar in the edifice of the United States' Asian policy, was
removed by the Communist revolution when, on 1 October 1949, Mao Tse-Tung
emerged victorious. This event had a powerful impact on India, which, as a result
of the changes in China, began to play an ever more independent role in world
affairs. India sought to maintain a balanced policy between China, the Soviet
Union, and the United States, but this the United States interpreted as being
contrary to its interests and favourable to the global aims of China and the Soviet
Union. On 17 October 1949 Prime Minister Nehru declared:
Inevitably she [India] had to consider her foreign policy in terms of

enlightened self-interest, but at the same time she brought to it a touch of her
idealism. Thus she has tried to combine idealism with national interest. The main
objectives of that policy are: the pursuit of peace, not through alignment with any
major power or group of powers, but through an independent approach to each
controversial or disputed issue
Although by the middle of the fifties it had become fairly evident that India
was determined to pursue an independent neutralist foreign policy, the United
States persevered in its endeavor to extend its influence in India, notwithstanding
repeated disappointments. In December 1950 the United States signed a 'Point
Four' agreement with India and, in October 1951, Mr. Chester Bowles was sent
to that country to appraise the Indian situation and to offer generous assistance
for India's First Five Year Plan. In 1951 a mutual Defense Assistance Agreement
was signed between India and the United States, which enabled India to receive
certain military assistance from the United States without any of the
corresponding obligations that devolved on aligned states. Another Agreement
was signed by the two countries, at the beginning of 1952, for the establishment
31
of an Indo-American Technical Co-operation Fund, with further advances over a
period of five years, totaling $250 million.
While taking advantage of American unilateral overtures, India remained

steadfast in her independent foreign policy. On the question of the Japanese
Peace Treaty, the Government of India sent a note to the United States
Government announcing its inability to subscribe to that treaty. In reply to this
note, on 26 August 1951, the United States expressed regret that India would not
participate in the treaty and felt aggrieved at her decision to make a separate
peace treaty with Japan. When, in February 1953, President Eisenhower
announced the United States' policy of 'de-neutralizing' Formosa, President
Rajindra Prashad criticized it, and Mr. Nehru condemned it as the 'military
mentality' of seizing countries.
By this time increasing influence was being exerted by the United States
on the countries of what was called the 'defensive perimeter'. Especially after the
Korean war, American policy in south-east Asia was governed on the one hand
by the global conception of presidential doctrines and the 'containment' policy,
and on the other, by the concept of the 'defensive perimeter', under which Japan
in particular emerged as the central concern of United States policy in the Pacific.
After China was lost to America, the original conception of India and China as the
twin pillars of the United States' south-east Asia policy was reconstituted, with
Japan replacing China.
Pandit Nehru, however, stoutly resisted every attempt to put India in this
subservient position—to the regret of many eminent American political
commentators. Richard P. Stebbins, for example, wrote:
The refusal of the Indian Government to accept this country's

interpretation of the Far Eastern crisis and to endorse our various protective
actions against Communist China had caused lively annoyance in Washington
and for the time being destroyed the possibility of coordinated action with Asia's
leading non-communist Government. India's policy mirrored with painful clarity
the distrust of the West, the insistence on the rights of Asia's re-born peoples
On 28th August 1951, The New York Times wrote editorially under the title
'The Lost Leader':
Jawaharlal Nehru is fast becoming one of the great
disappointments to the post-war era ... to the West, he seemed (a few
years ago) a logical champion of a free democratic, anti-communist Asia,
and the India he directed was the obvious candidate for the leadership of
Asia . . . instead of seizing the leadership of Asia for its good, Nehru
turned aside from his responsibilities, proclaimed India's disinterestedness
and tried to set up an independent Third Force India, suspended in mid-air
between the two decisive movements of our day—the Communism that
32
Russia heads, and the democracy of which the United States is the
champion.
Mr. Raymond Cartier has written:
There is certainly not a country in the world where America is more

suspect as a Nation and the American more despised as an individual than in
India. Nehru has never ceased to obstruct every American effort to organise the
defence of Asia but Nehru in this case merely interprets the distrust and
animosity of his people
In The United States in its World Relations, Nelson M. Blake and Oscar T. Barck,
say of the Asian participation in SEATO:
The prestige of the alliance suffered particularly from the unwillingness of

India, Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia to participate. These nations that had
recently won their independence from Britain and the Netherlands looked with
suspicion on SEATO as a cover for the perpetuation of colonialism.... American
relations with India were clouded by mutual suspicions and misunderstandings.
Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru was determined that India should play a fully
independent role in world affairs and refused to commit his country to either the
Communist or anti-Communist blocs. . . . Indian representatives in the United
Nations were accused of playing the role of Communist stooges. Unable to
anchor its Asiatic defence lines on India, the American State Department tied
itself by alliance and military aid programmes to India's rival, Pakistan thereby
still further embittering Indian-American relations
Russell H. Fifield maintains that
At the time of the Manila Treaty negotiations [1954], all the powers directly
concerned were eager to have as wide an Asian participation as possible. India,
Burma, Ceylon and Indonesia would have been welcomed partners but they
chose to stay outside. In fact, India and Indonesia—and to a lesser extent Burma
and Ceylon—were highly critical of the Manila Conference, accusing it of creating
tensions and dividing nations
In India and America Sunderlal Poplai and Phillips Talbot wrote that
'American military help and political alliance have gone to Pakistan only and not
also to India solely because India has declined such help and association and to
conclude, as I began, with the view of Richard P. Stebbins:
Had the United States been less firmly committed to its worldwide
strategic programme, or had India been somewhat less unsympathetic to
American views on the 'cold war', this country might have hesitated to take a step
which threatened to complete the breach of confidence which had been
developing with the largest democracy in Asia. As things stood, however, Indian-
33
American relations were already in a condition that made many Americans
doubtful whether it was really possible to continue taking Indian susceptibilities
into account
Despite the many allurements held out by the United States to India, the
growing disenchantment with that country began to manifest itself in a number of
pronouncements by important American officials and political leaders. On 12
February 1951 President Truman stated:
I recognize that there are important political differences between our

Government and the Government of India in regard to the course of action which
would most effectively curb aggression and establish peace in Asia. However,
these differences should not blind us to the needs of the Indian people
India's refusal to be inveigled by the United States in the cold war forced
the United States to change its attitude towards the sub-continent. Senator
Knowland, leader of the majority party in the American Senate during the years
1952-4, was reported to be of the view that 'neutralist nations like India do not
deserve the same military or economic aid as our active allies, or an equal place
at the Conference table'. In August 1953 the United States Government came out
openly against the inclusion of India in the proposed political conference on
Korea. Secretary of State Dulles made no secret of his displeasure at some of
the actions of the Indian Government in the international field. Opposing India's
representation at the conference, he said that exclusion from such a conference
was the price she should pay for her policy of neutralism. According to United
States News World Report of 4 January 1954, Vice-President Nixon 'tended to
favor military aid to Pakistan as a counter-force to the confirmed neutralism of
Jawaharlal Nehru's India'.
It will be seen from these few but pertinent citations of official and non-
official opinion that the United States began to look for alternatives only when it
came to the distressing conclusion that India's independent neutralist policy had
taken root, and that she was unwilling to collaborate in the United States' Asian
strategy. Just as, after the victory of the Chinese Communists, Japan had
replaced China as one of the pillars of its Asian policy, so Pakistan was to
replace an India unprepared to give its allegiance to the United States' global
objectives.
However, despite the feeling that India was being disobliging, the United
States continued to entertain the hope that in the course of time she might
change her outlook; and so nothing untoward was done to displease her.
Regardless of resentment caused in the United States over India's violent
opposition to the proposal to establish a Middle East Defence Organization, in
May 1953 Mr. Dulles promised to continue American aid to enable India to
implement her Five Year Plan. In making this commitment, he paid tribute to
India's efforts in the United Nations to bring an end to the hostilities in Korea.
34
Summing up the United States' attitude towards India at this period, Blake
and Barck write:
Despite these recriminations, neither India nor the United States could
afford a serious rupture, since each needed the other. Attempting an ambitious
programme of economic development to combat the nation's desperate poverty,
India wanted American economic aid and technical assistance. And the
American Government, in turn, realised that to cut off aid to India would be to
abandon a crucial front to the Soviet Union, already showing an eagerness to
send equipment and technicians into underdeveloped countries as a means of
enlarging its political influence
Neither during the darkest period of United States-Indian relations, nor

during the brightest phase of the United States-Pakistan relations, did the United
States take a stand as an ally of Pakistan in the Indo-Pakistan disputes. It
rewarded the most outrageous Indian provocations with massive economic
assistance to that country, and accepted the complete identification of Pakistan
with its interests without allowing these factors to determine the whole range of
assistance to either country. When the United States decided to give military
assistance to Pakistan, President Eisenhower expressed his country's
willingness to give aid to India also. In a letter delivered to Prime Minister Nehru
on 24 February 1954 he wrote:
I send you this personal message because I want you to know about my
decision to extend military aid to Pakistan before it is public knowledge, and also
because I want you to know directly from me that this step does not in any way
affect the friendship we feel for India. . . . What we are proposing to do, and what
Pakistan is agreeing to, is not directed in any way against India. I am confirming
publicly that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is misused and directed
against another in aggression I will undertake immediately . . . appropriate action,
both within and without the U.N., to thwart such aggression. I believe that
Pakistani-Turkish collaboration agreement is sound evidence of the defensive
purposes which both countries have in mind. . . . We also believe that it is in the
interest of the free world that India should have a strong military defence
capability, and have admired the effective way in which your government has
administered your military establishments. If your government should conclude
that circumstances require military aid of a type contemplated by our mutual
security legislation, please be assured that your request would receive my most
sympathetic consideration
Although the United States' decision to extend military assistance to

Pakistan caused misgivings in India, Mr. Nehru remained steadfast to non-
alignment and, on 1 March 1954, rejected President Elsenhower's offer in the
following words: 'You are, however, aware of the views of my Government and
our people in regard to the matter. Those views and policy which we have
35
pursued after most careful thought are based on our desire to help in the
furtherance of peace and freedom. We shall continue to pursue that policy. On
that very day, the Prime Minister of India vehemently criticized the United States'
military assistance to Pakistan and termed it as 'intervention' in Indo-Pakistan
affairs. He observed that the United States was attempting to 'dominate' Asia and
announced that the Indian Government was no longer prepared to accept the
United States' Observers in Kashmir as neutrals. In so far as President
Elsenhower's offer was concerned, he declared that 'In making this suggestion,
the President has done less than justice to us or to himself. If we object to
military aid being given to Pakistan, we would be hypocrites and unprincipled
opportunists to accept such aid ourselves. The Mutual Security and Assistance
Agreement concluded, on 19 May 1954, between Pakistan and the United States
was followed by a Conference of eight countries at Manila in September 1954
and an agreement was reached on creating SEATO. Although Cambodia, Laos,
and South Vietnam were barred by the Geneva Armistice from entering into such
alliances, the United States included these countries within the area to be
protected against an 'armed attack'.
One year later the Baghdad Pact was concluded, and renamed CENTO
after the Iraqi coup d'etat in July 1958. In conformity with the United States' policy
of the 'defensive perimeter' and 'containment', which required enlisting key-states
into alliances and appeasing the others with economic support outside the
alliances, the United States chose not to make an outright commitment to the
Baghdad Pact in order to mollify the fears of those non-Communist states who
considered the Pact to be an 'imperialist thrust' in the region. Pakistan was
separately covered by another commitment by virtue of the Montreal Defence
Pact of 1956. Again, early in 1959 the United States signed bilateral agreements
of co-operation with Turkey, Iran, and Pakistan, which were designed to
strengthen further the military aspects of CENTO. In the preamble to the
Pakistan-United States Bilateral Agreement of Co-operation of March 1959, the
United States undertook to preserve the 'independence and integrity of Pakistan'.
Although, by this time, Pakistan had veered fully into the American sphere
of influence, the considerations prevailing in the United States' economic aid
policies remained unaffected. During the aid allocation for the fiscal year 1954-5,
Mr. Dulles stated that the largest single item—$85 million out of $307,400,000—
was earmarked for India, and urged Congress to support this request in spite of
disagreements on foreign policy between New Delhi and Washington. After
praising Mr. Nehru as a 'leader dedicated to the democratic form of Government',
he went on to say:
We believe that India's great effort to achieve economic progress should

be supported. We should remember that among free nations there is room for
diversity of views. We should not let our wish to help the people of India to
develop their nation be swayed by any temporary difference, however important.
It is essential that we continue to help, if for no other reason than to serve our
36
enlightened self interest. It would be a tragic day for us if the confidence which
people have in their democratic institutions should fail
On 10 March 1956 Mr. Dulles stated in a Press Conference in New Delhi

that he saw no reason why the supply of American arms to Pakistan should lead
to an arms race in the sub-continent. He went out of his way to extend a
reassurance to India:
There can be every confidence on the part of India that there will be no
use of these armaments in any aggressive way against India. Pakistan knows
that if that should happen, there will be a quick ending of its good relations with
the US, and that, under the UN Charter, the USA would support India if she
became a victim of any armed aggression
In a special foreign aid message on 31 March 1959, President Eisenhower

declared that collective security would become more rather than less important
as we moved into the age of missile weapons. The friendly nations in whose
territory many of these weapons would be deployed, he said needed the
continued assurance of American help to their forces and defence. Some 250
bases 'in the most strategic locations, many of them of vital importance', had
been made available for the use of American forces by other members of the free
world. 'Dollar for dollar', the President insisted, 'our expenditure for the mutual
security programme after we have once achieved a reasonable military posture
for ourselves, will buy more military security than far greater additional
expenditures for our own forces.'
37
CHAPTER 4
India seeks American Support against

China
With the United States' policy well grounded on the concept of military
alliances, it was not surprising that the warmth of the United States-Pakistan
relations continued to increase during the late fifties, reaching their highest point
just when India's relations with China suddenly deteriorated in late 1958 and
early 1959. United States-Pakistan relations endured some slight tremors during
the Ladakh clashes and some more severe ones when the Sino-Indian border
dispute began to intensify. In these developments the United States saw a great
new opportunity—that of realizing its long-cherished ambition to spread its
influence over India.
1959 marked the end of one era and the beginning of another. Mr. Manzur
Qadir was then Foreign Minister of Pakistan and I was in New York leading
Pakistan's delegation to the United Nations General Assembly. In a letter
addressed to him from there, I gave warning that the conflict in Ladakh would
give rise to many changes in the sub-continent. The Dulles era had come to an
end and a new situation was evolving for which the inflexible diplomacy of 1945-
58 would no longer be suitable. The conditions of the forties and early fifties had
altered radically. Europe was changing and there were changes in the Soviet
Union; the world was moving away from the dogmas of Dulles to the spirit of
Camp David. These and other developments in Asia and elsewhere called for a
reorientation of the United States' foreign policy. The changes came sooner than
expected by Pakistan. The regime, which was closer to the United States than
any previous Government, was not psychologically prepared to accommodate
itself to the changes caused by the rigidity of American post-war policies.
The magnitude of the change can be measured, in economic terms, by the

fact that at 30 June 1959 American economic aid to India in the twelve years
since Independence was officially valued at over $1,705 million, including $931
million in agricultural commodities and some $774 million in other forms of
assistance. As against this amount, as much as $4 billion were given in
economic aid to India during 1959-63.
In May 1959 Senator Wiley Smith, who had then returned from a tour of
south-east Asia, gave the following testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee:
There is no doubt of the fact in my mind from talking to Nehru and his
close advisers, that there was some concern about the Red Chinese and their
38
operations on the border. . . . From the standpoint of the United States, it is a
hopeful sign that the Indian Government is becoming somewhat alarmed over
Red Chinese operations and is conscious of that fact, as explained to me by
some of the leaders, that Red China has made great forward strides in
industrialization under a totalitarian system, whereas India has moved much
more slowly because of its intention to act only under democratic processes, and
with full concurrence of the Indian Legislature.
Perhaps for the first time military aid to Pakistan was seriously criticized in these
hearings, although it was concluded that for five years it should continue at the
current level, but emphasis was laid on the importance of building up Indian
strength against China. The document entitled United States Foreign Policy,
compiled by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in August 1959, set out the
following objectives:
1. Use of bilateral aid to stimulate co-operation among the developing

countries of Asia.
2. Re-examination of the role of local military forces and US bases in Asia

in relation to US strategic, political, and economic objectives.
3. Inclusion of the countries concerned to undertake regional accords

against Communism. India and Pakistan were specifically mentioned in
this connection.
While changes in the United States' policies were taking shape, American
commentators were for the first time critical of the system of alliances and
Pakistan's inclusion in them. In The United States in World Affairs 1959 Mr.
Richard P. Stebbins said: 'In effect, the formation of SEATO in 1954 divided
South and Southeast Asia politically in much the same way that the Baghdad
Pact was to divide the Middle East a year later. Correspondingly, the need for
support to India and other non-aligned countries began to be increasingly felt in
the United States. Mr. Stebbins goes on to say:
Many students of Asian affairs felt that there was even more urgent work
to be accomplished in this second field—the building of healthy national
societies—than in the field of military defence to which the United States had felt
compelled to give its main attention through most of the 1950s. Action in this
latter realm could at least be conducted over a much broader front, since even
the neutral countries in the area were usually willing to accept outside help for
non-military purposes if it was obtainable 'without strings' and on terms
compatible with their own dignity. All of these countries, from Afghanistan to the
Philippines, were aware that their progress as modern states was being seriously
retarded by unfavourable economic and social conditions. . . .
39
Many Western observers considered the successful implementation of
India's successive five year economic plans to be of crucial importance not only
for India itself but for the whole cause of Asian independence. ...
With a population now estimated at 415 million and increasing by seven

million a year, India's need for accelerated economic development was so great
that the United States could scarcely resent its acceptance of aid from
Communist as well as free world quarters, especially when the Indians had given
so many proofs that they did not intend to allow their independence to be
compromised. The border skirmish of November 1959 in Ladakh established the
seriousness of the Sino-Indian differences and prompted President Eisenhower
to undertake a tour of Asia on which he wanted to discuss regional problems with
Mr. Nehru against the background of the Sino-Indian border controversy. The
President expressed satisfaction at the outcome of these discussions and hoped
for an era of better understanding between the United States and the largest
democracy in Asia. In January 1961 Senator John F. Kennedy became President
of the United States. He was among those liberal Democratic Senators who had
doubted the wisdom of President Eisenhower's policy of establishing a rigid
system of alliances against Communism. Such a system seemed to him not only
outmoded but likely to diminish Western influence over non-Communist nations.
As a Senator, Kennedy had already shown his unhappiness over what he
considered to be the neglect of India, which, in his estimation, occupied a
position of pivotal importance in the American strategy of containing Communism
in Asia. He elaborated these views in the Senate on 25 March 1958:
Mr. President, let us recall again the profile of the Asian Continent. India
with its nearly 400 million souls and China a country in the neighborhood of 600
million. Let us not be confused by talk of Indian neutrality. Let us remember that
our nation also during the period of its formative growth adopted a policy of non-
involvement in the great international controversies of the nineteenth century.
Nothing serves the ultimate interests of all the West better than the opportunity
for the emergent uncommitted nations of the world to absorb their primary
energies now in programmes of real economic improvement.
This is the only basis on which Asian and African nations can find the
political balance and social stability which provide the true defence against
Communist penetration. Our friendships should not be equated with military
alliances or 'voting the Western ticket'. To do so only drives these countries
closer to totalitarianism or polarizes the world in such a way as to increase rather
than diminish the chances for local war.
In considering the economic future of India, we shall do well to recall that

India has passed the point of economic take-off and is launched upon an effort
which will by the end of the century make her one of the big powers of the world,
with a population of just under one billion and capable of harnessing all the
resources of modern science, technology, and destruction. No greater challenge
40
exists in the future than the peaceful organization of a world society which
includes not only the wealthy industrial States of America, Western Europe, and
Russia, but also powerful new industrial states in Asia, Latin America, Africa and
the Middle East. How these states emerge from their period of economic
transition will not only color but quite likely caste the historic setting of the next
generation. This question was recently set in these words by Professor W. W.
Rostow before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee:
Shall these new powerful States emerge to maturity from a totalitarian

setting, their outlook dominated by bitter memories of colonialism and by
memories of painful transition made without help while the rich West stands by,
concerned only with the problems of defence? Or shall these States emerge from
a democratic setting, built on human values, shared with the West, and on
memories of shared adventure in the decisive periods of transition?
The answer to this question will not be long in the making if we do not act
now and over the next few years, for India, the most important of all the non-
committed States, has entered its formative period. A successful Indian
programme is important at least as such for the example it can set for the
economic future of other underdeveloped countries as for its own sake. The
United States, Western Europe, and Japan have it in their power to make a
demonstration that the democratic process is a persuasive method of creation,
not frustration. . . . India today represents as great a hope, as commanding a
challenge, as Western Europe did in 1947—and our people are still, I am
confident, equal to the effort
In his conversations with John Fischer, the following question and

President Kennedy's answer are revealing:
Q: Do you think it was a mistake for us, under Mr. Dulles' administration, to try to
force a good many of these underdeveloped countries into military pacts with us?
KENNEDY. ... I would say that Mr. Dulles was probably more successful in
Germany, really, than he was in some of these other areas. The Aswan Dam
refusal, the concept of the Baghdad Pact, which was his, and the Eisenhower
Doctrine, which is being rejected really in every country—all these, I would think,
are unhappy monuments to Mr. Dulles in the Middle East.
However, before the 1959 Sino-Indian clash in Ladakh, Senator Kennedy was
not prepared to support India at the cost of alienating Pakistan. This is borne out
by the following extract from a speech he delivered before the Senate on 25
March 1958: our special and valued treaty relationships and military pacts with
Pakistan do not make possible such an international effort for India. I myself have
for some time investigated the possibility of devising a programme which would
jointly serve the needs of India and Pakistan.
41
I have regretfully concluded that the current political cleavages between
India and Pakistan do not allow such a programme. . . . The choice is not one
between India and Pakistan. Our responsibility is to aid each in its basic
development programmes. I hope the time is not far off when these types of
multilateral efforts can be adopted to aid the economic growth of Pakistan
But in his speech in California on 1 November 1959, when Sino-Indian

border tension was rife, Senator Kennedy decided to give all-out support to India:
Whatever battles may be in the headline, no struggle in the world

deserves more time and attention from this Administration—and the next—than
that which now grips the attention of all Asia: the battle between India and China.
...
And that is the struggle between India and China for the economic and
political leadership of the East, for the respect of all Asia, for the opportunity to
demonstrate whose way of life is the better. . . .
It should be obvious that the outcome of this competition will vitally affect
the future of all Asia—the comparative strength of Red and free nations—and
inevitably the security and standing of our own country. India's population is
larger than the total population of the continents of Africa and South America
combined. Unless India can compete equally with China, unless she can show
that her way works as well as or better than dictatorship, unless she can make
the transition from economic stagnation to economic growth, so that it can get
ahead of its exploding population, the entire Free World will suffer a serious
reverse. India herself will be gripped by frustration and political instability, its role
as a counter to the Red Chinese in Asia will be lost and Communism will have
won its greatest bloodless victory. . . .
It is not enough that we participate on a crash basis, for temporary relief.

We must be willing to join with other Western nations in a serious long-range
programme of long-term loans, backed up by technical and agricultural
assistance—designed to enable India to overtake the challenge of Communist
China. . . .
We want India to win that race with Red China. We want India to be a free
and thriving leader of a free and thriving Asia. But if our interest appears to be
purely selfish, anti-communist, and part of the Cold War—if it appears to the
Indian people that our motives are purely political—then we shall play into the
hands of Communist and neutralist propagandists, cruelly distort America's
image abroad, and undo much of the psychological effect that we expect from
our generosity
With regard to military pacts, he reiterated on 9 February 1959 that they
42
provide no long-term solutions. On the contrary, they tend dangerously to
polarize the Middle East, to attach us to specific regimes, to isolate us very often
from the significant nationalist movements. Little is accomplished by forcing the
uncommitted nations to choose rigidly between alliance with the West or
submission to international Communism. Indeed, it is to our self-interest not to
force such a choice in many places, specially if it diverts nations from absorbing
their energies in programmes of real economic improvement and take-off
On 14 June 1960 Senator Kennedy attacked the policies of the

Eisenhower Administration in the following terms:
To be sure, we have, in 1960, most of the formal tools of foreign policy: we

have a defence establishment, a foreign aid programme, a Western alliance, a
disarmament committee, an information service, an intelligence operation and a
National Security Council. But we have failed to appraise and re-evaluate these
tools in the light of our changing world position. We have failed to adapt these
tools to the formulation of a long-range, coordinated strategy to meet the
determined Soviet programme for world domination—a programme which
skilfully blends the weapons of military might, political subversion, economic
penetration and ideological conquest. We are forced to rely upon piecemeal
programmes, obsolete policies and meaningless slogans. We have no fresh
ideas to break the stalemate in Germany, the stalemate over arms control, the
stalemate in Berlin and all the rest. We have as our grand strategy only the arms
race and the cold war. . . .
So let us abandon the useless discussions for who can best 'stand up to
Khrushchev' or whether a 'hard' or 'soft' line is preferable. Our task is to rebuild
our strength, and the strength of the free world—to prove to the Soviets that time
and the course of history are not on their side, that the balance of world power is
not shifting their way—and that therefore peaceful settlement is essential to
mutual survival. Our task is to devise a national strategy—based not on eleventh-
hour responses to Soviet-created crises, but a comprehensive set of carefully
prepared, long-term policies designed to increase the strength of the non-
communist world
When Mr. Kennedy became President of the United States he was in a

position to put his plans into practice. His country's relations with India and
Pakistan were now to be governed by the philosophy of 'containing' Communism
through a ring of economically strengthened, free, and neutral nations, supported
by United States' military power against Communist encroachment. The
emphasis on greater economic aid was designed to provide markets for United
States' goods in order to maintain pro-West links with the recipient countries. The
value of military bases and alliances was greatly reduced by spectacular
advances made in military technology. These developments, among others, were
responsible for the shift in emphasis from military support to further economic
collaboration. The ability 'to fire a missile from the United States, under our
43
control, in case of a threatened attack or if a vital interest of ours was
endangered', had the virtue of reducing dependence on allies who, on account of
the American military bases in their territories, tended to compromise the United
States' freedom of action in the service of its interests in international relations.
Shortly after his inauguration President Kennedy took a number of decisions
which soon began to affect the United States' relations with India and Pakistan.
His admiration for Nehru was revealed when, in his address to a joint session of
Congress, he declared: 'I can vividly recall sitting where you sit now ... the
undimmed eloquence of Churchill, the soaring idealism of Nehru, the steadfast
words of de Gaulle'.
Corresponding changes in India's attitude were seen in the United

Nations, where she collaborated with the United States on the Congo issue and
opposed the Soviet Union's campaign against Secretary-General Dag
Hammarskjold. American grievances against India's past actions in the United
Nations were fast beginning to disappear and, indeed, she was encouraged to
take initiatives on questions concerning Africa and Asian affairs. Simultaneously,
negotiations were undertaken to provide India with massive economic assistance
for her new Five Year Plan in the form of Long Term Development Fund loans at
very low interest rates repayable over a forty- to fifty-year term. President
Kennedy was reported to be ready to earmark nearly one third of the proposed
new Development Fund for India. Vice-President Johnson was made to
undertake a tour of Asia on a mission to establish a new equilibrium between the
United States and India and other non-aligned States. During his visit to India he
declared: 'I am confident without reservation that India and the United States will
continue to build a friendly and a wholesome relationship. This I can assure you
is very much welcome on the part of America. Our President John F. Kennedy's
high regard for India and India's leadership needs no reiteration beyond the
presence here of Ambassador Galbraith.' Senator Fulbright, Chairman of the
United States Senate Foreign Relations Committee, observed that it was for
India and other nearby countries to play a more active military and economic role
in the defence of the area. On 6 May 1961 Mr. Averell Harriman, the United
States' Roving Ambassador, was reported to have told Mr. Nehru that it was the
view of the United States' Administration that certain neutral countries of Asia
should underwrite the neutrality of Laos.
George E. Jones, a staff reporter for United States News and World
Report, wrote that 'Jawaharlal Nehru, Prime Minister of India, is turning out to be
a top favourite of the Kennedy Administration among statesmen of the world.' He
disclosed that the proposed massive economic aid to India was designed to link
India and Nehru securely to the West. Indian behaviour, he stated, 'was also
supporting this thesis as Nehru "lined up" against the Soviet attempt to unseat
Dag Hammarskjold as Secretary-General of the United Nations. He moved
Indian troops into the Congo at a time when the United Nations' force there
seemed about to collapse. In Laos, he supported British moves for a cease-fire
and urged Khrushchev to accept them.'
44
On 18 May 1961 Krishna Menon, attending the 14-Nation Conference on
Laos in Geneva, joined the Western powers in objecting to the veto provision
sought by the Soviet Union in its 'peace plan'. The previous month, twenty-four
hours after attacking United States' 'intervention' in Cuba, Nehru conveniently
changed his tune—calling Mr. Kennedy 'dynamic' and suggesting that 'there
might be two sides to the Cuban story'. He also said that 'at present. President
Kennedy and his top advisers say that Nehru can become a firm friend of the
West. That, they say, would bring large dividends to the United States in India
and other under-developed parts of the world.' This growing demonstration of
confidence was again made in June 1961, when the Indian Ambassador to
Washington, Mr. M. C. Chagla, on the eve of his return to India said:
When I came here neutralism was distrusted and suspected. Today it has
become respected . . . the switch in American policy is so great that America now
wants neutral states in Africa and Southeast Asia . . . and take economic aid.
What we have been proposing for a long time—long-term loans in support of
social justice and not propping up reactionary Governments—this is now
completely accepted here, at least by the White House as demonstrated in
President Kennedy's proposals
As well as President Kennedy and some of his advisers, there were many
other leading Democrats who expressed themselves enthusiastically in favour of
India. Many of them began to question military assistance to Pakistan. Mr.
Chester Bowles, for instance, said that 'it was bad arithmetic to alienate 360
million Indians in order to please 80 million Pakistanis who are split in two halves
and divided by 1 ,000 miles of Indian territory'. Senator Fulbright observed that
the 'American military aid to Pakistan was much excessive and that this policy
forced India, because of the apprehension caused by Pakistan, to deviate funds
from economic development'.
The turn of events in the sub-continent rekindled not only all the old
passions for India but also the known prejudices against partition. Voices were
again heard criticizing the division of the country on the anachronistic concept of
religion and questioning the whole viability of a country the two parts of which are
separated by a thousand miles of hostile territory. The cold arithmetic of Mr.
Chester Bowles, who calculated his conclusions in terms of population and
territorial length and breadth, was subjected to renewed scrutiny. Nehru's
troublesome policies and the irritation generated by his non-alignment were
forgotten, as was the fidelity with which Pakistan attached itself to the United
States' interest. Undoubtedly, substantial economic and military assistance was
rendered to Pakistan, but it was not without an adequate quid pro quo. Pakistan
had undertaken to stretch her defence commitments against the Communist
Powers without a categorical assurance with regard to her security against India.
She had incurred the hostility of the Soviet Union, which openly supported
Afghanistan and India against Pakistan. The policy of alignment also damaged
45
Pakistan's image in the United Nations, strained her relations with neighbouring
Islamic Arab states, and drove her towards isolation in the community of Asia
and Africa. The changes in the sub-continent and on the Himalayan frontiers had
erased with a single stroke both the services of Pakistan and the antagonisms
against India.
On 6 June 1961 the Consortium pledged a total of $2 billion aid to India

out of which the United States alone pledged $15 billion, which was more than
half the total. According to Time magazine of 9 June 1961, the United States'
eagerness to give aid to India had 'startled' its aid partners in the Consortium. As
against this, Pakistan's relatively meagre requirement of $945 million was
slashed by the same Consortium. Simultaneously, it was heard that military aid
would also be granted to India after adequate provision had been made in the
Mutual Security Act for aid to neutrals. Defence Secretary McNamara was
reported to have testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that all
the four conditions of the Mutual Security Act, which required a recipient nation
'to ally itself politically and militarily, with the free world against the Communist
bloc' were to be removed as they were 'not appropriate in agreements for
essential military assistance to the newly independent nations'. He further
asserted that India had achieved greater stability than her neighbour, Pakistan,
due to her 'able political administrative traditions', and suggested that the
conditions of the Security Act be removed in the case of India. This departure
from established policy was yet another sign of the new philosophy of aid,
tailored to suit India's special requirements. These events necessitated a meeting
between President Kennedy and President Ayub Khan, who went to the United
States in July 1961 to make renewed efforts to restore the relationship of
confidence between Pakistan and the United States. The hesitant manner in
which aid was now extended to Pakistan was described by President Ayub Khan,
on 9 July 1961in a television interview in London:
Now in respect of India, the United States made a special effort with the
other contributing countries to persuade them to match the United States' effort.
The United States went out of her way to bequeath a billion dollars as their
contribution at a time when the Indian plan was not even worked out.
In our case, all sorts of objections were raised. Some were genuine while
some were, to my mind, spurious—the sort of things which are designed to put
off a caller. There did not seem to be a real effort to recognise the situation. And I
don't think the United States made any special effort. If they had expected the
other contributing countries to match the United States' effort, they should have
told them that there will be this call too, and that the United States expects them
to do this, that or the other.
All I say is that USA did not make any real effort in this regard. But let us
hope that this performance will be improved next time
46
The result of the discussions between the two Presidents, as revealed in
their joint communique and President Ayub Khan's statement after the meeting,
can be summarized as follows:
1. Pakistan's alliance with the United States had been strengthened and
misgivings in the mind of President Ayub had been removed;
2. President Kennedy had agreed to raise the question of Kashmir with Mr.
Nehru and impress upon him the necessity of bringing about a just and
peaceful solution of the problem;
3. Pakistan had been assured that its military problems would not be made
difficult, and if and when arms aid was given in this region Pakistan would
be consulted. It was further assured that military aid would not be given in
this region unless there was a very good cause for giving it;
4. The United States was not selling any armaments to India;
5. Pakistan's economic-aid requirements would be fully met;
6. The United States would assist Pakistan financially and technically in
solving problems of waterlogging and salinity.
President Ayub Khan expressed satisfaction at the repaired relations, but as

subsequent events showed. President Kennedy had made some accommodation
to Pakistan's needs chiefly because the Sino-Indian conflict of 1959 had not yet
been extended. There was speculation on whether the differences would be
resolved or become wider. In 1961, during President Ayub Khan's visit to the
United States, it was not fully realized how deep Sino-Indian differences had
become; an enlarged conflict or a rapprochement were both possible. At this
juncture it would not have been expedient to antagonize Pakistan further by
continuing to take one measure after another in India's support and against
Pakistan's interest. The uncertainty of future developments in the sub-continent
called for at least a temporary acceptance of the status quo. Time would reveal
how deep was the breach in Sino-Indian relations. The Colombo Powers were
meanwhile engaged in finding a mutually acceptable solution to a conflict that
was more the result of a punitive expedition than an invasion.
This period of marking time was destined to be brief. During Nehru's visit
to Washington, in November of the same year, President Kennedy compared him
with Abraham Lincoln and Roosevelt. No mention was made of Kashmir in the
joint communique, which referred to almost all international problems including
Berlin, a Nuclear Test Ban Treaty, general and complete disarmament, Laos, and
the Congo. That this visit was undertaken shortly before India's attack on Goa in
December 1961 is clearly significant. It appears that after his meetings with
President Kennedy, Mr. Nehru was in a position to ascertain that the United
States would not stand in his way on account of Portuguese membership of
NATO. When there was an uproar in the United States over India's seizure of
Goa, Dr. Henry Kissinger, President Kennedy's Special Emissary, was sent, in
early January 1962, to reassure the Indians that the United States did not intend
to take any action against India. On 6 January Dr. Kissinger declared in New
47
Delhi that 'we are not going to spite India because of Goa, in the matter of the
Kashmir dispute when it is raised before Security Council'. On the subject of
Pakistan-China relations Dr. Kissinger is reported to have said that if Pakistan
were 'stupid enough' to make an alliance with China, 'how long would Asia
survive without a strong, independent India?' He also promised the Indians that
the United States would support India against invasion from China as it could not
permit China to destroy India. As for Portuguese membership of NATO, Dr.
Kissinger is reported to have said that he never thought it wise to have included
Portugal in the alliance. According to him, Portugal had become a NATO
member because at that time America was suffering from a disease called
'Pactitis'. Speaking in Calcutta on 15 January he touched upon Pakistan-China
relations and said that he could not believe that Pakistan could make a military
alliance with China. He is further reported to have said 'it is inconceivable to me
that Pakistan would encourage any aggression against India', and added that it
would be inconsistent 'on the part of Pakistan to have military alliance with
Communist China as well as the United States though Pakistan has recognized
Communist China'. He explained that one reason why he considered an alliance
between Pakistan and China to be improper was that Pakistan was allied with the
United States and that 'it would not be in the interest of India and Pakistan to
bring Communism into the sub-continent to settle their disputes over an issue'. In
the same speech he went on to observe that there was no real possibility of
Pakistan's entering into an alliance with China to enhance its 'bargaining power'.
Explaining the objectives of United States' aid, Dr. Kissinger said that there were
two objectives: to stop Communism and to build up a free and prosperous
society. In this connection he affirmed that if India used force to 'drive away'
China from Indian territory, the United States would be 'most sympathetic' to
whatever action the Government of India took against China. In addition to these
important declarations made by President Kennedy's Special Emissary,
Secretary of State Dean Rusk stated on 7 January that India's action in Goa did
not affect American determination to aid India.
These expressions of encouragement to, if not connivance at, India's

seizure of Goa, emboldened Indian leaders like the Congress President Sanjiva
Reddy to declare on 4 January that India was 'determined to get Pakistani and
Chinese aggression on its soil vacated before long'. He further asserted that
'Cease-fire in Kashmir could not be accepted as a permanent solution of the
problem. The whole country is behind the Government in liberating the one-third
of Kashmir under Pakistan's illegal occupation.'
The Sino-Indian border conflict of October 1962 removed all doubts as to

America's complete support for India. It was now decided to support India even at
the risk of alienating Pakistan. This was the opportunity for which the United
States had been yearning from the time of Partition—its cherished dream was
coming to reality.
48
The rout of the Indian Army in Ladakh and NEFA evoked immediate
reactions in the United States. Without so much as consulting Pakistan, Western
allies of the United States were mobilized to render military assistance to India. In
the meantime China unilaterally declared a cease-fire and withdrew its forces;
but Mr. Nehru encouraged by the quick and zealous response of the West—and
in particular of the United States— declared, in December 1962, that India would
continue its military preparations even if the Sino-Indian border dispute was
settled. He emphasized that India would make every effort to drive its enemy
from the India borders. On 10 December Mr. Averell Harriman observed that the
Sino-Indian conflict would endure for a long time; and therefore the United States
should continue giving military aid to India. He expressed approval of India's
relations with the Soviet Union, which he declared to be in the United States'
interest. Nehru said that the Soviet Union had made it clear that it had no
objection to India's receiving military and other forms of aid from the United
States and Britain.
In the same month, Nehru stressed the historic ties between India and
Pakistan and declared that 'confederation remains our ultimate goal, though if we
say it they are alarmed and say we want to swallow them up'. At the same time
he emphasized that an overall settlement with Pakistan would not be possible
while the war with China continued. On 28 December Pakistan and China agreed
to sign a boundary treaty. Mr. Galbraith, American Ambassador to India,
commented on this news by saying that 'Pakistan should consider American aid
as an effort to counter the menace of Communist aggression'.
During these developments President Kennedy and Prime Minister

Macmillan met at Nassau, on 18 December, and agreed on an arms aid plan for
India amounting to about $120 million, half of which was to be contributed by the
British Commonwealth. To buttress the American aid in the military field with
political support, Mr. Galbraith informed the Indian Foreign Secretary on 27
December that the United States' aid to fight China was not contingent upon a
Kashmir settlement. By giving such an assurance to India before the conclusion
of negotiations between India and Pakistan on the Kashmir dispute, the United
States wrecked the possibilities of an Indo-Pakistan settlement and so, by its own
action, furthered close relations between Pakistan and China. The Indian attitude
to the Kashmir negotiations became increasingly negative on account of the
repeated assurances given by the United States' Administration that the
settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute was not linked with the United
States' economic and military support to India. These assurances, coupled with
the fact that the Sino-Indian border conflict was over, made India all the more
intransigent and brought about a collapse of the Kashmir negotiations. The
assurances given by Mr. Galbraith were further supported by Secretary of State
Dean Rusk, and reiterated by Mr. Galbraith. Mr. Rusk stated in March 1963 that
while the United States' Government believed it 'very important for the security of
the entire subcontinent, that India and Pakistan resolve their problems between
them ... I would not in any sense qualify our aid purpose by this word "condition".'
49
Mr. Galbraith restated in late April 1963 that American aid to India was not
dependent on a settlement of the Kashmir dispute; and Mr. Nehru also
confirmed, in the Lok Sabha on 7 May, that both Mr. Duncan Sandys and Mr.
Rusk had assured him that Britain and the United States were not linking the
question of military aid to India with a settlement of the Kashmir dispute.
Such an attitude not only jeopardized the settlement of the Jammu and
Kashmir dispute, but threatened the territorial integrity of Pakistan. The United
States remained unmindful of the dangers to which Pakistan drew attention and
believed that Pakistan was exaggerating India's threat to its security. Not content
with extending its influence in India at a cost to Pakistan, the United States
showed its disapproval of Pakistan's taking counter-measures to protect its
security and territorial integrity. Pakistan's efforts to improve relations with China
were misrepresented and attacked in the United States. Double standards were
being applied without hesitation. The altered international conditions required the
United States to alter its position on alignment and non-alignment, but a
corresponding adjustment on the part of Pakistan was not to be tolerated. The
Washington Evening Star of 25 July 1963 declared:
Pakistan's fears are understood here, without being respected, and in no

sense are they being allowed to dominate American plans for the security of this
troubled area. Pakistan may swiftly have reason to repent its decision if it
chooses to dilute its alliance with America by co-operation with China.
Yet another pledge to support India was made by Mr. Chester Bowles, the
new American Ambassador to India, when, in May 1963, he stated that the
United States was 'very anxious to help' India build up her military strength
against China. He added 'the only thing to be determined now was the amount of
military aid that the Indians can absorb'. On the conclusion of the Indian
President's visit to the United States, the joint communiqué issued by President
Kennedy and the President of India recorded that: 'their two countries share a
mutual defensive concern to thwart the designs of Chinese aggression against
the sub-continent. Both the Presidents recognized the vital importance of
safeguarding the freedom, independence, and territorial integrity of India for
peace and stability not only in Asia but in the world. On 30 July President
Kennedy and Premier Macmillan decided at Birch Grove to provide a United
States-Commonwealth umbrella to India in order to 'familiarize' the Indian Air
Force with supersonic fighter-bombers; and to draw up schemes to provide
further military aid to strengthen her defences against the threat of renewed
Chinese Communist attack. Shortly after, the United States was reported to have
offered a foreign exchange loan of $80 million to finance an atomic power station
at Tarapur near Bombay, designed to be one of the largest in the world.
Unconcerned with the many actions prejudicial to the security of Pakistan,

the United States continued to express its dissatisfaction over the growing
relations between China and Pakistan. In July 1963, commenting on the Air
50
Agreement between Pakistan and China, a Press Officer of the State Department
stated that the air link 'could have an adverse effect on efforts to strengthen the
security and stability of the sub-continent, which the Chinese Communists want
to prevent'. This was followed by General Lucius Clay's remarks, during his
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, to the effect that he
did not believe that the United States can let 'Pakistan dictate our course of
action with regard to her neighbor'.
Concluding that the breach between the nations of the subcontinent was
final, the United States decided to ignore Pakistan's fears and render long-term
military assistance to India. This left Pakistan with the following alternatives:
1. she could liquidate the American bases on her territory and withdraw
simultaneously from the bilateral military agreements and from CENTO
and SEATO. At the same time she could seek to reach a long-term
agreement with the Soviet Union over the supply of military equipment,
and make a security pact with the People's Republic of China;
2. she could decide to adopt these measures, but only implement them
gradually in response to countermeasures on the part of the United
States;
3. while making no overt changes of alignment, she could conclude secret
agreements with China;
4. she could retain her existing alignment and make no diplomatic overtures
to China and the Soviet Union; or
5. she could play an opportunist role, following no fixed policy, but trimming
her sails as the wind blew from one direction or another.
I will say nothing here of the merits and demerits of the various courses
open to the Government of Pakistan.
51
CHAPTER 5
America aids India and ignores Pakistan
The shift in India's foreign policy did not escape the notice of the non-aligned
nations of Asia and Africa. Dr. Subandrio, the Foreign Minister of Indonesia, an
important non-aligned nation in the community of Asia and Africa, observed on
26 June 1963 that there had been a major shift in his country's foreign policy,
because of the 'selfish and heartless attitude of India'. Mr. R. G. Senanayake, a
member of the Ceylonese Parliament, gave warning of a potential threat that
India might invade Ceylon, and added that 'despite Gandhism, India was doing
everything to become an imperialist power by amassing American weapons
including warships and submarines'. He went on to declare that 'India's target is
Ceylon and not China'. Similar declarations, expressing alarm at India's growing
military strength and its abandonment of non-alignment, were made by other
prominent Afro-Asian statesmen.
These apprehensions notwithstanding, on 27 July 1963, Mr. Nehru

defended India's acceptance of the Western offer of joint air exercises and
military equipment by emphasizing that it did not mean any change in the
country's foreign policy of neutrality. Later in the year, however, he rejected
Western 'air cover' on the ground that foreign bases on Indian soil would
compromise India's non-aligned status. In the meantime, it was reported that the
Indian request for $100 million emergency military aid was being considered, in
addition to the aid promised at Nassau. Moreover, in August 1963, the Aid to
India Consortium increased that year's contribution from various countries to
India's Third Five Year Plan from $915 million to $1,000 million. The largest
additional donor was the United States with an increased contribution of $60
million. In contrast to this, the quantum of aid to Pakistan was not only being
increased, but some of that already pledged by the United States International
Agencies was being cut back. The outstanding retraction in the pledged aid was
made in the case of the gigantic Tarbela Dam. The delaying tactics over the
Steel Mill project, and the suspension of funds for the Dacca Airport, are further
examples of that policy. These changes were made despite the World Bank's
expressed satisfaction at the utilization of aid in Pakistan and an adverse
comment on the misuse of aid funds by India. Congressman Gross pointed out in
the House of Representatives that, because the World Bank report was
unfavorable to India, the United States' Administration considered it advisable to
suppress it.
Feeling assured of continued assistance without any prior conditions on

Kashmir, Mr. Nehru declared in the Lok Sabha on 13 August 1963 that' "the
concessions" which we offered to Pakistan [for a settlement of the Kashmir
dispute] are no longer open and they must be treated as withdrawn'.
52
Commenting on Mr. Nehru's volte face, The Washington Post said that: Nehru
speaks from his own bitter experience of personal failure in the thirty-year search
for a Hindu-Muslim peace prior to partition when he argues that the overall tenor
of Indo-Pakistan relations might well remain essentially the same after the
Kashmir settlement. Pakistan would still be reliving the trauma of partition. India
would still be the great power of the region and would be more determined than
ever after relinquishing Kashmir to exact Pakistan's acknowledgement of the
intrinsic power relationship between the two countries.
As Pakistan's relations with the United States slipped from one crisis to
another, President Kennedy felt it necessary to touch upon the complexity of the
United States' relations with India and Pakistan, saying in a press statement on
12 September 1963:
The fact, of course, is we want to sustain India, which may be attacked

this fall by China. So we do not want India to be helpless as a half billion people.
. . . Of course, if that country becomes fragmented and defeated, of course, that
would be a most destructive blow to the balance of power.
On the other hand, everything we give to India adversely affects the

balance of power with Pakistan, which is a much smaller country. So we are
dealing with a very, very complicated problem, because the hostility between
them is so deep.
George Ball's trip was an attempt to lessen that. I think we are going to
deal with a very unsatisfactory situation in that area
Overlooking the delicate balance of power in the subcontinent, the United

States' Government did not wait to consult Pakistan before rendering large-scale
military assistance to India in the aftermath of its autumn 1962 border conflict
with China; this despite President Kennedy's earlier undertaking to President
Ayub Khan that Pakistan would be so consulted. At first the United States'
Government made the grant of military assistance to India conditional on the
settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, but when Mr. Nehru refused to
relent, the condition was withdrawn. The Pakistan Government's repeated
apprehension that the growth of India's military machine would increase the
threat to Pakistan's security, and contribute to greater tensions between India
and China, proved to be of no avail. The salient steps taken during President
Kennedy's time to strengthen India's defences were as follows:
1. At Nassau, on 18-21 December 1962, after the cease-fire on the Indo-

China border had taken place, the United States and Britain decided to
continue to supply India on an emergency basis with up to $120,000,000
worth of military aid. The programme included a variety of military
equipment but its central feature was the arming of six Indian Divisions for
mountain warfare.
53
2. As a result of the Nassau decision, a United States-Britain-Canadian Air
Mission visited India to examine what would be India's air needs should
China attack again.
3. Another US Mission went to India to assess the question of expanding
India's capacity for production of arms.
4. On 30 June 1963, at Birch Grove, the United States and Britain decided
on a further substantial programme of military aid to India, over and above
that amount agreed to at Nassau. This enabled India to decide to raise her
standing army from 11 to 22 divisions as rapidly as possible and to
expand substantially her air force and navy.
After the assassination of President Kennedy in November 1963, his

successor, President Johnson, continued on the same path. On 27 December of
that year Time magazine reported that Nehru had now agreed to accept the
Western air defence umbrella and the United States' Seventh Fleet in the Indian
Ocean, but, in return, he had asked for $1 billion military assistance to secure his
concurrence. In March 1964 the United States' Defence Secretary, Mr. Robert
McNamara, repeated the American determination to continue the programme of
military support to India. He stated that the United States planned to continue the
'modernization of a number of Mountain Divisions of the Indian Army and would
also provide certain other "assistance" '. He acknowledged that military
assistance to India had 'deeply troubled' Pakistan but felt that 'it is important to
the entire free world, including Pakistan, that India be able to defend itself against
Communist Chinese aggression'. The Defence Secretary forcefully pleaded for
continued support to Iran, Pakistan, and India, and described these nations as
being on the 'front line of the free world defence against Communist
encroachment in the near East and South Asia'. So it was made clear that the
United States now considered India to be virtually a member of an unwritten
alliance against Communism and entitled to rights and privileges at least equal to
those of SEATO and CENTO members; but with the all-important difference that
India would be permitted to maintain its veneer of non-alignment and be free
from awkward and perilous obligations which reciprocally bound other aligned
nations.
On 1 March 1964 Mr. George Ball, the United States' Undersecretary of

State, warned Pakistan that 'we very much hope President Ayub will not carry
relations with Red China to a point where it impairs a relationship which we have
and an alliance which we have'. He added that 'what it [Pakistan's relations with
China] reflects in terms of an attitude is something about which we are very much
concerned. We watch this very carefully.' And he went on to say:
Pakistan ... is very clear about her enemy being the Soviet Union and
about the fact that she is a member of an alliance which is directed against
Communist aggression, and I am sure that if there were any move by Red China
against Pakistan, then Pakistan would respond with military defence. Her
54
discussions with Red China up to this point have not suggested otherwise, but
we are watching this relationship with great attention.
In April 1964 Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State for Near East
and South Asian Affairs, told the United States House of Representatives
Foreign Affairs Committee:
At the same time, Pakistan has moved to take advantage of Communist

overtures, designed to isolate India, by concluding trade, boundary, and civil air
agreements with Red China and by expanding cultural exchanges.
We have made clear our concern and our belief that even if marginal
benefits may accrue to Pakistan from these measures, the political effect is to
give advantage to an enemy against which we are formally allied.
Here, as elsewhere, we must seek to accomplish our objective without

infringing upon the sovereign rights of another Government. We continue to
believe that our national interests and those of Pakistan coincide and that this is
recognized by Pakistan as well
Parallel with the mounting criticism of Pakistan, American support for India
continued to grow. At this juncture, not perhaps fortuitously, the idea of
confederation, originally aired by Nehru, was picked up by The New York Times
and The Washington Post. Both these influential newspapers advocated
confederation between India and Pakistan, linked by a joint defence over
Kashmir. Many other influential sources—both official and unofficial—expressed
similar views. Unofficial emissaries made frequent visits to the sub-continent to
assess the prospects of Indo-Pakistan confederation. During this time, in
testimonies before Congress, United States' officials voiced the opinion that
containment of China in south-east Asia was more important than the settlement
of the Kashmir dispute. Phillips Talbot told the Foreign Affairs Committee that, as
far as the United States' aid programmes went, the main American concern was
to balance the various aspects of our relationship in South Asia. If Kashmir were
the most important thing in the world to the United States, then I would think that
it would be our duty to say, no more aid to either country until the Kashmir
dispute is settled. If, on the other hand, in the sub-continent it is more important
to limit the opportunity of the Communist powers to move in, to limit potential
disintegration and chaos in those two countries so that they can develop viability
and they can be effective nations of the world, then we should take what
measures we can to help them constructively and in our diplomatic efforts, try
very hard to help them soften these bone-deep cultural, religious, social,
economic, and political disputes.
Mr. William S. Gaud, Deputy Administrator of Aid, was more outspoken

when he told the House Committee that 'while Kashmir is an important issue, it is
not an essential issue in that part of the world as far as we are concerned'. On 18
55
June 1964 Mr. Dean Rusk reaffirmed the importance of the United States
remaining 'steadfast in its support to Indian economic development and defence
efforts during the coming year'. In his statement the Secretary of State mentioned
some 'key problem areas where United States' aid is a factor'. They included
South Vietnam, India, Brazil, Africa, and Cyprus. No mention was made of
Pakistan.
The idea of 'a coalition of Asian powers with India as its main force to
counter-balance China's power' was expressed again in September 1964, when
Senator Hubert Humphrey supported it during his election campaign for the vice-
presidency. According to his view, the United States was to decide the 'long
range political future of Asia' and was to make India 'strong enough to exercise
leadership in the area'. When the People's Republic of China detonated its first
atomic bomb in late 1964, Mr. Chester Bowles reassured India that 'a closer
military alliance with United States could bring the entire nuclear power of the
Seventh Fleet into frontier struggle on the side of India, and India would have not
only the atomic bombs, but the much more devastating hydrogen bombs at her
disposal in the Fleet arsenal of weapons'. In February 1965 Mr. McNamara,
accusing China of 'trying to drive a wedge between Pakistan and the United
States', saw 'a very real need for India to improve the quantity of its defence
against the Chinese Communist threat'. He believed that 'it is in our interest to
assist them'.
As a mark of its disapproval of Pakistan's growing relations with China, the

United States' Government postponed the Consortium meeting of aid to Pakistan
in July 1965 by two months on the excuse that congressional authorization had
not yet been given, and that, pending appropriation by Congress, the United
States was not in a position to pledge financial aid for the first year of Pakistan's
Third Five Year Plan. This decision was taken by the United States' Government
without consulting other Consortium countries. In communicating the
postponement from July to September 1965, the American Ambassador to
Pakistan gave President Ayub Khan a message from President Johnson which
stated that, if Pakistan so wished, she could discuss certain other problems in
this period. By contrast, the aid to India was sanctioned a little earlier by the Aid
to India Consortium, and before congressional authorization was obtained. The
Consortium meeting was abruptly postponed to exert undisguised pressure on
Pakistan. Shortly after conveying President Johnson's message to President
Ayub Khan, the American Ambassador called on me and spelt out the 'matters'
requiring discussion before the Consortium could meet to consider Pakistan's
economic needs. These matters covered the whole range of Pakistan's relations
with the Peoples' Republic of China, with President Soekarno's regime, and
Vietnam.
The United States' Government's commitment to come to Pakistan's

assistance in the event of India misusing its aid is evident beyond doubt. In
addition to the terms of SEATO and CENTO and those of the bilateral defence
56
agreements, the former United States' Ambassador in Pakistan, Mr. Walter P. Mc
Connaughy, stated in Hyderabad, on 31 October 1962, that the United States
would take every precaution that the 'assistance' provided to India to help her
fight the Chinese would not be used against Pakistan. In November 1962 the
United States gave a guarantee that she would come to the direct assistance of
Pakistan in the case of aggression from outside, including India. Ambassador Mc
Connaughy again declared in a Press Conference in Karachi, on 9 November
1962, that 'The United States in turn has assured the Pakistan Government
officially that if this assistance to India should be misused and misdirected
against another country in aggression, the United States would undertake
immediately, in accordance with constitutional authority, appropriate action both
within and without the United Nations to thwart such aggression by India'. This
statement was a reiteration of the one made by the State Department on the
previous day. Speaking on the same subject, on 20 November 1962, President
Kennedy told a Press Conference:
In providing military assistance to India, we are mindful of our alliance with

Pakistan. All of our aid to India is for the purpose of defeating Chinese
Communist subversion. Chinese incursions into the sub-continent are a threat to
Pakistan as well as India, and both have a common interest in opposing it. We
have urged this point in both Governments. Our help to India in no way
diminishes or qualifies our commitment to Pakistan and we have made this clear
to both Governments as well.
At the end of the statement he touched on the point mentioned in the joint
communiqué issued in Washington on 13 July 1961, during President Ayub
Khan's visit to the United States. That had stated:
The two Presidents re-affirmed the solemn purpose of the bilateral

agreements signed by the two Governments on March 5th, 1959, which declared
among other things that 'the Government of the United States of America regards
as vital to its national interest and to world peace the preservation of the
independence and integrity of Pakistan'.
Recapitulating all previous assurances, Ambassador Mc Connaughy said that 'in

addition to these public statements of American policy, direct assurances of a
similar nature have been given to the Government of Pakistan. The record is
clear. The policy of the United States in regard to the independence and defence
of Pakistan remains unchanged.' On 17 September 1963 Mr. Phillips Talbot gave
the following confirmation of American assurances:
I think that the leaders of the Government of Pakistan understand our

concern for the security of Pakistan, just as the leaders of India understand our
concern for the security of India. And both, I believe, recognize that in what we
regard as the highly unlikely event that either country should attack the other,
there would be an American response
57
Addressing the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee on
25 March 1964, Mr. McNamara reiterated that the United States had taken 'great
pains to assure Pakistan that our aid to India will not be at the expense of
Pakistan security to which we are committed under our Mutual Defence
Arrangements'.
The gradual whittling down of both economic and military assistance to

Pakistan since 1962, and the progressive increase in military and economic
assistance to India, were beginning to exercise deleterious political influences,
besides widening the imbalance between India and Pakistan. In spite of the
assurances given to Pakistan, a growing sense of uneasiness spread through the
country as the balance tilted each day more in India's favour. The Indian attitude
towards Pakistan was becoming more defiant. This was chiefly demonstrated in
Kashmir, the focal point of the conflict. India had not taken any drastic measures
to integrate Jammu and Kashmir in the Indian Union until the United States
decided to provide her with military assistance. Then in late 1963, without any
justification, India marched her troops into the village of Chaknot in Azad
Kashmir. This and other provocative demonstrations of chauvinism were
repeated with greater bravado as the position of the United States became
clearer. Almost a year after the occupation of Chaknot, in October 1964, Prime
Minister Shastri declared as a matter of set policy the integration of the occupied
territory of Jammu and Kashmir into India. When Pakistan lodged a protest with
the United States, Mr. Harriman merely expressed his 'shock and surprise' and
promised to convey American 'anxieties' about it to New Delhi. That India's bold
adventures in Kashmir were the outcome of United States' military, economic,
and political support did not escape the attention of many well-informed political
observers, such as Bertrand Russell who said:
In Kashmir, India has refused to allow a plebiscite for many years, despite
United Nations resolutions. One hundred thousand Indian troops have
suppressed Kashmiri autonomy. Despite all this for seventeen years Mr. Nehru
held back from invoking the two Articles of the Indian Constitution which would
integrate Kashmir by decree. We must ask why Premier Shastri invoked those
two Articles, arrested Shaikh Abdullah and thereby effectively closed the door to
peaceful redress of the Kashmiris' grievances. The answer to this question
suggests the cause of the outbreak of this war. . . . The official integration of
Kashmir made the uprising in the valley inevitable and the participation in the
uprising of Kashmiris from Pakistan had to be expected
Prime Minister Shastri initiated a policy towards the subjugated State

which even Nehru dared not adopt. It was rapidly integrated, the relevant articles
of the Indian Constitution ensuring autonomy for Kashmir were abrogated, the
Civil Service in the disputed territory was 'Indianized', political leaders from
Shaikh Abdullah down were put behind bars, popular agitation over the Hazrat
Bal Shrine incident was ruthlessly suppressed, and the cease-fire line invoked as
58
an excuse to eject Muslims from the border regions into Pakistan and replace
them by militant Sikh and Dogra populations. Except for the arrest of leaders,
none of these actions had been taken in all the years of Nehru's Prime
Ministership. In this way the situation was deliberately brought to a head.
As a follow-up, and to test Pakistan's resolve, India embarked on military

operations in the Rann of Kutch in April 1965. An offensive probe was put into
operation to ascertain Pakistan's political and military responses and to
determine the extent to which she was prepared to defend her frontiers. Although
the battle went badly for the Indian forces, and Pakistan was in a position to inflict
a humiliating defeat on them, the restraint exercised in not pressing these military
advantages encouraged the Indians to believe that Pakistan would refrain from
military action in retaliation to India's plans to annex Jammu and Kashmir. At the
same time, realizing that there would come an end to Pakistan's restraint and
that she would not indefinitely endure one serious provocation after another,
India took the precaution of simultaneously attacking Lahore to foreclose the
Kashmir issue by the use of force. On the other hand, if Pakistan had taken
advantage of its military successes in the Rann of Kutch and completed the
operations in that sector by annihilating a complete Indian division and occupied
Karim Shahi, to which it had a right, India would have regained her senses and
not precipitated another conflict only five months later.
When, on 6 September 1965, India launched her attack on Pakistan, all

but two or three of the nations of the world expressed shock and disapproval.
The British Prime Minister deplored the Indian crossing of the cease-fire line;
President Nasser made it plain to Krishna Menon that the attack on Lahore was a
gross violation of international frontiers; the People's Republic of China gave an
ultimatum to India to end her aggression or be prepared for Chinese intervention;
and Iran, Turkey, and Indonesia gave moral and material support to Pakistan. At
Casablanca, all the Arab states condemned the attack on Pakistan and, in the
United Nations, the overwhelming majority of countries from Latin America,
Africa, and Asia were severely critical of India's aggression. There was
widespread sympathy for Pakistan in Western and Eastern Europe. The United
States showed great concern at the outbreak of hostilities, but, instead of
implementing its many assurances by coming to the assistance of its attacked
ally Pakistan, the United States' Government confined its energies and influence
to bringing about a cease-fire. With this end in view an embargo was imposed on
both countries, by which the United States chose to equate the aggressor with
the victim of aggression. While Pakistan received its military supplies only from
the United States, India received its armaments from the Soviet Union and many
other countries and manufactured locally most of the light equipment and
ammunition; so the embargo, in actual fact, operated exclusively to Pakistan's
disadvantage.
Much more will be written about the war and of other nations' attitudes to
it, but until further information can be made available, it is enough to say that
59
great disappointment was felt in Pakistan at the American attitude. Had the
United States not changed its policies, India would not have embarked on her
bold adventure in a hurry. She would not have dared to attack Pakistan if there
was the fear that the United States would fulfil her treaty obligations and other
commitments to Pakistan. If the military balance had not been altered, India
would not have been in a position to mount the attack. The six mountain divisions
which were formed and equipped by the United States for the purpose of facing
the Chinese were turned against Pakistan in Kashmir. Pakistan, a member of
CENTO and SEATO, a client of long standing, and a victim of aggression by a
country five times its size, found its principal ally more anxious to search for a
cease-fire than to come to its rescue. The American point of view has, of course,
to be considered. President Ayub Khan went to meet President Johnson in
Washington in December 1965, hoping that from their dialogue would emerge a
better understanding of each other's position. A number of steps were taken by
Pakistan as a measure of her penance and to honour the new understanding
reached in Washington. The impression began to gain currency that slowly, one
by one, the shards of the precious urn of special relations, which had been
shattered in the aftermath of the 1965 war, were being picked up and pieced
together. Action was taken in every direction to reduce what the journalists called
'irritants'.
The United States' decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan

thus came as a shock to those who believed that the serene days of the special
relationship were returning. Global Powers do not act in pique; nor do they lose
sight of their objectives under pressure of exigencies. On occasions, they may
seek time to remove an impediment or misunderstanding, but that is only the
exterior manifestation of a diplomacy under which lie deep motivations. As it is
claimed that the decision to stop military assistance was intended to bring about
Indo-Pakistani co-operation, it is necessary to examine what is meant by this 'co-
operation' and why so much emphasis is being placed on this word.
Constitutional terms like 'confederation' and 'condominium' are outdated.

Moreover, in the sub-continent they are charged with historical prejudices of a
kind that make people distrust their use. Once a meeting of minds has taken
place and a common purpose evolved, formulas can always be found to translate
cooperation into constitutional language. What is important is not the outward
expression but the actual substance of cooperation. There are countries whose
federal or confederate structure is of no help in producing harmonious relations
between the component units. One might take Nigeria as an example of a
country where inner discords between the federative units have not ceased to
create trouble. On the other hand, though Canada and the United States are
linked by no constitutional arrangement, their manner of co-operation transcends
formal arrangements.
According to the American view, a meeting of minds is necessary before a

more formal and defined association can be considered. As a first step in this
60
direction, tensions must be eased and disputes frozen. With their armies no more
facing each other, two countries can look for common goals, instead of wasting
effort in a hunt for outmoded legal arrangements which only accentuate
suspicions and excite prejudices. If India and Pakistan were to set aside their
differences, that, in itself, would be a negative form of co-operation. They could
then be brought together to face the supposed common enemy, Communist
China. From the American point of view, once the direction of relations changes,
the task of achieving a large area of co-operation is considerably simplified, even
to the extent of leading to a future constitutional link. To this end, as an essential
prerequisite, every endeavor was being made to bring about Indo-Pakistani co-
operation.
61
CHAPTER 6
American Policy to bring Pakistan under

Indian Hegemony
Force enters when diplomacy is exhausted. If all attempts to bring about co-
operation between India and Pakistan fail, it would be imprudent to rule out
coercive measures. This does not necessarily mean that the United States,
whose objectives are not quite identical with those of India, would, in
desperation, create conditions that would enable India to dismember or destroy
Pakistan. However, if the lessons of September 1965 are not forgotten, it would
be rash to discount this possibility altogether in the calculations of Pakistan's
foreign and defense policies.
The history of Pakistan-United States relations has been outlined in the

preceding chapters to clarify the implications of present developments. It is high
time that, after two decades of independence, we learned to approach events
more systematically and to put an end to the age-old habit of impetuous and
arbitrary ad hoc responses.
On the face of it, the decision of 12 April 1967 was taken to restrain the
arms race between India and Pakistan and prevent another war. It was also
supposedly intended to divert defense expenditures to agricultural and industrial
development. In the first place, however, an arms balance between India and
Pakistan is likely to reduce the risk of war. This has been borne out by our
experience of the last twenty years. Outside the sub-continent, and on a much
larger scale, there is the example of the existing military balance between the
Soviet Union and the United States, which has led not to war but to a detente.
The temptation to wage war normally arises when there is a military imbalance.
After a period of time, the effect of the United States' decision will lead to a
situation in which India would be in a strong position to strike at Pakistan. It does
not, therefore, necessarily follow that an arms race between India and Pakistan
would, ipso facto, lead to war. It has been contended that an arms balance can
also be obtained by a reduction of armed forces. How that is both dangerous and
impracticable will be demonstrated later. Only vigilance and preparedness are
likely to prevent war, and neither a bilateral reduction of armed forces nor an
advantage in India's favor will prevent catastrophe. Even more obvious is the
fallacy that the United States' decision was taken in order to prevent war between
India and Pakistan. Independent of an arms race, India and Pakistan have been
permanently in a state of either enmity or acute confrontation; only the degree of
tension has varied. Their relations have never been normal and are not capable
of becoming normal without the settlement of fundamental disputes that have
smouldered since Partition. The United States has always been aware of this
inflammable situation, but nevertheless concluded Mutual Defense Agreements
62
with Pakistan and welcomed Pakistan's membership of SEATO and CENTO.
Indeed, it went to the extent of giving assurances to Pakistan that it would assist
Pakistan in the event of aggression from India. From the time of Independence,
both India and Pakistan began to strengthen their armed forces and the United
States has been the principal contributor to this arms race. It remained the most
important source of military supplies at the height of our tensions. In 1954, after
defense agreements were concluded, the United States began to supply military
equipment to Pakistan, much to the anger of India. Following the Sino-Indian
conflict in 1962, the United States gave military assistance to India and ignored
Pakistan's protests that this would prompt Indian aggression. Commenting on the
traffic in military weapons in the Middle East after the 1967 conflict, James
Reston made a pertinent observation:
The Administration is simultaneously making speeches against the

dumping of modern and obsolete arms on all kinds of countries and steadily
making shipments of more and more arms. In fact, the United States government
is now sending more weapons to more countries than any other nation in the
world.
The facts are startling: from 1949 to June 1966, the United States
government alone (not counting the private arms salesmen) sold $16 billion in
military arms to other countries and gave away a total of $30 billion. This $46
billion amounts, over the same period, to $4 billion more than all the economic
grants and loans provided to other countries by the United States since the
middle of 1948, including the spectacularly successful Marshall Plan
The United States cannot justifiably withhold arms on the grounds that it
would lead to an arms race between India and Pakistan; nor can it be seriously
contended that the decision to stop military assistance to Pakistan is influenced
either by the desire to prevent war or an arms race leading to war. Turkey and
Greece receive massive arms assistance from the United States, and more than
once have been on the brink of war over Cyprus; yet the United States has not
suspended its military assistance to either of them. This differentiation has been
made because the centre of the cold war has shifted from Europe to Asia, where
the struggle against Communism has, in effect, now come to mean the struggle
against the People's Republic of China.
It cannot be seriously contended either that military assistance has been

stopped to divert defense expenditure for economic development, with the pious
purpose of making India and Pakistan more prosperous. From the very
beginning, India and Pakistan have been spending a large part of their resources
on defense and yet, for many years, the United States continued to supply arms
to both countries without political or economic preconditions. India and Pakistan
have not suddenly become poor. Famine and poverty are not new phenomena to
arouse the conscience of the United States into curtailing defense expenditures
so that the money can be spent elsewhere. If the American Government had
63
actually felt that the economic welfare of Pakistan took precedence over its
territorial integrity, it would not have given massive military assistance for so long
to two poor countries, historical adversaries of one another. Since the end of the
Second World War nations everywhere have seen that economic vulnerability
opens the doors to foreign interference. If India and Pakistan had been
economically self-sufficient, it is doubtful if they would have had a dominant
foreign presence on their soil. Thus, the factors that attract foreign intervention
cannot be repugnant to Powers seeking to enlarge their influence in the affairs of
other states. It would be an elementary contradiction to remove maladies which
invite interference and are responsible for the spread of influence.
What then has caused this major change in the historical position of the
United States? There is no significant new internal factor in the sub-continent to
account for it. India and Pakistan were at war over their unresolved disputes in
1948, years before the United States stepped in with military assistance. The
arms race between them began before the United States gave it impetus; and
there was poverty in both countries much before the United States sought to
diversify their defense expenditures to eradicate economic ills. All the old
conditions remain unaltered. New factors, however, have appeared outside the
sub-continent, and their emergence has exaggerated the existing problems of the
sub-continent and given them a new sense of urgency. These external factors,
which have caused a general reappraisal in Washington, are the precarious state
of the Vietnam war and the growing power of China in Asia. This situation has to
be controlled, and it cannot be done effectively without the co-operation of India
and Pakistan.
These factors were not present in 1954 and they had not assumed their
present proportions in 1962; but recent developments have necessitated many
decisions, including the one announced on 12 April 1967. It is not true that the
United States wants to retire from the sub-continent in disgust. No country has
tried harder to extend its influence in the two countries, yet the United States has
taken a decision which, on the surface, gives an impression of withdrawal from
the most sensitive area of contact between Great Powers and underdeveloped
countries. Can it be argued that the United States considers the situation to be so
hopeless that any further investment would be unproductive? Is it conceivable
that the greatest Power on earth would suddenly write off six hundred million
people and a strategically important sub-continent? Such an abdication is out of
the question, especially at a time when America has made it abundantly clear
that it will leave no void to Communism. It remains America's primary objective to
increase its influence in the sub-continent and to make this region a bastion of
the 'free world' in Asia. Only eight days before the State Department announced
its decision to stop military assistance to India and Pakistan, the United States'
Secretary of State, Mr. Dean Rusk, appealed to Pakistan and India 'to find some
way to achieve genuine co-operation in the sub-continent', and went on to inform
the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee that 'such co-operation
would constitute a formidable bulwark of the free world strength'.
64
An American President not so long ago observed that it would not be
possible to hold Asia if the sub-continent were lost to Communism. If the United
States is prepared to risk world conflagration in order to hold the line against
Communism in Vietnam, is it likely to walk out of the sub-continent and so
forsake its position in Asia for all time? Let it be clearly understood that the
announcement to terminate military assistance does not herald a retreat. On the
contrary, it is an overt demonstration of strength and an ultimatum to the
countries involved. In the past, the United States took the position that it was not
able to influence India and Pakistan to arrive at a settlement of their disputes,
maintaining that its aid was not given to coerce either country. As its influence
was insufficient to bring them to terms on the basis of its own interests, it
desisted from exercising its coercive power. Its strong presence in one country
and its relatively weak presence in the other fell short of the requirement for
punitive action. With the lapse of time, however, the United States has deeply
penetrated both and now feels that its influence is, for the first time, of such
magnitude that it can take the risk of exercising simultaneous pressure on both of
them to bring them together.
Since the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 and the decline in India's prestige,
the United States has gradually assumed a position of commanding influence in
that country. India would face unbearable hardships without the ten million tons
of food which the United States supplies to it annually, and which the United
States alone can provide. Even if past credits and servicing of debts are set
aside, and even if the internal chaos in India is discounted, its present
dependence on the United States, and Pakistan's established dependence, are
sufficient factors for the United States to conclude that such an advantageous
position is not likely to endure for ever. Assistance to both countries has never
been higher; consequently, their dependence has never been greater; and the
United States urgently needs sub-continental adjustments. On every
consideration, global and regional, long-term and immediate, this is the
opportune moment to bring Pakistan and India finally together for the attainment
of the United States' objectives in Asia and elsewhere. Now is the time to cash
the dividends from two decades of colossal investment.
The Soviet Union also wants a settlement of Indo-Pakistani disputes, but

for different reasons. Up to a point the interests of the two Global Powers are
similar. The announcement made in Washington on 12 April 1967 states that the
Soviet Union, among other nations, was consulted and informed of the United
States' decision to stop military assistance to India and Pakistan. If the two
Global Powers are acting in concert to force a settlement between India and
Pakistan, it would mean that Pakistan would have to make greater sacrifices and
pursue a bolder policy of friendship with the People's Republic of China. If,
however, the Soviet Union is not acting in conformity with the United States and
will not co-operate in forcing a settlement by the use of collective aid levers, it
would be less difficult for Pakistan to retain its neutrality.
65
The Soviet Union seeks peace between India and Pakistan to contain the
influence of the United States and China. The United States seeks peace
between the two countries to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the sub-
continent and to make India and Pakistan jointly face China. This is the important
difference and it would have been conclusive, if Sino-Soviet differences had not
become so deep. The Soviet Union is unlikely to press Pakistan with the same
degree of intensity as the United States to take second place to India and openly
to assume a belligerent attitude towards China. The United States, on the other
hand, would like Pakistan to cooperate with India, thus completing the
encirclement of China from this end of Asia. The sub-continent is the one gap yet
to be filled. Time alone will show to what extent the Soviet Union will co-operate
with the United States to meet a part of their common objective. The Soviet
Union's position might remain close to that of the United States for some time,
but it is doubtful if the proximity of interest is likely to endure indefinitely. The time
has surely come for the Soviet Union to redefine its global role and remove the
doubts occasioned by its being pushed into one compromise after another by the
United States. In any event, Pakistan is capable of exercising considerable
maneuverability to negotiate a more favorable future relationship with the Soviet
Union. But if time and opportunity are allowed to slip, the belated initiatives will
lose meaning, which would be a great tragedy for Pakistan's diplomacy.
The United States' position is fairly clear. What it is after is in its highest
global interest and to that extent understandable. The fact that Pakistan has to
pay a high price is relevant only to the people of Pakistan. It would be better to
face the ordeal dispassionately rather than with a torrent of protest, which
subsides without any corresponding benefit to the national cause. This is not the
first crisis in Pakistan's relations with the United States. The pattern has been
fairly evident for quite some time. Each successive action the United States has
taken has been for the attainment of fixed objectives. Each crisis has been
followed by voluble press comments and a spate of statements, which are
afterwards relegated to the archives. This strategy could be described as a
'Please—Punch' approach, a method to confuse the leadership of Pakistan and
weaken the resolve of its people against an overall compromise.
An action is taken to move Pakistan towards global alignment, which

occasions loud but ineffectual protests. Then an economic carrot is dangled in
front of the Pakistan Government to persuade its official spokesmen to return to
their desks. The inducement has taken many forms: the supply of food under PL-
48o, on conditions varying with the requirements of United States' diplomacy;
project and commodity aid, determined separately and collectively in Consortium
meetings held twice a year by the World Bank; project aid outside the
consortium, as in support of the Indus Basin Treaty and salinity and water
logging projects; support for the Pakistani rupee; and the utilization of counterpart
funds for rural development and other similar projects. Again, after a decent
lapse of time, comes another punch prompting protests which are soothed by
66
further economic palliatives; and so the caravan moves towards its destination.
This pattern of action began in November 1959, when there was a border
skirmish between India and China on the heights of the Ladakh plateau. The
present position is simply the inevitable outcome of changed conditions. New
situations have brought about a change in the United States' objectives in the
sub-continent and, hence, Pakistan has had to watch one crisis follow another.
With the change of the United States' attitude, neutrality and non-
alignment, once denounced by Dulles as immoral, began to gain respectability.
The world was reminded of India's importance, of the vastness of her territory,
and the significance of her large population. There were pressing reasons why
she should be made a show-piece of democracy in Asia. In 1961
disproportionate economic assistance was allocated to non-aligned India in
preference to aligned Pakistan, but Pakistan did not repair the damage by
approaching the Soviet Union and China. In those days the Russian response
might have been favorable, because the Sino-Soviet differences had not erupted
into the open and the detente between the Soviet Union and the United States
had not crystallized. Pakistan, however, reacted with platitudinous paper
propaganda, soon to be silenced by the servile acceptance of some economic
aid. The next painful punch came during the Sino-Indian border clash of 1962,
when the United States seized the opportunity to pour in massive military
assistance to India in contravention of its commitments to Pakistan.
Subsequently, a long-term military assistance commitment was made in 1964 to
non-aligned, neutral India to the peril of aligned Pakistan, in violation of a prior
commitment. In short, the sub-continent's frantic arms race was introduced and
encouraged by the United States.
Then came the conflict between India and Pakistan in 1965. If this was not
a sufficient lesson for us, the present crisis in Pakistan-United States relations is
not likely to be more educative. China, the country against which SEATO was
constructed, demonstrated its sympathy and support for Pakistan, a member of
that alliance. The tragedy of Pakistan's foreign policy has its ironic scenes. With
its alliance torn to shreds, the country was compelled to explore new avenues to
safeguard its national security and territorial integrity. Could that be done by
trying to re-establish a special relationship with the United States on a subjective
basis, as was attempted in December 1965? Objective considerations have
hitherto frustrated every endeavor directed towards such a tenuous
rapprochement. The search for national security has to be made in a different
manner and in other directions. The United States' attitude will continue to stiffen
until Pakistan agrees to its terms or draws a line and says 'thus far and no
further'. The latest example of the United States' 'Please—Punch' strategy is the
commitment on Tarbela made to placate Pakistan. The inevitable punch followed
on 12 April 1967, when the stoppage of military assistance was announced.
Whether Pakistan is in a position to alter the present course of its relations with
the United States can only be known when resistance is offered. Pakistan's
national interests must be safeguarded, even at the expense of displeasing the
67
United States. This does not mean that Pakistan has physically to confront the
power of the United States, but only that we have to make it resolutely clear by
diplomatic, political, and economic means that we will never permit the gradual
erosion of our national interests. Such a stand would require internal adjustments
and sacrifices but not, necessarily, lasting tension with the United States. One
passing crisis is preferable to a succession of crises punctuated by periodical
respites, leading to an ineluctable emergency, when it might be beyond
Pakistan's means to redeem its position.
Pressure is an impolite word. It is bad manners to employ it in the

language of diplomacy, which is not to say that nations have not exercised
pressure in the past. In the age of physical domination, coercion was exercised in
a crude fashion. In our neo-colonial times, methods of coercion are more refined,
as India and Pakistan have not been alone in discovering. Some countries have
been able to resist submission to the hegemony of Global Powers, others have
not. We in Pakistan, however, are concerned with our own situation. Our
dependence on the United States in the military field has been total and not
inconsiderable in economic and food requirements. The implementation of the
Indus Basin Treaty has also to be taken into account. The intensity of pressure
on Pakistan will be much greater than on India for the simple reason that the
demand on Pakistan is of a much higher order. The pressures will increase until
resistance is offered or until we throw up our hands in submission. If we run, we
shall have to keep running until we collapse. The pressures on India will also
grow, but they will be less severe, as has already been demonstrated by the
stoppage of military assistance, a decision entirely unfavourable to Pakistan.
Thus, intensive pressure on Pakistan and moderate pressure on India will be
applied simultaneously; and now that the war in the Middle East has ended in
victory for America’s ally, the United States will press the more heavily on India
and Pakistan. After a brief respite, when the political situation in the Middle East
gets clearer and the General Assembly files one more resolution, the United
States will turn its full attention to the sub-continent for the achievement of its
global aims.
In 1958 the United States was not in a position to coerce India, but that
situation has changed. Advantage has been taken of the general disarray in
India, of the appalling famine conditions, to make the first inroads. As in the case
of Pakistan, pressure was initially applied in the economic and financial spheres.
This was done to test India's responses; to see if, like Pakistan, she would
gradually succumb to one pressure after another, leading to the final show of
strength. As in the case of Pakistan, it all started in the spirit of the good
Samaritan. Advice was proffered on fiscal policies leading to the devaluation of
the Indian rupee. Elated by this success, the United States moved forward to
interfere in the industrial and agricultural policies of India. The Indian
Government was advised to grant concessions to private entrepreneurs in order
to strengthen the fabric of free enterprise. The Indian Government, harassed by
mounting difficulties and the spectre of famine, capitulated. These results
68
apparently encouraged the United States to come out into the open by
terminating military assistance to both countries with the object of compelling
them to submit to a broader agreement. After two decades of painstaking effort,
circumstances conspired to place the United States in a commanding position in
India and Pakistan. It has been a notable triumph of twenty years of diplomatic
tenacity. The United States has every reason to feel satisfied with the hold it
exercises over the six hundred million people of the subcontinent, where at the
end of the Second World War it had no influence. After so much patient labor the
time has come to reap the harvest and, on 12 April 1967, Washington made a
demand for the repayment of the first installment of its astronomical investments.
Far from heralding a withdrawal from the sub-continent, the United States'
decision must be construed as a forward thrust, a calculated step to dictate terms
to India and Pakistan. The history of our sub-continent is rich in examples of
interference by European Powers ever since the English and the French first
landed on the coast and acquired settlement rights in certain places. Aided by
knowledge of that history, the United States has repeated the pattern of imperial
influence; dive's Diwani has a counterpart in the economic concessions and
military facilities that have been given to the Americans. The establishment of
settlements at Calcutta, Madras, Pondicherry, and other places from which the
European Powers enlarged their influence, has its modern equivalent. It might be
said that the extension of America's influence in our sub-continent is rather
different from the concessions given to the European trading communities, and
there are indeed differences; but why should one see less danger in today's
foreign military base than in the peaceful trading stations of the past? Those
peaceful trading stations turned out to be bridgeheads for conquest. In what way
are military bases any less dangerous? Every military concession accorded by
an Asian country is a source of danger to it. The perils are so grave that France
liquidated foreign bases on her territory by serving notice on NATO. India and
Pakistan have already given the equivalent of the Diwani of Bengal, bestowed by
the Mughal Emperor on Clive, in order to obtain foreign economic and military
assistance. It seems that neither country has learnt the lesson from that part of
our inglorious past that brought about the subjugation of our people for almost
two hundred years.
I repeat that the United States has taken this far-reaching measure not
because it fears another war between India and Pakistan; or because it seeks to
restrain their arms race; or because it seeks to divert heavy military expenditures
for economic development. The official reasons given by the United States
Government are meant to clothe the decision with respectability, but the real
motives behind this facade of righteousness are as follows:
1. The United States today exercises optimum influence in India and

Pakistan and believes that it is in a position to compel both countries
simultaneously to an arrangement compatible with its own global
interest.
69
2. The United States wants this arrangement to come into being
expeditiously, on account of the growing difficulties it faces in Vietnam,
where it thinks that it is engaged in a decisive struggle for its future
position in the continent of Asia.
3. It believes the time to be appropriate because of the detente between
the United States and USSR, which establishes an area of common
interest in the sub-continent, and expects that the Soviet Union will
desist from exploiting the situation.
4. The United States believes that China is too involved in its internal
problems and has received too many setbacks to take any bold
counter-initiative.
5. Internal difficulties in India and Pakistan, especially economic and in
respect of food supply are propitious for the application of numerous
kinds of pressure on both countries.
6. The United States has tested Indian and Pakistani reactions to
pressure and considers it can take a calculated risk in the application
of new and severer pressures to accelerate the achievement of its
global policies.
It is pertinent to ask why the United States chose to apply coercion in the
military field when it has at its disposal numerous economic levers. It cannot be
denied that a modicum of pressure from such levers was applied before
announcing the decision to terminate military assistance. In fact, many pressures
were surreptitiously applied as a prelude to this decision. The United States
terminated the agreements under which India and Pakistan receive food on a
liberal long-term basis and concluded new agreements with stringent terms
which provided food on a month-by-month basis to feed the starving people of
India from ship to mouth. The United States also terminated its liberal long-term
food deliveries to the sub-continent and, more recently, put both countries
virtually on a 'month-by-month' basis. Nor was this the only change. Out of India's
total requirement of about 10 million tons of food-grains, she was made to spend
only $18 million of foreign exchange on food imports; and out of Pakistan's total
requirement of about 2 millions, she was made to spend approximately $90
million of her foreign exchange in 1966-7 on food imports. The liberal terms of
PL-480 were modified much more adversely for Pakistan at a time when the
country faced an acute food shortage. Other pressures were applied in the
economic field by the release of economic aid on a piecemeal basis, whereby the
strain of uncertainty had an adverse effect on the economic situation generally.
However, the enforcement of economic sanctions does not have the same
impact as the termination of military assistance, where it threatens a nation's
security. Economic difficulties can generally be overcome by internal
adjustments. In this instance, the application of sustained economic pressure
would have caused greater hardship to India than to Pakistan, on whom the
greater pressure has at present to be exerted, as immeasurably more is
demanded from Pakistan. Pressure on a nation's food supply can be a powerful
lever, but to apply it openly to create famine conditions would have tarnished the
70
image of the United States—a great Christian state, known for its humane
traditions. Moreover, if food had been withheld, it would have harmed India much
more than Pakistan and, for the reason stated, it was necessary to apply greater
pressure on Pakistan.
The stoppage of military assistance has the appearance of a moral

gesture and one in accordance with the trend of the times. Ostensibly a decision
promoting peace, it suits the spirit of the United Nations with its emphasis on
disarmament. In fairness to United States' diplomacy, it must be admitted that
less injurious means were attempted before applying this open sanction. It is
never a pleasant task to administer obvious pressure and has only now been
applied because less blatant attempts failed to register sufficient progress. The
decision of 12 April 1967 has been announced in the context of a series of
discreet approaches, and there were reports of discussions on joint economic
ventures between India and Pakistan under the aegis of the United States. Since
1958, American policy has been directed towards entangling Pakistan with India
in a catena of joint ventures, which would subordinate Pakistan. Pursuing this
objective, President Johnson, in his message to Congress, waxed eloquent on
the virtues of joint regional projects. In New Delhi on 9 May 1967, this theme was
elaborated by Mr. George Woods, President of the World Bank, when he stated
that numerous advantages would accrue to India and Pakistan if they
collaborated in projects that could be financed by the Bank. He went on to say
that he had exchanged views with Indian leaders on this matter and, as an
example, mentioned the water systems of East Pakistan and West Bengal in
India. He showed impatience at the lack of progress on this joint project,
observing that preliminary studies on a project for its utilization had been too long
delayed. We were also informed of strenuous endeavours made to bring about a
bilateral reduction of armed forces. It appears that when the initiatives for joint
economic ventures and efforts to bring about reduction of armed forces did not
make headway, the United States proceeded to apply pressure where it hurt
most.
Joint economic projects between India and Pakistan cannot even be

contemplated without the settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute, and
without a genuine normalization of relations. Such co-operation can only stem
from equality and mutual trust. It cannot be secured at gun-point particularly
when one nation has usurped the economic and territorial rights of its neighbour.
Under such conditions, it is even less practical to attempt to compel a reduction
in the level of their armed forces.
71
CHAPTER 7
Collaboration with India on American Terms

The reasons adduced for joint economic collaboration between India and
Pakistan are precisely those advanced against the Partition of the sub-continent.
Arguments, decisively settled by Partition, have been resurrected. The objections
of the Indian National Congress to a division of the sub-continent's economy and
security forces had been overruled at the creation of Pakistan by the Muslim's
decision to be 'separate and equal'. Many years ago, in a conversation between
Mr. Jinnah and the British author Beverley Nichols, the economic and defence
consequences of Partition were discussed.
SELF [Nichols] The first is economic. Are the Muslims likely to be richer or poorer
under Pakistan? And would you set up tariffs against the rest of India?
JINNAH I'll ask you a question for a change. Supposing you were asked which
you would prefer ... a rich England under Germany or a poor England free, what
would your answer be?
SELF It's hardly necessary to say.
JINNAH Quite. Well, doesn't that make your question look a little shoddy? This
great ideal rises far above mere questions of personal comfort or temporary
convenience. The Muslims are a tough people, lean and hardy. If Pakistan
means that they will have to be a little tougher, they will not complain. But why
should it mean that? What conceivable reason is there to suppose that the gift of
nationality is going to be an economic liability? A sovereign nation of a hundred
million people—even if they are not immediately self-supporting and even if they
are industrially backward—is hardly likely to be in a worse economic position
than if its members are scattered and disorganized, under the dominance of two
hundred and fifty million Hindus whose one idea is to exploit them. How any
European can get up and say that Pakistan is 'economically impossible' after the
Treaty of Versailles is really beyond my comprehension. The great brains who
cut Europe into a ridiculous patchwork of conflicting and artificial boundaries are
hardly the people to talk economics to us, particularly as our problem happens to
be far simpler. SELF And does that also apply to defense? JINNAH Of course it
applies to defense. Once again I will ask you a question. How is Afghanistan
defended? Well? The answer is not very complicated. By the Afghans. Just that.
We are a brave and united people who are prepared to work and, if necessary,
fight. So how does the question of defense present any peculiar difficulties? In
what way do we differ from other nations? From Iran, for example? Obviously,
there will have to be a transition period. . . . JINNAH You will remember I said, a
moment ago, that the British would have to do a lot of hard thinking. It's a habit
72
they don't find very congenial; they prefer to be comfortable, to wait and see,
trusting that everything will come right in the end. However, when they do take
the trouble to think, they think as clearly and creatively as any people in the
world. And one of their best thinkers—at least on the Indian problem—was old
John Bright. Have you ever read any of his speeches?
SELF Not since I left school.
JINNAH Well, take a look at this. I found it by chance the other day.
He handed me the book. It was a faded old volume, The Speeches of

John Bright, and the date of the page at which it was opened was June 4th,
1858. This is what the greatest orator in the House of Commons said on that
occasion:
How long does England propose to govern India? Nobody can answer this
question. But be it 50 or 100 or 500 years, does any man with the smallest
glimmering of common sense believe that so great a country, with its 20
different nationalities and its 20 different languages, can ever be bounded
up and consolidated into one compact and enduring empire confine? I
believe such a thing to be utterly impossible.'
JINNAH What Bright said then is true today ... In fact, it's far more true—though,
of course, the emphasis is not so much on the 20 nationalities as on the 2 ... the
Muslim and the Hindu. And why is it more true? Why hasn't time brought us
together? Because the Muslims are awake . . . because they've learnt, through
bitter experience, the sort of treatment they may expect from the Hindus in a
'United India'. A 'United India' means a Hindu-dominated India. It means that and
nothing else. Any other meaning you attempt to impose on it is mythical. 'India' is
a British creation . . . it is merely a single administrative unit governed by a
bureaucracy under the sanction of the sword. That is all. It is a paper creation, it
has no basis in flesh and blood.
SELF The ironical thing is that your critics say that Pakistan itself is a British
creation—that it is an example of our genius for applying the principle of 'divide
and rule'.
JINNAH (with some heat) The man who makes such a suggestion must have a
very poor opinion of British intelligence, apart from his opinion of my own
integrity. The one thing which keeps the British in India is the false idea of a
United India, as preached by Gandhi. A United India, I repeat, is a British
creation—a myth, and a very dangerous myth, which will cause endless strife. As
long as that strife exists, the British have an excuse for remaining. For once in a
way, 'divide and rule' does not apply.
SELF What you want is 'divide and quit'?
73
JINNAH You have put it very neatly.
SELF You realize that all this will come as something of a shock to the British
electorate?
JINNAH Truth is often shocking. But why this truth in particular?
SELF Because the average, decent, liberal-minded voter, who wishes Britain to
fulfill her pledges, and grant independence to India, has heard nothing but the
Congress point of view. The Muslims have hardly a single spokesman in the
West.
JINNAH (bitterly) I am well aware of that. The Hindus have organized a powerful
Press and Congress—Mahasabha are backed up by Hindu capitalists and
industrialists with finance which we have not got.
SELF As a result they believe that Congress is 'India', and since Congress never
tires of repeating that India is one and indivisible, they imagine that any attempt
to divide it is illiberal, reactionary, and generally sinister. They seriously do
believe this. I know that it is muddle-headed, but then a democracy such as ours,
which has to make up its mind on an incredible number of complicated issues,
usually is muddle-headed. What they have to learn is that the only liberal course,
the only generous course, the only course compatible with a sincere intention to
quit India and hand over the reins of government . . .
JINNAH And the only safe course, you might add, is ...
SELF
Pakistan!
JINNAH
The essence of Pakistan—at least of its spirit—is found in the foregoing

dialogue. To give a complete exposition of the details of the plan, in a book of
this size, would be quite impossible. It would need a sheaf of maps and pages of
statistics, and it would carry us far a field, over the borders of India, and involve
us in a great deal of unprofitable speculation.
It is fairly certain, however, that the reader who takes the trouble to go
really deeply into the matter, with a mind unwrapped by prejudice, will come to
the conclusion that Pakistan offers no insuperable difficulties, economic,
ethnographic, political or strategic and is likely, indeed, to prove a good deal
easier of attainment than a large number of similar problems which the world has
successfully resolved in the past fifty years. It is, of course, a major surgical
operation, but unfortunately there are occasions in the lives of nations, as of
individuals, when major surgical operations are not only desirable but vitally
74
necessary. And this is one of those occasions. The constant friction between the
Hindu and Muslim nations has produced something which strongly resembles a
cancer in the body politic. There is only one remedy for a cancer, in its advanced
stages, and that is the knife. Gandhi's faith cures, British soothing syrup, the
ingenious nostrums which are proffered by eager hands throughout the world—
all these are useless. They only aggravate the patient's condition and make his
ultimate cure more difficult. To the knife it will have to come in the end, and
surely one knife, used swiftly and with precision, is better than a million knives,
hacking in blind anarchy in the dark?
What is strange, in the whole Pakistan controversy, is not the support

which it is slowly gaining among all realistic men but the opposition which it still
evokes from sincere well-wishers of India. This is, of course, due to the strength
and persistence of Congress propaganda, backed by Hindu big business. The
Hindus have almost a monopoly of propaganda. By subtle and persistent
suggestion they have managed to persuade the world that they are 'India' and
that any attempt to divide 'India' is a wicked 'plot on the part of the British, acting
on the well-established principle of divide and rule'.
Most liberals of the West have fallen for this propaganda, hook, line and
sinker. Consequently, we have the extraordinary spectacle of 'advanced' British
politicians rising to their feet in the House of Commons, and solemnly and
sincerely pleading the cause of Indian 'Unity' in the joint cause of Indian
independence—sublimely ignorant of the fact that their insistence on this so-
called 'unity' is the one and only thing that keeps the British in the saddle!
Unite and Rule

Divide and Quit
After two decades of independence, Indo-Pakistan relations have

remained static. None of the animosities have been removed, none of the causes
of Partition remedied. In the prevailing conditions, a reduction in the armed forces
of India and Pakistan would freeze the disputes for ever and benefit India. It
would amount to de facto recognition of India's supremacy in the sub-continent
and, to all intents and purposes, legalize its usurpation of Pakistan's economic
and territorial rights. History holds no example of bilateral disarmament between
states with fundamental, unresolved territorial disputes. Disarmament measures
have generally been taken under multilateral aegis like the League of Nations or
the United Nations. Unilateral disarmament is suicidal. Bilateral disarmament
between adversaries is a negation of sovereignty and an admission of defeat by
one of them. In the case of India and Pakistan, bilateral disarmament at present
is inconceivable. It would be a grave risk to agree to bilateral reduction of forces
for all time, when future developments might bring unexpected changes and
cause friction over unresolved disputes.
75
A reduction in armed forces is impracticable for these reasons and for
more mundane considerations. It cannot come about by budgetary discipline
alone. Nor can it be enforced by Pakistan's having one man in uniform for every
three or four Indians in uniform. In a technological age disarmament is no longer
as simple as that. It is no more a question of reducing the number of divisions
and brigades, but a highly complicated undertaking which has so far not
succeeded in producing result in multilateral negotiations. So many factors have
to be taken into account that a balance of strength defies arithmetical calculation.
In reducing the level of our armed forces, we would have to take into account
India's manpower outside her regular forces, her progress in the development of
weapons, her advances in nuclear development, her fuel and mineral resources,
the number and quality of her factories producing tanks and aircraft and
automatic weapons, and the quality of such weapons. These and many other
factors have to be calculated in seeking balanced reduction. In addition, there
would have to be means of verifying the implementation of such an agreement.
India's record in the implementation of past agreements is woefully inadequate.
Inspection and control in so vast a country are more difficult than in Pakistan and,
even if possible, who is to be the custodian of control? If the custodians are to be
the United States and the Soviet Union, it would mean entering into a new phase
of the cold war rather than avoiding war; and the whole point of the operation
would be lost. China would accuse both countries of submission to United
States-Soviet tutelage directed against her.
In spite of the self-evident objections to bilateral disarmament, the

Pakistan Government has taken the unusual step of announcing unilateral
reduction in the expenditure on armed forces for 1967-8. In presenting his
budget, the Finance Minister extolled the virtues of development and expatiated
on the burdens of armaments which he considered to be 'nonproductive
expenditure'. As a 'gesture' to India, the Government reduced the defence
expenditure for the current year by Rs. 70 million (from Rs. 2, 250 million to Rs.
2, 180 million) and imposed a total cut of as much as 24 per cent from the peak
defence expenditure of Rs. 2, 850 million in 1965-6. Judging from past
experience, Pakistan may have to pay very dearly for this gesture. It is a tragic
commentary on present official thinking that it has forgotten what price Pakistan
had to pay during the September war of 1965 for having virtually frozen its
defence expenditure, despite a sharp upward trend in India's defence outlay
since 1962. During that war, many Government officials did not conceal their
bitter regret at not having increased defence expenditure since 1962 to provide
one or two more divisions, which might have made the decisive difference
between victory and defeat.
Even the peak expenditure of Rs. 2, 850 million in the war year of 1965-6
was barely sufficient to onset the expenditure of over Rs. 10, 260 million regularly
earmarked by India since 1962. With the termination of military assistance from
the United States, it would have been more sensible to maintain, if not increase,
the expenditure on defence, which is less than one quarter that of India. In
76
introducing a measure of unilateral disarmament sufficient to have dire
consequences on the nation's security, the Government of Pakistan seems to be
unaware of the truth of Santayana's observation that 'those who cannot
remember the past are condemned to repeat it'.
77
CHAPTER 8
American Demands and the Choices before

Pakistan
The United States' decision to stop military assistance to the sub-continent

appears to be directed against both countries in the form of what was called
'even-handed treatment' at the time of the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1965. Like the
earlier treatment, this, in reality, is injurious only to Pakistan, which for over a
decade has received military equipment solely from the United States. Her armed
forces are accustomed to American weapons and the defence establishment has
been orientated according to American thinking. Pakistan does not possess
sufficient indigenous ordnance factories for its ammunition requirements, nor
does it have a steel mill or factories producing armaments. Although, all of a
sudden, Pakistan's one source of military supplies has dried up, the United
States' decision provoked an uproar in India. Under certain stringent conditions,
the United States has agreed to permit the sale of spare parts on a cash basis to
both countries. This concession, admittedly, will cushion Pakistan's defence
requirements for a brief period. It has been made, however, not to give Pakistan
any passing advantage over India, but to continue to maintain the American hold
on Pakistan's defence machinery. It is in the United States' interest to keep a
finger on the trigger even after the termination of its military assistance. Not only
does it thereby retain its influence in this most vital field, but it can also extract
valuable information concerning the military equipment Pakistan has recently
received from other sources.
If Pakistan does not now hasten to take positive counter-measures to

safeguard her security, India is likely to evict more Muslims on the Assam
borders, take over East Pakistan's water resources, strangle its economy, and
prepare to launch an attack on Azad Kashmir and, if necessary, on the rest of
Pakistan. Internal disorders and external difficulties might well tempt India to
make such an attack. Aggression has now become an established instrument of
India's foreign policy, an instrument employed on no less than six occasions
since her Independence twenty years ago. If the military balance is to swing in
India's favour, there is no reason to suppose that she would hesitate to commit
aggression for the seventh time and strike at Pakistan, her 'enemy number one'.
To turn now to the United States' other sub-continental objectives, there is

sufficient evidence on record to establish that the Anglo-American Powers
wanted a united India to face the 'historical threat' of Russia to the sub-continent
and their control of the Indian Ocean. They accepted Partition reluctantly and, at
that time, did much to strengthen India in the hope and expectation that, when
78
the passions of the moment had died down, the two peoples would come
together again. After Independence the United States made many overtures to
India and, only when it became clear that Prime Minister Nehru was not prepared
to involve India in Great Power politics and become a pawn in the global
struggle, was Pakistan inveigled into the pacts in 1954 and military assistance
extended. After 1962 the whole situation changed. The United States saw a great
opportunity to step into India and win it over to its sphere of influence. In the
expectation that it would ultimately be able to lever Pakistan into a position of co-
operation with India the United States warmly applauded the proposal of joint
defence and subsequently made many strenuous efforts to promote collaboration
between India and Pakistan.
As a result of these changed conditions, the United States sees the

Jammu and Kashmir dispute in a different light. It is for this reason that United
Nations resolutions calling for the exercise of the right of self-determination by
the people of Jammu and Kashmir have faded into the background. There can be
no fairer way to resolve such a dispute than to ascertain the wishes of the
people, but the United States now regards this problem as an embarrassing
obstruction in the realization of its plan to encircle China. It has to consider
India's need to hold the Kashmir valley with its lines of communication to the
sensitive region of Ladakh. If this dispute were to be resolved on an equitable
basis, it would, in all probability, lead to a peaceful boundary settlement between
Pakistan and China. The United States, however, requires not peace on the
frontiers with China, but tension to pin down China's military forces from the
borders of Manchuria to Ladakh. It would suit American interests for the dispute
to be absorbed in a larger overall settlement between India and Pakistan. This
would permit the tension on the frontiers to continue with greater intensity and
with a united military presence. If the dispute has to be frozen, the termination of
military assistance to Pakistan and the resultant military imbalance between India
and Pakistan can only help to perpetuate the unjust status quo.
It may be asked why India should be reluctant to come to so

advantageous a settlement. If lndo-Pakistani co-operation were the exclusive aim
of the United States, there would be no reason at all for India to object. If that aim
was only to bring about maximum co-operation between India and Pakistan for
its own sake, India would experience a sense of triumph; but the attempt to bring
about this co-operation is not for its own sake but to encircle China. Having had
experience of a minor conflict with China, India is fearful of provoking a hostile
confrontation and in normal circumstances would want to maintain a position of
non-alignment. She has to contend, however, with the legacy of the Sino-Indian
dispute and take into account her present economic and military dependence on
the United States and her food-grain requirements, which the United States
alone can supply and without which millions of Indians would starve to death. But
for these conditions, in all probability India would have sought an adjustment with
China. Whether she now wants or does not want such a settlement is irrelevant.
What is relevant is that India certainly does not want to aggravate her differences
79
with China and become a pawn in the global conflict. It is one thing to live with
the legacy of a border conflict and extract substantial concessions out of the
United States by exploiting and exaggerating the border tension. It is quite
another to become party to an arrangement which might spell total disaster for
the sub-continent. The Vietnam war might well extend beyond its present
frontiers. Were that to happen, the attitude of India and Pakistan would be of very
great importance and, naturally, India does not want to be involved in such an
entanglement. She has followed a policy of non-alignment, but circumstances
have put her in a posture of double-alignment. Her resistance to co-operation
with Pakistan arises not out of the co-operation per se, which is her historical
mission, but because this kind of co-operation can only lead to entanglement in
global politics. For this reason, India would hesitate and pressure must therefore
be exerted on her, but to a lesser degree than on Pakistan. If India succumbs,
she is still a doubtful beneficiary. To succeed, where Gandhi and Nehru failed, in
securing Pakistan's subservience would be a stimulant to the demoralized people
of India and would, perhaps, temporarily arrest internal fissiparous tendencies;
but, in return, to be called upon to face China as a belligerent in the global
struggle would be a poor exchange. Despite the advantages of such an
arrangement, India is likely to consider her consequent entanglement in the
United States' global strategy is too high a price to pay for these benefits; in
which case she would be subjected to further pressure.
For Pakistan, however, the sacrifice would be twofold. The idea of

becoming subservient to India is abhorrent and that of co-operation with India,
with the object of provoking tension with China, equally repugnant. Such an
arrangement as the United States Government has in mind has both advantages
and disadvantages for India; but for Pakistan only disadvantages. If India,
notwithstanding her differences with China, is reluctant to become a party in a
major conflict with China, it is all the more necessary for Pakistan to avoid a fatal
conflict with a country that gave proof of its friendship by coming to our
assistance when we faced aggression from India. It would be catastrophic for
Pakistan to be dragged into such an alignment.
America's reason for terminating military aid is to force both countries into
confrontation with China. Indo-Pakistani cooperation is a necessary step towards
a fixed objective, which is the encirclement of China. The United States, being
badly bogged down in Vietnam, would like to give military assistance only to
countries willing to use that assistance in the Vietnam war and prepared to use it
against China. It does not want to waste its weapons and munitions on countries
which might use them in conflicts in which the United States is not engaged.
Mr..Mc Namara announced in the spring of 1967 that the Asian countries which
will receive the bulk of United States' military assistance—apart from South
Vietnam—will be South Korea, Thailand, Philippines, and Taiwan. All are
involved in the Vietnam conflict and are co-operating with the United States'
armed forces in one form or another.
80
Apart from the message the decision is intended to convey to India and
Pakistan, it seems a sensible policy to supply armaments only to those countries
engaged in the Vietnam war and not to countries which are not prepared to use
them in this common struggle. Whatever the known prejudice against partition
and however unrelaxing the effort in pursuit of a subcontinent united against
Communist China, and whatever the changes brought about during the Kennedy
administration by the placing of greater emphasis on economic assistance in
contradistinction to military alliances, the pragmatic and compelling reason for
the suspension of military assistance is to be found in the vicissitudes of
Vietnam. With the understandable exception of Israel, which is, in a fundamental
sense, both a domestic and an international responsibility of the United States,
military equipment is supplied to be used against Communism and not in non-
Communist conflicts. This is the crux of the matter. Since the end of the Second
World War, the United States has only given military assistance to those
countries which are prepared to join in alliance against Communist states.
Western Europe was given massive economic and military assistance to become
a powerful bastion against the Soviet Union. Military alliances were forged in Asia
for the same purpose. Japan, Philippines, Taiwan, South Korea, Thailand, and
South Vietnam were given military assistance to confront the People's Republic
of China. Iran, Turkey, and Greece were given military assistance to become
powerful fortresses against the Soviet Union. Pakistan was armed on condition
that she, like other countries in Asia, Europe, and Latin America, entered into
alliance in recognition of the Communist danger and would be prepared to be a
part of the world-wide encirclement of the Soviet Union and China with the
common and collective purpose of containing Communism, if necessary, with the
use of force.
The assumption was that Pakistan, being an ideological state, was a

natural opponent of godless Communism and, as such, a natural friend of the
United States. It was well known that Pakistan had fundamental disputes with
India and there was the fear that Pakistan was seeking military assistance only in
order to buttress her defences against India. This doubt was always present in
the thinking of the United States, but there was the contrary hope that, with the
passage of time, Indo-Pakistani differences would resolve themselves and
Pakistan would give undivided attention to the Communist threat. This hope
seemed to be justified in view of Pakistan's many acts in support of the United
States; and in view of Prime Minister Nehru's attitude and declarations, which
appeared to the United States to further Communist interests. To demonstrate
Pakistan's sincerity and our attachment to the common interest, we deliberately
pursued a policy of aloofness towards the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China. Our relations with the Soviet Union were virtually non-existent.
Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan abruptly cancelled his visit to the Soviet Union
after having sought and received an invitation. This unwarranted step could
hardly have contributed to good relations. Many strains developed in our
relations with that Great Power until a climax was reached with the U-2 episode.
81
Pakistan had recognized China after the revolution, but our relations with
that country were far from normal. Admittedly, there was an exchange of visits
between Prime Ministers on one occasion and some trade contacts, but relations
were not satisfactory. Having initially supported China's admission to the United
Nations, we later reversed our attitude under pressure from the United States.
We were also responsible for some unwarranted provocations during the Korean
conflict, so that before 1962 relations between the two countries could not be
described as cordial. In the United Nations and other international forums,
Pakistan was generally prominent in support of United States' policies, at times
with embarrassing fidelity. It was therefore believed that, although India was
Pakistan's traditional antagonist, Pakistan nevertheless remained faithful to the
United States as its natural friend in the fulfilment of its global policies directed
against Communism. To this extent, there was no contradiction in Pakistan's
relations with the United States, and we continued to receive military assistance
as an ally in a common cause against a common enemy. In reality, -however,
there was a fundamental contradiction between the assumption under which the
United States entered into special relations with Pakistan and Pakistan's own
aims. The United States recognized the risks involved in arming Pakistan, but it
nevertheless rendered military assistance for the following reasons:
1. It believed that Indo-Pakistani disputes would sooner or later be

resolved under the compulsion of geography and of economic and other
factors.
2. It believed that, with the increase of its influence in the sub-continent, it
would assist the two countries to come to terms.
3. It believed that, if India and Pakistan resolved their differences,
Pakistan at least would play its part in the struggle against Communism.
4. Pakistan had an ideology different from Communism, and a
conservative leadership was in firm control of the country.
5. Pakistan had sufficiently demonstrated its antipathy to Communism
internally and externally.
6. It planned to give military assistance in such a way as to retain effective
control over its weapons so that, if Pakistan 'misused' the equipment, the
United States could quickly frustrate the venture.
Assistance was provided to Pakistan for one set of reasons and received
for another. To this contradiction the Sino-Indian conflict of 1962 added an
entirely new element. Nehru ceased to be an antagonist of the United States. In
despair and disillusion, he pleaded for American military assistance to rescue
himself from the talons of Communist China. It was non-aligned India, and not
aligned Pakistan, that had joined battle with America's chief adversary. This new
development offered limitless opportunities to the United States for penetrating
India in order to bring that country gradually into an arrangement directed against
China, which, by this time, had become the United States' principal adversary.
This altered situation revealed the irreconcilable contradictions between the
82
different assumptions on which Pakistan and the United States had built their
special relations.
For the first time during this period, genuine measures were taken by
Pakistan to improve relations with China and, to a lesser extent, with the Soviet
Union. With these new developments taking shape, it would have been both
naive and unrealistic to expect the United States to continue rendering military
assistance to Pakistan for an indefinite period of time. Imperceptibly, events were
moving Pakistan towards a final choice. We had either to forsake our
fundamental national interests and become hostile to China and continue to
qualify for military assistance; or improve relations with China and maintain the
struggle for the attainment of our vital national interests at the risk of the
suspension of American military assistance. Let us for the moment consider the
consequences of acquiescing to the United States' global interest.
In exploring the possibilities available in capitulation by instalment, it must

be remembered that it is a function of diplomacy to look for various approaches
and to avoid abrupt decisions which sound like ultimatums. What is important is
the implementation of policy and the direction it takes. Change comes about
gradually and imperceptibly; often, under the cover of emphatic denials. It is like
sowing seed for a harvest which will mature only in its natural period. In the
present instance, acquiescence could be given over a period of time to any of the
following alternatives:
1. Agreement to co-operate with India in an overall settlement, with the

disputes absorbed in the larger settlement and jointly to confront China.
2. A secret compromise with the United States and with India on terms of co-
operation in the larger context, gaining time to prepare the people of
Pakistan for its acceptance.
3. Agreement to co-operate with India against China, provided the United
States were to use its influence to bring about an honourable and just
settlement of disputes between India and Pakistan.
4. An inequitable settlement with India, not involving Pakistan in confrontation
with China.
5. No overall and inequitable settlement with India, but agreement to treat
China as an antagonist, independently, as was the position before 1962.
Within the framework of the United States' global objectives, there is little to
choose between any of these alternatives. Only outside the sphere of Global
Power politics can Pakistan find freedom of action leading to other, and more
beneficial, conclusions.
Let us consider the implications of each available choice:
1. From the United States' point of view, the ideal solution would be for
Pakistan to co-operate with India in an overall settlement with the disputes
83
absorbed in the larger settlement and collectively to face China. Conversely, this
arrangement would be the most damaging to Pakistan, involving an abject
surrender to India, a betrayal of values which have been sacrosanct for
centuries. It would, moreover, result in enmity with a powerful and friendly
neighbour which came to Pakistan's assistance in her hour of greatest peril.
Instead of reducing tension, this solution would multiply tensions and create a
host of internal problems. It could bring the flames of war into our homes and,
were the Vietnam war to spread, it might involve our country in a war of total
destruction. An agreement on such terms would not only be humiliating and
dangerous, but would provide no material compensations.
2. It would not be possible to keep such a deplorable compromise secret, nor

would it serve the United States' interest to maintain the secrecy for long.
Moreover, the revelation of such a compromise would cause consternation and
be violently opposed by the people of Pakistan.
3. The United States could be told that, as a quid pro quo for the resumption
of military assistance, Pakistan would cooperate with India against China
provided the United States exerted its influence on India to agree to an honorable
settlement of all disputes. In such an event, the United States is likely to assure
Pakistan that it would make renewed efforts for a fair settlement but, at the same
time, caution Pakistan that it is not in a position to force India to relinquish
Jammu and Kashmir. Were such vague and ambivalent assurances to be
offered, Pakistan should remember the bitter experience of the past; and
remember, too, that it might not be in the United States' interest to disturb the
status quo in Jammu and Kashmir, in view of the Sino-Indian dispute over
Ladakh. Pakistan would be entrapped by such a commitment and the disputes
would remain unsettled on a satisfactory basis. If, in such conditions, military
assistance is resumed to Pakistan, India would also become eligible. That
country's own internal resources and capacity for the production of armaments,
coupled with the ever-flowing military supplies from the Soviet Union and Eastern
Europe together with the restored assistance from the United States, would soon
tilt the military balance between India and Pakistan steeply in India's favor. This
would end all chance of an honorable settlement of disputes with India, and, in a
few years, India would be in a commanding position to attack Pakistan. In such a
situation China, not unaware of Pakistan's changed posture, would be unlikely to
respond sympathetically to Pakistan's difficulties.
The restoration of military assistance in such circumstances would be of no

avail. It would be brought to a grinding halt— as in the last conflict—if it were
used in defense against India, but with the difference that, on this occasion,
China would also be hostile. Such an undertaking would achieve not the
encirclement of China, but of Pakistan. It would maintain the enmity of India from
the south and of China from the north and the east; and, from what may be
gathered from recent newspaper reports, it would influence the attitude of
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Afghanistan as well. Such would be the position in the event of renewed
hostilities between India and Pakistan.
The influx of military equipment at the present, or any foreseeable, level

would be insufficient to defend Pakistan against China or the Soviet Union. To
the objections regarding the inadequate quantum of military equipment for
defense against these Powers, the United States has always maintained that, in
the event of a full-scale armed conflict, it would itself step in with its military might
and consider the use of ultimate weapons. After Vietnam, however, there can be
no certainty that the United States will ever again commit its ground forces in
vast numbers on the land-mass of Asia. If, moreover, there were any certainty in
the use of ultimate weapons, President de Gaulle would not have made his bold
departure from the integrated defense system of Western Europe and the
Atlantic alliance to give France an independent nuclear deterrent. If Europe, the
mother of the United States, is uncertain about the use of nuclear weapons by
the United States for the defense of Europe, it is all the more necessary for Asia
to be skeptical. In any event, to contribute to a situation that would invite nuclear
weapons to our territory, would make us the planners of our own destruction. In
the one contingency, we would not be in a position to use effectively the military
assistance against India, which is our adversary, and from whom we fear attack;
and in the other that is in the event of its use against China or the Soviet Union, it
might lead to the annihilation of our country. So, in either case, the restoration of
the status quo as it existed before 1962 would have disastrous consequences.
Submission to such terms would mean a spiral of tension in times of peace and
destruction in times of war. We would surround ourselves with powerful
adversaries were we to rely on the nebulous assurance that, if we went to war
with the nuclear giants, our friend across the seven seas would be at our bidding.
The United States might offer such an assurance, because it is a step in the
attainment of its objective, but if it restored military assistance on such terms
there would be still more strings attached to it. The United States believes that
Pakistan's recent actions have worked against the interest of its global policies.
Seeking to bring it back to heel, it would like to ensure that Pakistan does not
again get out of hand. So any assurances that Pakistan gets, and any
assurances that Pakistan gives, will not automatically restore confidence. Our
country will be made to demonstrate its bona-fides time in and time out, till it
leads to our isolation and total dependence.
4. If Pakistan agrees to a settlement with India without agreeing to face

China, this would be acceptable to the United States, whom it would give an
opportunity to move step by step from one favorable position to another. In these
circumstances also, the United States might restore military assistance to both
countries, ensuring, however, that co-operation between them will, in due course,
become total and that its own increasing influence in the sub-continent will
eventually enable it to attain its principal objective. This arrangement would be
acceptable to India if the understanding goes no further, but agreeable to the
United States only as an interim position. Even if Pakistan unequivocally made it
85
clear that such co-operation would not be employed against China, it would not
enjoy any credence in that country. The confidence gained so assiduously would
be lost and China would assume that the change of policy has been made with
the eventual object of encircling it. Thus, even in such a situation, Pakistan would
arouse the suspicions of China and find herself in compromising situation after
situation.
Pakistan's diplomacy will meet its severest test in resisting this arrangement.
The terms of the alternatives have the approval of both India and the United
States. It is here that the parallel interests of the United States and India
converge and, therefore, Pakistan must exercise the utmost vigilance to frustrate
the maneuvers, as, in the ultimate analysis, they lead to the same results.
5. Pakistan can agree to continue to treat China as an antagonist as was the

position up to 1962, but not co-operate with India in the absence of an honorable
settlement of disputes. In the course of time, the United States has found this
situation to be unsatisfactory. So long as Indo-Pakistani differences exist it is
difficult for the United States to work with any degree of certainty in this region.
There are too many imponderables in the situation. Such an agreement would
harm it and is one which has already failed. What the United States wants is the
maximum effective encirclement of China, for which neither Pakistan nor India is
alone sufficient; their collaboration is essential. But even if the United States
agrees to such an accommodation, it will continue to make efforts to bring about
the co-operation between India and Pakistan for its global interest, especially in
view of the strategic difficulties in the eastern wing of the sub-continent, where
only a narrow strip of a few miles separates Pakistan from Assam and the
Himalayan states. Without the co-operation of Pakistan this whole region is
extremely vulnerable to armed penetration. Such an agreement would result in
renewed antagonism between China and Pakistan and the continuance of
existing tensions between India and Pakistan, a situation which Afghanistan is
not likely to ignore. It would again bring about the encirclement of Pakistan and
increase the number of its adversaries from one to three. Nor would that be the
end of the story. If we agree to such terms, Pakistan would be called upon to
make a token contribution in the Vietnam War. The moment Pakistan agrees to
make any contribution to the United States' military effort in Vietnam, it will make
itself eligible for military assistance, but this would mean an irreconcilable conflict
with China. It would not only be an action against the current of history, alien to
the movement of our times, but it might also encourage India to become more
hostile in the hope of provoking an open quarrel between China and Pakistan.
The Soviet Union and China and, indeed, all Socialist and non-aligned States
would regard us as mercenaries engaged against fellow Asians in a barbaric and
unjust war.
All five choices are unacceptable to Pakistan. In one way or another, all lead
to the same fatal consequences. This does not mean that Pakistan does not
want a settlement with India; indeed, Pakistan fervently seeks peace with India,
86
but the settlement must be honorable and on the basis of equality. Once the
disputes are resolved in a spirit of understanding and according to norms of
justice, Pakistan would be prepared to co-operate with India on terms of mutual
benefit. However, this co-operation must be between two sovereign independent
nations and not dictated by Global Powers for their own ends. India and Pakistan
must be left free to shape their own futures in peace. If their disputes are
resolved honorably, outside the interplay of global politics, no one in Pakistan will
object to co-operation between the two nations.
In analyzing the implications of military assistance, a balance sheet has to be

drawn up of gains and losses. The cessation of aid has both advantages and
drawbacks. It can be interpreted as a development which has saved Pakistan
from being engulfed in a deplorable Asian or global war. If we refuse to use arms
against the Soviet Union and China, those Global Powers have a corresponding
obligation not to use their arms against us. It would remove sources of suspicion
and conflict between Pakistan and its two powerful northern neighbors. It would
permit Pakistan to give its undivided attention and resources to meet the one and
only genuine threat to its security and territorial integrity. The question is how
Pakistan can adequately meet this threat to its security in the absence of
renewed military assistance from the United States. While it is true that military
assistance was not made available for use against India, nevertheless its
possession did act as a deterrent against India. In the last war, Pakistan was
able to use the United States' military assistance until the United States imposed
an embargo and other restrictions.
The question now to be answered is how is this deterrent to be maintained?
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CHAPTER 9
The Indo-Pakistan War and its Analogies
The ways in which Pakistan can meet the challenge to her vital interests
can best be considered by seeing how she stands in the world. Indeed, an
assessment of Pakistan's international position and her attitude to world issues is
of paramount importance in evaluating how she will be able to resist foreign
intervention in her internal affairs.
To some extent the policies of the United States and India run parallel, but
fortunately for Pakistan their ultimate objectives differ. In the interest of its
sovereignty, it is essential for Pakistan to conduct its diplomacy in such a way as
to divide the parallel lines and enlarge the contradictions. India seeks to bring
Pakistan back to Mother India, but is not anxious to become entangled in a global
conflict against China. The United States wants to see meaningful co-operation
between India and Pakistan with the purpose of encircling China and, if this is to
be the purpose, India would hesitate to have that kind of co-operation with
Pakistan. India would equally resent the growing interference in her internal
affairs aimed at making her an active instrument in the cold war.
Pakistan has no alternative but to resist foreign interference inimical to her

national interest and to carry on the struggle for the vindication of its legitimate
rights in the sub-continent. The success or failure of her diplomacy will depend
not only on her bilateral and direct relations with India, on the one hand, and with
the United States on the other, and with them jointly, but on the manner in which
she discharges her international obligations and conducts her general foreign
policy.
Although the principal challenge to Pakistan comes from India and the
brunt of the international pressure from the United States, it would be wrong to
lose sight of the rest of the world in this context. Just as it was necessary to trace
the evolution of United States' relations with Pakistan in order to interpret
properly that country's recent actions affecting Pakistan, it is equally necessary
for Pakistan to define and determine her place in the world, in Asia, and in the
subcontinent, for meeting the challenge of the times.
Pakistan has a moral obligation to support de-colonization and to strive for

a more equitable economic and social international order. Afro-Asian unity is a
powerful force for emancipation and Pakistan, as a member of the Afro-Asian
community, has to be in the vanguard of the Afro-Asian movement. It can be
justly demanded from Pakistan that she should continue to identify herself with
88
the aspirations of the peoples of these continents. Like us, most of Asia and
Africa was in bondage for centuries. As a newly independent country, it is our
bounden duty to accelerate the progress of freedom and economic emancipation.
We cannot expect other states to support us in our righteous cause if we are
reluctant to put our weight behind the just causes of others. It is only when we
are prepared to share in the common struggle and exercise our influence in a
spirit of comradeship and equality that we can expect to enhance our prestige
and find increased support for ourselves. Afro-Asian solidarity is neither a myth
nor an abstract philosophy, but a condition necessary both for our individual
advancement as well as our collective protection. The underdeveloped nations,
the bulk of which are in Asia and Africa, are the proletarian nations of the world.
Though individually they may be as weak and impoverished as is a single
workman or peasant, together they are as formidable as a collective movement
of the laboring masses.
So far, Pakistan has been able to identify herself with the aspirations of
Asia and Africa and our support for these countries has been of significant
advantage to us. In Asia and Africa, as in Europe, there are certain key states
which require Pakistan's particular attention. In Africa she must cultivate better
relations with the French-speaking countries, as well as with Muslim states and
Commonwealth nations; and in Asia, we must concentrate our attention on our
neighbors and such countries as Japan, Cambodia, and the heroic nation of
Vietnam, which deserves our special sympathy.
Japan is the most prosperous country in Asia on account of its highly

developed economy. Like the Federal Republic of Germany, it is at present under
heavy American influence. In many ways it is the most important country in Asia
as regards the United States' grand strategy against China. For years after the
Second World War the Japanese took little part in international affairs, but are
now increasingly exerting their influence in Asian and world affairs. However,
Japanese interests are not likely to deviate from those of the United States for a
long time. To give one example, Japan refused to allow Pakistan International
Airlines to touch Tokyo in continuation of its flights to Canton and Shanghai. We
must learn to live with such problems and be patient, for it is essential that we
improve our economic and cultural co-operation with Japan; and if, in the
meantime, we cannot get Japanese support, we should try to assure their
neutrality in questions important to us.
Pakistan has a primary responsibility to foster comradeship among Muslim

nations in accordance with its traditional foreign policy, which derives from the
obligations imposed by the country's Constitution and ideology. We share with
the Muslim states stretching from Morocco to Indonesia a number of affinities,
and even before Independence, Muslims of the sub-continent gave what support
they could to Islamic causes. This movement of solidarity is a factor which cannot
be ignored by the Great and Global Powers in the formulation of their policies.
Although Pakistan's policy has always been to develop the friendliest possible
89
relations with Muslim countries, she has on occasion’s encountered difficulties.
There have been failures, which can be ascribed partly to our lack of experience
in international affairs and partly to the internecine conflicts of the Middle East.
The traditional problems of the Middle East always appear to be colossal,

but they have been surpassed by those introduced with the Arab-Israel war of
June 1967. This brief conflict has, temporarily at least, changed the map of the
region and radically altered the balance of power. It has done incalculable harm
to the Arab peoples, but the sting of defeat may provide their leaders with a final
opportunity to rally and remedy the wrongs they have suffered. Internal Arab
disputes, which were getting more and more complicated, can perhaps now be
smoothed out. One of the main causes of antagonism between the Arab states
lies in their conflicting social systems, but, if Capitalism and Communism can co-
exist, it should not be beyond the reach of human endeavor to establish a
working accommodation between Arab socialism and Arab conservatism;
especially as Islam, language, and geography form permanent links of cohesion.
The scars of war and the need to redress the consequences of defeat should
furnish the incentive for an urgently needed modus vivendi between the Arab
socialist and conservative regimes. Since the United Arab Republic occupies a
special place in the Arab World and in Africa, and for other obvious reasons too,
Pakistan should cultivate its relations with that country. This need not be
inconsistent with her cordial relations with Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.
The war in the Yemen has bedeviled inter-Arab relations and must be brought to
an early end to permit Arab unity to counter the threat of Israel. Had Arab forces
not been engaged in such large numbers in the Yemen, they could have been
deployed to better use against Israel in the last war.
The tragedy of this futile war in the Yemen is that a treaty to terminate
hostilities, called the Jeddah Agreement, already exists between the United Arab
Republic and Saudi Arabia; but although it has been in existence for over a year,
there has been not the slightest movement towards its implementation. It could in
no way be construed as an act of interference if friendly states were to urge the
implementation of an agreement which has already been voluntarily arrived at by
the two states. If the war in the Yemen does not come to an end and if the
disorders in Aden and its surrounding territories become more serious, this
sensitive region could become the cockpit of a bitter conflict involving not only an
enlarged quarrel between Muslim states, but also attracting Great Power
intervention. The Arabs do not need to be told what it means to invite Great
Power intervention. Even before the Arab-Israel war, the interference of Great
Powers in their region had caused them innumerable difficulties. There are many
ways of resisting the interference of Great and Global Powers: one is to remove
the conditions which attract their intervention. The problems of the Gulf region
will have to be looked at anew by the Arab states in order to eliminate
intervention by the Great Powers and to prevent regional tensions. What is
needed is to prevent the plunder of the fabulous wealth of the poverty-stricken
people of the region. Federations of the sheikhs are being considered to facilitate
90
collective exploitation. The blessing of freedom does not create a void. On the
contrary, a free people are the best guardians of their rights. The theory of
'political vacuum' is a product of neo-colonialism, and the departure of the British
will create no such vacuum. The people of the Persian Gulf region will have to
resolve their differences like a truly independent people unwrapped by the
prejudices left behind by colonialism. Pakistan must keep a vigilant eye on such
potential trouble spots; for circumstances could place her on the horns of a
dilemma. She must work for the reduction of tensions and make what
contributions she can towards shaping peaceful co-existence among fraternal
Islamic states.
The internal Arab quarrels, the conflict in the Yemen, and the rivalries
between progressive and conservative regimes in the Arab world, have all been
overtaken by the Middle East war of June 1967. No event since the end of the
Second World War has caused greater territorial changes. It has called in
question the raison d'etre of the balance of terror between the Global Powers and
given substance to China's criticism of the doctrine of co-existence.
In considering these events, it is important to make comparisons and learn

their lessons. Before unleashing its aggression on Pakistan, India conducted
some probing military operations in the Rann of Kutch to test Pakistan's resolve
in resisting encroachments on her territory. Similarly, Israel conducted probing
operations against Jordan in November 1966 and against Syria before
embarking on aggression. Prime Minister Shastri and the Israeli Prime Minister
Levi Eshkol chose exactly the same words with which to threaten the victims of
aggression, saying that they would attack at a time and place of their choosing.
In both the Indo-Pakistan war and the conflict between Israel and the Arab
states, aggression was committed by the usurpers of territory. Even so, some
Western Powers were critical of the victims of aggression for acts of war,
forgetting that the United Nations Charter provides for self-defence and general
international law permits wars of liberation under the well-established doctrine of
Bellum Tustum. Just as Pakistan did not immediately come to the aid of the
freedom fighters in Jammu and Kashmir, the Arab states also did not carry their
action to a logical conclusion after closing the Gulf of Aqaba, as they had a right
to do under international law. Neither Pakistan nor the Arab states completed the
plain exercise of their rights, and all suffered as a result. In both cases the
initiative was left to the aggressors, who took the fullest advantage by striking
first with all their might. In the Indo-Pakistan war, the Air Force of Pakistan
gained mastery of the skies and this supremacy had its effect on the fortunes of
the war. In the Middle Eastern conflict, Israel with its surprise attack gained the
decisive air superiority. In both wars the aggressors violated cease-fire
agreements and occupied strategic territories after the cease-fire; in both,
sanctions were threatened by the Global Powers. After the Indo-Pakistan war,
the Indians committed genocide in Kashmir, driving Muslims from their homes
and replacing them by Hindu Dogra populations. Similarly, Israel has now begun
to evict Arabs from the territories they occupied and is calling for fresh Jewish
91
immigration from other countries in order to replace the indigenous population
and to reduce the Arab majority into a minority.
The Great Powers' attitudes displayed even more striking similarities. The
United States proclaimed its neutrality in the Indo-Pakistan war, but in the event
its attitude caused difficulty to Pakistan. Similarly, in the Arab-Israel war it
proclaimed its neutrality, but was sympathetic to Israel. After the ultimatum given
to India by the People's Republic of China, the Anglo-American Powers
threatened Pakistan with dire consequences; and a few days before the Israeli
attack the American Ambassador to Cairo made a demarche to President
Nasser. In both conflicts, the United States and the Soviet Union co-operated in
the United Nations and demanded ceasefires. Under cover of the Security
Council the United States and the Soviet Union got together to hammer out a
resolution to put an end to hostilities without settling the merits of the disputes.
Commenting on the effect this co-operation had, Senator Fulbright says:
Soviet-American co-operation in bringing about the cease-fire in the India-

Pakistan war in September 1965 is one example of the kind of beneficial
collaboration that the Vietnamese war makes increasingly difficult. That co-
operation—or 'parallelism', as it was called—was possible because the Kashmir
war was one of the very few international conflicts of the postwar era, and
perhaps the most important, in relation to which Russia and America had similar
interests. As a result of their shared interest in a cease-fire that would humiliate
neither India nor Pakistan while also having the effect of restraining China, the
Soviet Union and the United States brought decisive influence to bear for the
acceptance by both sides of the United Nations Security Council cease-fire
resolution.
The interplay of Global Powers working in unison behind the screen of the
United Nations to produce resolutions on the Middle East was strikingly
reminiscent of the treatment given to Kashmir from the time of the first conflict
twenty years ago to the day when the Security Council again demanded another
cease-fire in September 1965. The same story is being written again with
unimaginative repetition. The same man, Gunnar Jaring, carrying the same brief-
case, has been dispatched to the capitals of the Middle East in the same way in
which he travelled between India and Pakistan little less than a decade ago. The
Secretary-General of the United Nations was deputed in both instances to plead
for a cease-fire and the United Nations was used as a cover by the Super-
Powers to co-ordinate their policies. In both the wars, once agreement was
reached between the Super-Powers, the Security Council demanded a cease-fire
and threatened sanctions. In both the wars, the Soviet Union did not want the
hostilities to be enlarged into a conflict of the Great Powers and for this reason
was anxious to terminate them at all costs. In the Arab-Israel war, the Soviet
Union took a wavering position as it did in the Indo-Pakistan war and, in the final
analysis, in both cases, it collaborated with the United States to enforce their
common will. In the search for peace, France played a commendable role in both
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conflicts by looking beyond mere cease-fires, while Britain in both stood behind
the United States. As in the case of the Indo-Pakistan war, it is being suggested
that the United Nations' resolution for the withdrawal of Israeli forces can only be
effective with Anglo-American and Soviet collaboration; and, again, that if the
United Nations are unable to effect a settlement, the four Great Powers,
excluding China, should make an attempt to secure peace in the Middle East.
China came out with unqualified support for the victims of aggression in both
wars, as did the bulk of the Third World. Soon after the Indo-Pakistan war came
to an end, the United States became active in pressing Pakistan and India to
collaborate on joint economic ventures. Hardly has the smell of cordite
disappeared from the Middle Eastern battlefield, when obtuse suggestions of
joint economic collaboration between Israel and the Arab states are emanating
from the United States. As in the case of India and Pakistan, the benefits of
sharing the river waters are being extolled in the Middle East. After a reappraisal
of policy, in April 1967, the United States terminated its military aid to Pakistan
and India. Now the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee is
reported to be considering the establishment of sub-committees to study
American Aid to the Middle East, and it has been suggested that the Great
Powers should collaborate to limit armaments to the Middle East. In both cases,
the United States is insisting on 'an overall settlement' between the belligerents.
Perhaps the most important similarity between the two situations was the dark
shadow of the Vietnam war, which paradoxically provided both the opportunity for
starting the wars and the compulsion for bringing them to a rapid end.
The points of difference are of equal interest, in so far as they illustrate

even more fully the complex realities of the international situation. The most
significant difference between Pakistan's situation and that of the Arab states
appears in the fact that, while China supported us unequivocally and without
reservations and, as an immediate neighbor, was in a position effectively to
implement its ultimatum, the Soviet support to the Arab World turned out to be
disappointing at the height of the war. On the military side, shortly before the
cease-fire Pakistan was better placed; whereas in the Arab-Israel war, Israel had
attained its military objectives and was still advancing when the cease-fire was
agreed upon.
Events, if they are properly controlled, and opportunities, if they are

properly grasped, will put an end to Britain's 'East of Suez' role. The United
States, in spite of its successes, has damaged its long-term position in the Middle
East. The prestige of the Soviet Union has suffered and, unless it stages a
spectacular come-back with massive military assistance and other measures of
tangible support, its position in the Arab World is unlikely to recover quickly. It is
reported that Cuba charged the Soviet Union with 'scandalous capitulation'. In an
attempt to repair the damage to Soviet prestige, diplomatic relations with Israel
were severed, the Russian Prime Minister went to the General Assembly, and
the President to Cairo, Damascus, and Baghdad; but unless the Soviet Union
succeeds in making Israel relinquish captured territory, and takes other
93
concomitant steps to reassert its claim to world leadership, its prestige will not
easily be restored. There was disillusionment in Arab countries over the attitude
of the Soviet Union to their war with Israel. The explanation given for the Russian
compromise was that its intervention would have led to a Third World War. Had
another world war taken place, it would not have been confined to the destruction
of the Soviet Union. If the Anglo-American Powers were prepared to face these
consequences, or at least give the impression that they would face them in the
fulfillment of their commitments to Israel, the change in the Soviet Union's
attitude cannot be explained away on the ground that its intervention on behalf of
the Arab states would have led to a major war. The truth of the matter is that the
Soviet Union cannot continue to make one compromise after another without
relinquishing its claims to the leadership of revolutionary causes. There is little
room left for any further accommodation. Russia must either re-establish her
authority as the protector of oppressed peoples' just causes, even if the
fulfillment of this responsibility carries the risk of war, or forsake her commanding
position in international affairs.
It has been a long road from the militant and uncompromising attitude of
Stalin to Khrushchev's spirit of Camp David and now to Prime Minister Kosygin's
Glassboro summit meetings, which President Johnson is already beginning to
describe as the spirit of Holly bush. If the spirit of Hollybush is the continuation of
the journey from the spirit of Camp David, instead of a return to the road which
brought the Soviet Union to the pinnacle of power, it would mean the end of the
Soviet Union's outstanding authority in international affairs. The near future will
show whether Hollybush has been a continuation of the journey from Gamp
David or is an about-turn in the direction of an uncompromising position on
fundamental problems affecting the Third World within the framework of the
Soviet Union's ideological responsibilities.
China has now emerged as the undisputed champion of oppressed

peoples and their just causes, and will strive to regain ground lost in Asia and
Africa after the failure to hold the Second Afro-Asian Conference and the
reverses in Indonesia and Ghana. As a manifestation of the United States'
growing influence in the sub-continent, India will find reasons for taking a more
conciliatory attitude towards Israel. President Nasser and other Arab leaders will
have to subject their policies to extensive reappraisal. They will need to work out
priorities, reduce points of conflict, and decide which is the greater threat; Israel
or their own inter-Arab rivalries. They will have to review without prejudice the
problems of the Yemen and the Persian Gulf, establishing a more durable
working arrangement between progressive and conservative regimes. Generally
speaking, the United Arab Republic's policies will have to become more inward-
looking for some time to come. Most important of all, genuine efforts must be
made to bring about a rapprochement between Iran and the United Arab
Republic.
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CHAPTER 10
Relations with Neighbouring Countries and Some

Others
Pakistan has established a model relationship with Iran and Turkey, and
this fraternal association is an increasingly powerful factor in Asia. The Regional
Co-operation for Development, popularly called RCD, will bring our countries
closer together as it is based on equality, mutual assistance, and friendship. We
should further strengthen our mutual relations and assist one another in
overcoming common difficulties by common endeavor.
It is a happy augury for the future that the seemingly intractable prejudices
between Turkey and the Arab states are being overcome. Many signs of
improvement have recently appeared, but none equaled the encouraging support
that Turkey gave the Arab states in their conflict with Israel. Similarly, although
relations between Iran and the United Arab Republic have in the past been
ruptured, the war in the Middle East and Iran's support for the Arab cause
provided an excellent opportunity to repair them. Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan, all
of whom maintain good relations with both Iran and the United Arab Republic,
are individually and collectively in a position to assist in the process of restoring
normal relations between the two countries. What appeared difficult before the
conflict, should now be less difficult after the Iranian demonstration of sympathy
with the Arabs. A rapprochement between these countries would help greatly in
bringing peace to the troubled Middle East and the explosive situation in the Gulf
region.
To turn now to the underdeveloped countries of Latin America, it is

necessary for Pakistan to maintain good relations with these, both to secure
fairer terms of international trade and better economic conditions of co-operation
between the developed and underdeveloped nations, and also to foster common
political aspirations. Latin America is far away from Pakistan, but distance should
not be accepted as an obstacle to the cultivation of good relations. Many of the
problems of Latin America are similar to those of Asia and Africa. It would not be
difficult to establish friendly relations with the countries of Latin America, provided
we continue to associate ourselves with the aspirations of all underdeveloped
countries struggling for a better life. The principle of self-determination is
sacrosanct to the nations of Latin America. Chiefly for this reason, in spite of
Pakistan's limited contacts with that continent, we have been able to surmount
the difficulties of distance and have had Latin America's support in the United
Nations on Jammu and Kashmir. It is all the more necessary for Pakistan to
95
develop her contacts with the states of Latin America, especially with the
important nations of Mexico, Cuba, Brazil, and Argentina.
Being in two parts, Pakistan has more neighbors than many other
countries; on the western side, Iran, Afghanistan, China, and the Soviet Union,
which is separated from Pakistan by a few miles; on our eastern flank, Burma,
and, separated by short distances, Nepal, Bhutan, and Sikkim. The territory of
India lies between East and West Pakistan. Because of their position, West
Pakistan needs to establish cordial relations with countries as far away as
Algeria; and East Pakistan, with countries as far to the east as Indonesia and
Japan.
Pakistan's relations with Iran are excellent and there is no reason why our
nations cannot continue to consolidate their mutual relations to stabilize peace in
our region. Afghanistan, another Muslim state, is a contiguous neighbor of
Pakistan, and good relations with that country would be in the interest of both.
For reasons of history, faith, and geography, we have more common links with
Afghanistan than with any other country in Asia. Ironically, and perhaps on
account of their many affinities, on occasions there is a low tide in our relations,
but, whatever the ebb and flow of political life, it is essential for two neighboring
Muslim states to maintain fraternal relations. It is possible for us to protect our
vital national interests, and yet be on good terms with that country. For obvious
reasons, India makes great efforts to win the good graces of Afghanistan.
Nepal is to Pakistan what Afghanistan is to India. Afghanistan is land-

locked by Pakistan and is a Muslim monarchy. It has good relations with the
Soviet Union and a northern land route crosses its territory. Nepal is land-locked
by India and is a Hindu monarchy. It has good relations with China and a road
connects them. Nepal's proximity to East Pakistan and to the vital states of
Sikkim and Bhutan; and the Province of Assam with its Naga and Mizo freedom
fighters, not to speak of uprisings in the Nexalbari corridor, gives Nepal a high
place in the calculations of Pakistan's foreign policy. Until a few years back, our
relations with Nepal were virtually non-existent. More recently, however,
strenuous efforts have been made to make up for lost time, and our relations
have improved in all spheres. There are prospects of yet greater collaboration,
which will promote increasing understanding between Pakistan and Nepal.
Sikkim and Bhutan are also Pakistan's neighbors, but unfortunately India does
not permit any contacts with these states, which she regards as her feudatories.
One day, no doubt, the spirit of independence and national assertion of these
northern Himalayan states will break the barriers of isolation and give Pakistan
an opportunity to develop relations of mutual benefit with them. Like Jammu and
Kashmir, Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan are perched on the Himalayan mountain
range to form a precious geo-political necklace, the value of which should not be
lost in the context of sub-continental politics. This vulnerable region could yet
become another Vietnam.
96
Pakistan should make every endeavor to maintain the most cordial
relations with Burma, a state which has a common border with East Pakistan and
the troubled regions of India. The boundary with Burma has been demarcated,
and our contacts have been developing steadily in all spheres of our bilateral
relations. There is peace and understanding on the Arakan border, which has
increased mutual confidence. Indonesia has no common frontier with Pakistan,
but its special relations with our country, formed during the era of President
Soekarno, qualify it to be regarded as a neighbors in the broader sense of the
word. We hope that the changes that have taken place there will not obstruct the
further growth of good relations between the two most populous Muslim
countries.
Although Pakistan has no common boundary with the Soviet Union, we

are close enough to be neighbors. Pakistan-Soviet relations have been marred
by a past history for which neither Pakistan nor the Soviet Union is entirely
responsible. At the time of Pakistan's Independence, there was every indication
that our relations would develop on the basis of reciprocal interests, but later
events were to disappoint that expectation. Pakistan became a member of the
Defense Alliance at the height of the Soviet-American confrontation and thus
incurred the hostility of the Soviet Union, which considered all pacts to be
directed against its basic national and international interests. In its anxiety to give
constant proof of its fidelity to the United States' global policies, Pakistan followed
at times an immoderate line, with the result that the Soviet Union retaliated by
supporting India over Jammu and Kashmir. The differences were skillfully
exploited by Prime Minister Nehru to worsen the state of Pakistan-Soviet
relations. Spurred by the changes in the international situation, a break-through
in Pakistan-Soviet relations was achieved when, as Minister for Fuel, Power and
Natural Resources, I visited the Soviet Union at the end of 1960 to conclude an
Oil Agreement with that country. This was the first contact of major significance
between the Soviet Union and Pakistan and it opened the way to contacts in
other fields. It is a heartening sign that in recent years Pakistan's relations with
the Soviet Union have continued to improve.
China and India are our most important immediate neighbors and will be
discussed separately. As regards relations in general, it can be claimed that
Pakistan has managed to establish cordial ties with most of its many neighbors.
This is no mean achievement.
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CHAPTER 11
Pakistan and the Vietnam War
Before discussing Pakistan's relations with China and India, it is necessary

to touch upon Vietnam, the most burning issue now facing the world. Like
Pakistan, Vietnam has a historical past of subjection to colonial domination. This
the Vietnamese people have gallantly resisted from the earliest period. Shortly
after the Second World War, they were obliged, when all attempts to come to
terms with their former colonial rulers failed, to take up arms against France
which was then supported by other Western states. That war of liberation forced
the French to leave the country. The Geneva Agreements of 1954 were intended
to constitute the framework of a free and independent Vietnam, but the United
States intervened and frustrated the objectives of these Agreements.
In the beginning, the United States sent 'advisers' and 'military observers',
under the pretext of combating Communism, to assist the South Vietnam regime
in the civil war, which it had intensified by its increasing military involvement. In
the Spanish Civil War many persons of liberal conviction came from other parts
of Europe and the United States to the help of the Republicans. After General
Franco's victory, Western Europe and the United States treated Spain for many
years as an outcast, ostracizing it from the Western community. How different is
the case of Vietnam, where the liberal and progressive forces are being crushed
to prevent the country from becoming Communist!
It is a matter of conjecture whether the United States believed, from the

beginning, that its commitment in Vietnam would become as extensive as it now
is. Pity and justice have been sacrificed to overweening national pride. The
United States is probably capable of achieving a military victory in Vietnam, but
such a victory would not provide the political answer to a problem which defies all
but political solutions. The United States envisages its future role in Asia as
depending on the outcome of the Vietnamese war, and is therefore determined to
continue its participation to the bitter end. Already the war is causing stresses in
the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union. China has not yet
committed her armed forces to the struggle, but provocative military actions are
nevertheless being taken against Chinese territory, which could lead to an
alarming enlargement of the conflict. American troops alone in Vietnam,
excluding the personnel of the Seventh Fleet, have exceeded 470, 000. The
South Vietnam regime and the American Generals are pressing for more troops.
General Westmoreland, the United States Army Commander, was summoned to
the United States to address Congress with the purpose of mustering more
support for the intensification of the war, and returning from his ninth visit to
Vietnam, Defense Secretary McNamara stated that more troops were needed for
98
the United States' war effort. On 3 August 1967, President Johnson asked
Congress to increase the reinforcements by 'at least 45, 000' in the current fiscal
year. At the same time he urged Congress to impose a 10 per cent surcharge on
individual and corporate income taxes, totaling $6 billion, to meet the rising cost
of the war in Vietnam. To take such severe measures in a pre-election year only
shows the magnitude of the United States' predicament.
Aerial bombardment of North Vietnam has become so ferocious as to

amount to a scorched-earth policy. Saturation bombing has been resorted to,
employing special fragmentation bombs which release razor-sharp slivers of
steel. Napalm and phosphorous bombs containing chemicals which burn fiercely
and are practically impossible to extinguish with earth or water have been
dropped both in the North and South. Their victims suffer agonies from the burns
inflicted, their flesh rots on their bodies and, if they survive, they are maimed for
life. The United States is experimenting with its latest murderous weapons in
order to bring the North Vietnamese to the negotiating table before the campaign
for the American Presidential Elections of 1968 gains momentum; but escalation
has an end point. There remain only three or four major steps and therefore the
enlargement of the war cannot be ruled out. It is a terrible gamble to which
international opinion and a section of opinion in the United States are opposed.
In Europe and in Asia resentment against the United States' military actions is
growing proportionately to the intensification of the war. To counter its increasing
isolation, the United States seeks the participation of other countries on its side in
the war. That is why so much pressure is being brought to bear on Pakistan to
make some token contribution to the United States' war effort, but under no
circumstances, no matter how heavy the pressure, should we weaken in our
resolve to have no part in that war or desist from condemning its continuance.
Such a stand might entail the loss of economic and military assistance, but by
defending its just position, Pakistan would finally gain much more than it loses in
material terms. It is all very well in times of peace to bemoan the loss of material
aid, and to envy the numerous benefits of economic and military assistance to
countries like Thailand, which, because of its support to the United States, is
obtaining aid in colossal quantities. The benefits and risks have to be considered
not only in times of peace, but also in terms of the consequences of war, if such
assistance is meant to draw the recipient nation into war. At present Thailand's
economy may thrive, but if the war spreads to that country, to what extent will
Thailand have benefited?
The Vietnamese fight for freedom is an inspiration to all nations exposed

to intervention from Great Powers. The sacrifices made by that country may well
benefit all underdeveloped nations, but the lesson of Vietnam is not only one of
heroism; for it has a darker side. The war could not continue without the
corruption of a small number of Vietnamese like the religious fanatic Diem, who
hoped to make South Vietnam a separate state by destroying all religions except
Christianity. The United States helped him because he conceded to it the right to
its physical presence in his country. From this point start the real misfortunes of
99
Vietnam. The war of liberation from the old colonial power was over, but a new
war had begun against the intervention of a neo-colonialist power. The memory
of the old system is being revived in Vietnam by the privileges accorded to the
nationals of a foreign power.
Pakistan must think not only of the immediate gains of economic and
military assistance, but of the consequences, if the donor's object is to enlarge
the war. Pakistan might itself become a battlefield, and it is absolutely essential
that we resist every pressure designed to entangle us in this disastrous conflict.
The future of Asia and of the sub-continent will depend on its outcome. It cannot
last for ever, but must give way to peace and once this is restored, many far-
reaching changes are likely to take place in the interpretation of the United
States' global objectives and of its place in Asia. Pakistan must wait patiently for
the turn of events.
Diplomacy is a flexible art. What appears to be impossible today is

possible tomorrow? If President Kennedy had not been assassinated, the
Vietnam war might well have taken a different course. A constructive dialogue
might have begun between China and the United States, on the lines of that
begun between President Kennedy and Premier Khrushchev in Vienna, which
led to the detente between the United States and the Soviet Union.
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CHAPTER 12
Sino-Pakistani Relations
Pakistan's relations with China have greatly improved since 1962. This
has caused misgivings in the United States, where the rationale of this
relationship has been much distorted. Sino-Pakistani relations are not primarily
based on the differences of the two countries with India. That factor forms only a
part, important though it be, of the rationale. China is Pakistan's neighbour and it
is essential for us to maintain good relations with all our neighbours on the basis
of friendship and equality. There are no territorial or other disputes between the
countries to give rise to differences. Ever since the Revolution in China, the
leaders of that country have made sincere efforts to establish normal relations
with Pakistan. During the Bandung Conference, Premier Chou En-Lai assured
the Prime Minister of Pakistan that China desired good relations with Pakistan,
and it would have been unwise for Pakistan to have spurned a gesture of
goodwill from a powerful neighbouring country. China's dominant place in Asia is
assured; Pakistan is an Asian state, whose destinies are forever linked with
those of Asia, and it is vital for Pakistan to maintain friendly relations with China
for strengthening Asian unity. As members of the community of Asia and Africa,
our countries have a common interest in the promotion of Afro-Asian solidarity—
a further reason why they must maintain good relations with each other. As
underdeveloped countries, China and Pakistan seek to co-operate with other
such countries, for obtaining better international trading terms and for a more
equitable participation with the developed states in the economic and social
advancement of the underdeveloped nations. From the very beginning, China
has taken a just position on the partition of Palestine and has supported the Arab
cause against Israel. China's support for the Arab nations is in conformity with
Pakistan's position, as was conclusively demonstrated by the bold position China
took on the side of the Arab states when Israel launched her recent aggression.
Like Pakistan and other Afro-Asian states, China has resolutely condemned
apartheid and the racial policies of South Africa and Southern Rhodesia. Most
important of all, she has unequivocally supported the right of self-determination
of the people of Jammu and Kashmir and this, quite apart from other
considerations, must influence Pakistan in seeking friendly relations with China.
As an underdeveloped country, Pakistan would like to see the United

Nations reformed, so that it would be in a better position to protect the interests
of weaker nations, but this is inconceivable without the participation of the
People's Republic of China, a Great Power entitled, in its own right, to a place in
the Security Council. Instead of the Global Powers trying to promote a dangerous
bilateral reduction of the armed forces of India and Pakistan, the United Nations
101
should work for complete and general international disarmament involving the
destruction rather than the monopolization of nuclear weapons. If peace can only
be assured in a disarmed world, and if it is desirable to encourage genuine
efforts for international disarmament, it is imperative to bring about the
participation of China in disarmament negotiations. Complete disarmament will
remain a distant goal without the co-operation of a nation of 700 million people
that possesses a nuclear arsenal. For all these self-evident reasons, Pakistan's
friendly relations with China are motivated by positive factors and not passing
exigencies affecting another country.
It has been insinuated that the ideologies of Pakistan and China are
incompatible and that a friendly working arrangement cannot therefore be
sustained between them. It is further argued that Pakistan's friendly relations with
China, being of a subjective character, will be unable to withstand the stress of
time. These are fallacious arguments. States deal with states, as such, and not
with their social systems or ideologies. If such an argument were carried to its
logical conclusion, Pakistan should have friendly relations only with Muslim
states and isolate itself from the rest of the world. It is a historical fact that Islam,
as a political force, has suffered more at the hands of Christian states than of
others. It was Christendom that launched crusades against Islam, and it was the
Christian nations which held almost all Muslim states under imperial bondage for
centuries, destroying their social and moral fibre to such an extent that the world
of Islam is still in the process of recovering from the damage inflicted. Professor
Arnold Toynbee has said:
Centuries before Communism was heard of, our ancestors found their
bugbear in Islam. As lately as the sixteenth century, Islam inspired the same
hysteria in Western hearts as Communism in the twentieth century, and this
essentially for the same reasons. Like Communism, Islam was an anti-Western
movement which was at the same time a heretical version of a Western faith;
and, like Communism, it wielded a sword of the spirit against which there was no
defense in material armaments.
It is unlikely that China is going to be responsible for the fall of the

Granada of Pakistan or for the wresting of Jerusalem from the Muslim states. Our
relations are based on the Bandung principles and on the strict adherence to the
concept of non-interference. Nowhere is it mentioned in the scriptures of Islam
that fostering friendship with non-Islamic states involves a compromise of
identity.
The people of Pakistan were under Western domination for over a century
and a half. Nevertheless Pakistan has maintained friendly relations with all
Western states and special relations with the United States and Britain. None of
these close contacts have contaminated the religious values of the people of
Pakistan. Their country has proudly maintained its Islamic character in spite of
Western penetration founded on domination and interference. If Pakistan's polity
102
and social structure is firm enough to withstand the onslaught of Western culture
and civilization, it can hold its own against any other ideology, especially of a
country that has never dominated ours or interfered in its internal affairs. When
relations between the United States and the Soviet Union were unfriendly,
equally great opposition was offered to the development of friendly relations
between Pakistan and the Soviet Union. It is only when relations between the two
Super-Powers improved that the objections disappeared. When relations
between China and the United States take a more realistic turn, the United
States may be less hostile to Pakistan's friendly relations with China. If Pakistan
were now to take provocative steps against China, her position would be the
more perilous when relations between China and the United States improve. We
would be left to lag behind as we lagged behind India in our endeavors to
improve relations with the Soviet Union. If valuable time is lost in this way,
irreparable damage is liable to be caused. It is therefore essential that Pakistan
continues to develop friendly relations—and resists all attempts to sever those
existing—with China, in view of the existing dictates of United States' global
policies. Pakistan must determine its foreign policy on the basis of its own
enlightened self-interest, uninfluenced by the transient global requirements of the
Great Powers.
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CHAPTER 13
Relations with European Powers and Great

Powers
It remains to be seen which of the three quasi-Great Powers of Western

Europe is capable of making the greatest contribution to Pakistan's national
cause in the foreseeable future; but on the basis of her present policy, France
seems the most likely. Her support for the principle of self-determination, her
effort to free herself from the Atlantic hegemony, and her comprehension of
Asian problems has resulted in France's good relations with Pakistan.
During the September war of 1965, France gave Pakistan no cause for
disappointment. On the contrary, her attitude in the Security Council was most
helpful on account of its opposition to sanctions threatened by the other Great
Powers. Even during the Consortium crisis of July 1965, France gave Pakistan
both economic and political support. Her global policy coincides with our national
and international interests, and she has taken careful note of the negative
consequences of India's shrinking status under the shadow of hegemony. France
believes that India's conflict with China is not conducive to the cause of peace in
Asia; values Pakistan as a country that has developed a relationship of trust and
understanding with China; and sympathizes with Pakistan's struggle to keep her
identity and sovereignty intact.
Pakistan is on friendly terms with the Federal Republic of Germany and

has not so far established any contacts with the other Germany; but because of
the limitations of German foreign policy, it cannot be asserted to what extent the
Federal Republic, despite its accumulating power, will find itself in a position to
offer substantial assistance to Pakistan in the event of heavy pressure being
exercised on it. Nevertheless, it is important that we continue to develop friendly
relations with that country on account of its inherent importance and its capacity
to assist Pakistan in the economic field. It cannot, however, for the present at
least, be considered a political lever or replace the military equipment denied by
the United States.
Britain's influence has diminished in our region and is now overshadowed

by the United States'. Because of her dependence on the United States, and
because both India and Pakistan are members of the Commonwealth, Britain will
continue to maintain a capricious neutrality. On occasions she will try to support
Pakistan, and on others India, but more often India than Pakistan. None the less,
we should try to maintain friendly relations with Britain, since, as with the Federal
Republic of Germany, good relations with Britain carry a number of advantages.
104
That these countries cannot make a positive and meaningful contribution to the
solution of our basic problems should not deter us. We have to buy time and
hope for change. Even in the present circumstances, there are many advantages
in maintaining the best possible relations with both of them. All subsidiary factors
should be put into the pool and on a suitable occasion, effectively utilized, and
pushed forward.
The theory of causation is as much applicable to foreign affairs as it is to

the law of tort. There is an active interrelationship and mutuality of influence in
the conduct of state relations. A foreign policy based on recognized universal
principles influences other states, while an expedient or opportunist policy
adversely affects the image of a state in its relations with other countries. If
Pakistan's policies remain consistent and moral, other states are bound to be
favorably influenced. By pursuing a pragmatic policy in relations with France,
Britain, and the Federal Republic of Germany, congenial conditions can be
created for Pakistan to develop cordial relations with the other states of Western
Europe. Past links with these and Pakistan's need for economic assistance make
such relations especially desirable. These positive factors acquire added impetus
from the growing influence of Pakistan in Asia.
Similar arguments apply in respect of the Socialist states of Eastern

Europe, with whom Pakistan's growing association could contribute to the
creation of a favorable climate in many spheres. In Eastern as in Western
Europe, there are certain key states which require our particular attention; the
most important being Romania, a country which has recently come to the fore by
pursuing a courageously far-sighted foreign policy. It is equally necessary to pay
attention to the industrially advanced countries of Czechoslovakia and Poland,
although they share the Soviet Union's apprehensions of what they call the
'revanchist claims' of Germany.
So far as the continent of Europe as a whole is concerned, an extension of

co-operation between East and West would be welcomed by Pakistan. The
process of inter-European collaboration would be accelerated by Britain's entry
into Europe as a European Power and by the removal of the many barriers that
still exist between Eastern and Western Europe. When these developments took
place. General de Gaulle's 'independent European Europe', a Europe making its
own distinct contribution to the preservation of world peace, will be born.
In Pakistan's relations with the United States we have seen the practical
manifestation of the policy of imposing rigid preconditions for normal relations.
Pakistan was supported in her dispute with India over Jammu and Kashmir
because, for certain self-evident reasons, it was in the United States' interest so
to support her. Having failed to spread its wings over non-aligned India, the
United States turned to Pakistan and, as a consequence, supported us on
Jammu and Kashmir on a quid pro quo basis. Changes in the international
situation have brought about adjustments in the original position of the United
105
States, dictated by global interests and strategy, without bearing either on the
merits of the dispute or the reason why we identified our interests with those of
that Power.
After the Tibetan crisis and the Sino-Indian border clashes, the United
States found fresh opportunities for attracting India to its sphere of influence.
Every such contingency is reflected in its attitude to the problem of Jammu and
Kashmir. When it was in its global interest to provide military assistance to
Pakistan, not all the protestations of Pandit Nehru had any effect on its decision
to supply arms to Pakistan. Again, when it was in the United States' interest to
supply arms to India, our own protests, violent as they were, had no effect on the
United States' policy to provide such arms. In February 1963, the American
Government sent Mr. Phillips Talbot, Assistant Secretary of State, on a visit to
the sub-continent. He said in Pakistan that, to keep the balance of power in the
region, the United States would not give more arms aid to Pakistan; adding that,
just as the United States continued to supply arms to Pakistan despite Indian
protests in the past, his Government would likewise continue to supply arms to
India despite Pakistan's protests. In that respect the United States' policy
remained obdurate. The flow of arms increased, as did economic aid and the
despatch of food-grains, and the entire scope of support to India multiplied
without pause. One can say that aid to India increased in almost geometrical
proportion to Pakistan's protestations.
In the case of the Soviet Union, we find that its traditional policy of
complete identification with non-aligned India over Jammu and Kashmir has
undergone some alteration on account of changes in the global situation. The
state of our relations had little influence in bringing about adjustments in the
Soviet Union's attitude when those adjustments were required by its global
interests. They were carried out in spite of India's protestations. The Soviet Union
chose to ignore Pakistan's membership of military alliances and the U-2 flights
when it served its global interests to make some adjustments to its attitude over
Jammu and Kashmir in order to contain China. Likewise, when relations between
India and China were cordial and relations between Pakistan and China were
not, China refused for its own reasons to support India on the issue of Jammu
and Kashmir. When Prime Minister Nehru failed to get China's support, he
sought to associate China with India symbolically by pressing Prime Minister
Chou En-Lai to visit Srinagar during his visit to India. Although relations between
Pakistan and China were far from normal in those days, the Chinese Prime
Minister, keeping an eye on the future, flatly refused to allow himself to be drawn
into even a symbolic support of India.
During the September war of 1965, all the Great Powers took their stance
according to their respective global evaluation of the war. The United States was
under a treaty obligation to assist Pakistan but, instead of rendering assistance, it
cut off all military aid to Pakistan and imposed an economic embargo on its
SEATO and CENTO partner. The Soviet Union, alarmed by the Chinese
106
ultimatum and fearing one more serious political and ideological cleavage with
China, sought sedulously to end the conflict. So great was its concern to
terminate hostilities that, for the second time only in its history as a socialist state,
it offered its good offices, this time for the resolution of Indo-Pakistan disputes.
China's open support for Pakistan, in spite of the sound political reasons for it,
was unprecedented. The positions taken by the three Global Powers were
determined not by their treaty relations nor by the extent of India's or Pakistan's
identification with them, but by their global aims.
Pakistan has not succeeded in converting the United States to its point of
view through bilateral or multilateral means, including complete identification with
its interests. India and the United States are now on better terms, but even when
relations between the two countries were strained and there were no differences
between Pakistan and the United States, Pakistan could not persuade the United
States to use its influence with India to resolve her disputes with us. The United
States hesitated to exert its influence on India in favor of aligned and friendly
Pakistan, even though it was in a position to do so. No earnest attempt was
made to promote an equitable settlement. In a White House briefing in May 1962,
President Kennedy observed that 'Pakistan's request for help in Kashmir
involving India demonstrates an effort to borrow the United States power for
other nationalistic purposes.' Pakistan was then not only seeking American
intervention, but was imposing a condition on the United States to settle the
Jammu and Kashmir dispute in order to have normal relations. By persistently
taking this dangerous course, we came close to enforcing—albeit inadvertently—
an unfair settlement.
How then should Pakistan protect her interests and maintain cordial
relations with the United States? A complete answer is difficult to find, but a
relatively safe solution is obvious enough: by rejecting preconditions for normal
relations and making it clear that interference in our national objectives will not be
tolerated. We should seek to put in quarantine the points of disagreement and
develop relations in areas of common understanding. If, despite such an
approach, the United States were to persist in seeking to bring about a
settlement not based on self-determination, and in seeking Indo-Pakistani
cooperation for its global political purposes, Pakistan should be prepared for a
diplomatic confrontation which in time would have to give way to normal relations
based on a new understanding. It is better to take a stand and face a period of
difficulty than to yield to pressure, open the floodgates, and admit one crisis after
another. By arriving at a new arrangement in which the United States' 'power
would not be borrowed', to use the words of President Kennedy, we would be
unburdening that country of an embarrassing responsibility and simultaneously
protecting our vital national interests. By insulating the points of difference, we
would in no way forfeit our right to pursue our causes vigorously, and other
means are available to press forward our claims, perhaps with greater chances
of success. Rather than perpetuate a demoralizing stalemate with a Great
Power, it is wiser to cut the knot that has become a noose. Yugoslavia has not
107
supported Pakistan's position on Jammu and Kashmir; nevertheless, our
relations with that country are cordial. This is because we have developed
relations with Yugoslavia in areas of agreement and have not sought that
country's intervention for the resolution of our disputes with India. We have
inadvertently insulated the point of difference with that country in our mutual
relations and have thus avoided diplomatic strains. We can continue to
demonstrate our desire for support and make indirect efforts to obtain it, yet
maintain normal relations outside the ambit of the differences while they last.
We should thus make it clear to every Great and Global Power that
Pakistan is prepared for normal relations with each of them separately, on a
bilateral basis outside the realm of currently irreconcilable differences, provided
that the Power in each case desists from interfering in the country's affairs
against the country's interest. We would maintain normal but qualified relations
without preconditions in exchange for non-interference in our internal affairs, in
our struggle for the liberation of the people of Jammu and Kashmir, and in the
equitable resolution of other disputes with India. Such an approach would be
consistent, logical, and, in the long run, the least obstructive to the attainment of
our objectives. It would provide us with an opportunity for normal relations with all
states, yet be reconcilable with the active pursuit of our objectives. It would give
us freedom to pursue our legitimate objectives without fear of inimical foreign
intervention, and would not prevent us from endeavoring by indirect influences
and persuasion to bring about favorable changes in the attitude of those Powers
which are either hostile or neutral. There is a fundamental difference between
'preconditions for normal relations' and 'persuasion' without preconditions. By not
seeking intervention for the resolution of our disputes, we would not be prevented
from trying to persuade other countries to take a right position. It goes without
saying that, if a state were to change its position voluntarily on account of the
application of indirect pressure, or for other reasons, there would be a
corresponding change in our bilateral relations with that state.
We must recognize clearly that no Global Power can, through its

diplomatic support, effect the hand-over of Jammu and Kashmir to Pakistan. At
the same time, their active political opposition can make it more difficult for us to
achieve our aims. We should therefore seek to disengage those states that are
either neutral or opposed to our position, by setting the points of difference
outside the range of our bilateral relations. Conversely, we should consolidate
our relations with all those countries, especially the Great and Global Powers,
which give Pakistan unqualified support over the Jammu and Kashmir dispute.
No country would have reason to take exception to priorities established on a
clear and rational basis of supreme national interest without preconditions. It
would be understood that the whole basis of Pakistan's foreign policy was to
consolidate relations with those who support us in our just causes, and to
insulate the points of conflict with those Great and Global Powers that are
opposed to our just struggle. Our cordial relations with countries supporting us
would not be scribe-able to ulterior motives and would demonstrate that we are
108
not pawns in any global contest, but that there is a perfect explanation for a
gradation in the relations with all countries. In this way, we would put our
relations with the three Global Powers on a rational basis without preconditions,
relatively consistent with their interests, in complete accord with our own, and
without fear of interference.
To be more specific, it would be advisable for Pakistan to avoid a direct

confrontation with the Global Powers over disputes with India. We should not
seek to lay down conditions with them for normal relations. We should be
prepared to have cordial but qualified relations with those that are opposed or
neutral with regard to our position; qualified, because of their different positions
on disputes of fundamental importance to our nation, but without strain, as we
would differ and yet maintain normal relations without fear of intervention. Our
interests will be less well served by unprofitable debates than by our creating
conditions such as would influence the Great Powers to change their position on
account of objective compulsions. This is a difficult undertaking, but it can be
achieved by unifying the support we have from those Great and Global Powers
as are unequivocally in favor of our just cause with that expressed by the
underdeveloped nations of Asia, Africa, and Latin America. All will depend on our
strategy and resolve.
Let us consider the opposite position. Were we to insist that the Great and
Global Powers should support us in our differences with India, before we proceed
to have normal relations with them, we would leave them with no choice but to
interfere in our internal affairs and impose unfavorable settlements on us, in
order to establish normal relations. Such preconditions would be injurious to our
vital interests, result in a series of intolerable compromises, and introduce double
dealings in our relations with all Great and Global Powers.
Our own effort is of primary importance in the attainment of our higher

objectives, yet we are not likely to succeed by these alone. We require
international support, some of which we already receive from the majority of the
smaller states committed to decolonization and self-determination. We have the
support of one Great Power in Asia and are in a position to obtain the same from
at least one quasi-Great Power in Europe. If, backed by such powerful collective
support, we proceed to act correctly and with discretion, we should be able to
exercise much influence on other states, both great and small, in the realization
of our just claims. We would free ourselves from entanglements and thereby
avoid being exposed to moral, material, and diplomatic pressures. Having
reached a position of relative safety we should wait for the favorable moment,
which the complex international situation is more than likely to furnish. Until then,
by hindering the pressure of interference, we would escape the imposition of an
unfavorable settlement on Jammu and Kashmir and bring consistency in our
bilateral relations with all states.
109
Global Power policies do undergo adjustments. The dynamics of the world
situation require that the smaller nations should seek to isolate areas of conflict
with Global Powers in the pursuit of their individual, in contrast to their collective,
objectives. Twenty years is not a long time in the life of a nation, and we should
continue with determination to uphold our just cause. We cannot forsake a moral,
ideological obligation only because the odds appear at present to be against us.
The people of Vietnam have faced destruction for over twenty years. Though
their villages and cities are being razed to the ground, their spirit of resistance is
firmer than ever. It is better to have a stalemate and no solution at all than to
agree to an unjust solution. An ignominious compromise would reduce the
chances of a just settlement in the future.
Pakistan's immediate task is to reduce and if possible eliminate foreign

interference, which is growing at a menacing pace and which, if not arrested,
could not only lead to an unjust settlement of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute,
but also involve us in an anti-China axis in collaboration with India. Therefore a
change is called for in the traditional diplomatic approach. Quite against the spirit
of our times, against the spirit of Bandung too, we have, to our peril, encouraged
foreign interference and intervention. Foreign powers would not seek to resolve
our disputes if the solutions work against their interest. Once the foreign
influence is eliminated, it should be possible to look anew at problems in their
proper perspective. The proposition reduced to its simplest form amounts to this,
that under no circumstances must Pakistan get entangled in the ideological or
territorial disputes of the Global Powers. We must maintain a non-committal
attitude in global confrontations, but, at the same time, take a clear and
independent position on world issues affecting the rights of peoples and nations
to equality, self-determination, and economic emancipation. Uninfluenced by the
attitude of other nations, Pakistan must always oppose aggression and stand
behind the victims, in conformity with the noblest norms of its ideology. We
should demonstrate strict neutrality in the ideological confrontation of the Global
Powers. In determining her relations with such Powers, Pakistan must also take
into account her geographical situation and the support she receives in her own
just causes. She must formulate her policies on the merits of each case, without
taking a predetermined position in the global rivalries. These policies must be in
accordance with the concept of non-interference in the internal affairs of a
country and self-determination for all nations. She must refrain from accepting
preconditions which limit her freedom of action in any respect in the discharge of
her national and ideological obligations.
110
CHAPTER 14
Some Conclusions
In view of past experience and other considerations Pakistan must pursue

three principal objectives:
1. A policy of friendship and good faith with China, a Great Power with
whom its basic interests conform.
2. Good relations with the United States and the Soviet Union, but without
preconditions and on the basis of non-interference; also with the
nations of Eastern and Western Europe, especially France, Germany,
Britain, Roumania, Czechoslovakia, and Poland.
3. The strengthening of the Third World—the under-developed nations of

Latin America, Asia, and Africa, and, in particular, Muslim nations and
neighbouring countries.
The realization of these objectives would secure, so to speak, Pakistan's

flanks and rear, enabling us to face the rising tide of difficulties with India, which
has become more acute on account of the changes in American sub-continental
policies. If Pakistan is not prepared to resist these, she should, at least, take an
unambiguous stand as did Burma and Cambodia some time ago. One sharp and
decisive encounter at the political level would put a stop to the downward trend,
and is infinitely preferable to a step-by-step retreat ending perhaps in
dismemberment. In international politics, ready prescriptions are not available as
they are in medicine, but this does not mean that remedies are not available for
political ailments.
The United States' decision to terminate military assistance to Pakistan

and its general policies in the sub-continent have considerably increased the
threat to Pakistan's security. We must therefore take remedial measures, and the
sooner the better for peace in the sub-continent. India's armed strength is greater
than Pakistan's. The United States' decision and increasing support for India
calls for positive measures to safeguard Pakistan's position and, in particular, to
maintain a military balance with India.
The United States has arbitrarily and without notice abrogated the letter
and spirit of the Mutual Defense Treaties and CENTO and SEATO Agreements.
Solemn commitments to Pakistan have not been honored. In Vietnam, on the
other hand, the world is being taken towards an international catastrophe in the
name of commitments. As the United States has unilaterally broken its
111
agreements with Pakistan, these agreements are no longer valid. From the date
of the announcement of cessation of military assistance to Pakistan, all defence
agreements with the United States have become null and void. As these have
lapsed, Pakistan should ask the United States to close the remaining special
facilities granted to it on Pakistan territory and withdraw its personnel from the
bases, along with the remaining MAAG personnel, on 1 July 1967, as announced
by Washington. If these facilities are terminated immediately, it would be a timely
mark of our good intentions towards the Soviet Union and China. Even a delay in
closing down the American Communications Centre at Peshawar might prove
counter-productive. If Pakistan's corrective actions do not closely follow the
stoppage of military assistance, the United States might not construe them to be
of a reciprocal character. In that event new complications will unnecessarily arise
in our mutual relations and in Pakistan's efforts to redress the balance from other
quarters.
If, however, Pakistan allows the agreements which have already been
broken, to come to their stipulated conclusion, it would mean assuming a perilous
unilateral commitment to the United States without any corresponding obligation.
It is simple common sense that, in the discharge of an elementary obligation to
the people of Pakistan, the Government should declare the Mutual Defence
Agreements and the pacts to have become non-existent, and formally withdraw
from GENTO and SEATO. It was certainly unwise to have participated in the last
SEATO Ministerial Conference in Washington, in April 1967. If, however,
participation was considered necessary, a powerful delegation should have been
sent to expose the real reasons for the United States' decision. Before leaving
SEATO altogether, Pakistan should have made clear to that meeting and to the
people of the United States the grave situation in Asia and the terrible
consequences of escalating the Vietnam war. By expressing the anguish of the
Asian peoples, Pakistan would have earned international respect and
strengthened the position taken by France. It might have encouraged the United
Kingdom to take the position she would like to adopt. Pakistan should have led
the movement for peace in Asia on the soil of the United States, where a large
and increasing section of public opinion, including prominent leaders of both
parties, are incensed over the war. Our voice would have represented not only
the people of Asia, but humanity everywhere, Pakistan should have made it clear
that she was being penalized not because of the Indo-Pakistani impasse, but
primarily because she refused to soil her hands by participation in the Vietnam
war. Having taken an unassailable position in the Conference, Pakistan would
have served the interest of world peace, and world opinion would have been
sympathetic. Such a position would have created a propitious political climate for
future negotiations with the Soviet Union, China, France, and other countries. It
appears, however, that it was decided at the Guam Conference, and in
subsequent meetings, to prepare for further escalation of the Vietnam war in
order to achieve a military victory. The sooner, therefore, that Pakistan
dissociates herself from treaties which are no longer valid, the better for her
future security and for peace in Asia. We cannot permit treaties which no longer
112
offer security to us, but actively threaten our security, to be used as springboards
for the escalation of the Vietnam war.
It is not by any means fortuitous that almost all countries which have
received military assistance from the United States have, in one way or the other,
been involved in internal troubles or in conflicts with Communist Powers. South
Korea has endured a war; the off-shore islands of China have been shelled; the
Philippines, Thailand, and Japan have had grave external and internal problems.
Greece has been through an internal conflict, which continues under the surface;
and after the Second World War, there was trouble on the northern borders of
Iran. Pakistan is among the fortunate few to have escaped such troubles, but this
situation cannot last forever and it would be an act of wisdom to leave SEATO
and CENTO immediately. At the 1967 SEATO Conference in Washington, the
Foreign Minister of Thailand is reported to have remarked that 'it is a harrowing
situation that there could be some who seek to derive only advantages from
membership of SEATO without accepting the corresponding obligations and
responsibilities, at this grave juncture while many of our youth are risking their
lives and a number of them fallen in the battlefield fighting for a lofty cause'. It is
further reported that he could not see how, under such circumstances, SEATO
'based on unequal rights and obligations can adequately continue to function'. He
thought that SEATO 'will go through the inevitable process of evolution and seek
to adjust itself on a basis of more corresponding mutuality of interest'. With such
remarks emanating from a Member State of SEATO, and with the announcement
of Britain's latest White Paper on defence that obligations to SEATO will be
'progressively altered in nature and size', it would be better if Pakistan took the
initiative to leave the pacts before she finds herself facing greater difficulties.
Despite the aligned nature of Pakistan's foreign policy and the fact of
receiving military assistance to combat Communism, we have been spared
conflicts with Communist states on account of objective common interests with
the People's Republic of China in Asia and in the sub-continent. India is an
adversary of Pakistan and has a dispute with China. China seems to be of the
opinion that India will become increasingly dependent on the United States and
gradually, under its influence, adopt a position hostile to China. For this reason, it
is in China's national interest to support Pakistan and it is in Pakistan's national
interest to develop friendly relations with China. Of all the countries which have
received military assistance from the United States to combat Communism,
Pakistan alone has a fundamental common interest with one of the most
powerful Communist states. This is a unique position, a freak in the global
permutations.
As Pakistan has no quarrel with the Soviet Union and the People's
Republic of China, we should, in view of the latest developments, conclude
treaties of friendship and non-aggression with them as soon as possible. We
might also consider concluding similar treaties with other Great Powers,
although, from a practical point of view, these are unnecessary. There is little use
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in claiming to be on friendly terms with all countries, whilst remaining members of
defence pacts and providing facilities to one Global Power which the others
consider to be directed against them. This is a basic contradiction and we should
make our relations genuinely non-contradictory.
Pakistan should also consider concluding treaties of friendship and non-

aggression with as many of her neighbours as possible. There should be no
difficulty in concluding such treaties with Iran, Burma, and Nepal. In addition to a
treaty with Nepal, it should be possible to hold constructive discussions on
certain other matters of common interest, which would in no way involve that
friendly country in our disputes with India. Pakistan should also try to conclude a
treaty of friendship and non-aggression with Afghanistan. The present crisis calls
for a series of swift diplomatic initiatives. Only by taking them can the anomalies
created by the turn in Pakistan's relations with the United States be rectified.
The United States exercises considerable influence in Western Europe. It

would therefore be difficult for Pakistan to succeed in making the NATO powers
deviate from the basic American attitude to the supply of military equipment.
Nevertheless, efforts should be made to find out to what extent some of them
would be willing to co-operate. From Pakistan's point of view, France is by far the
most important country in Western Europe, and it is questionable whether France
would be influenced by the United States' recent decisions. The sooner we
develop a special understanding with that country the better for us both.
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CHAPTER 15
The State's Best Defence
The Pakistan Government will have to undertake measures to make the

country's economic and food resources self-supporting. Most underdeveloped
countries need foreign assistance and ours is no exception. Foreign assistance
should serve to turn a dependent economy into a self-reliant one, but, if it is
accompanied by foreign interference, dependence increases and the object is
defeated. It has yet to be seen whether the economies of India and Pakistan
have moved towards self-reliance at all with the heavy foreign investments on the
Western pattern in the last decade or so. There are conflicting opinions on the
growth of Pakistan's economy. Some are of the view that Pakistan has made
tremendous strides and become a model Asian State, second only to Japan!
Others maintain that Pakistan's economic development has been erratic,
irrational, and not in accord with its resources and essential needs. There are
signs of growth and development and there are also indications of serious
economic trouble. With sustained effort and with a change in the economic
system, Pakistan can overcome her economic difficulties. The country's Achilles'
heel is her food-grain deficit of 2 million tons, but, with this problem solved, she
would be in a position to withstand a multitude of international pressures.
Unfortunately, much precious time has been lost. If the Government of Pakistan
had paid as much attention to agriculture in its Second Five Year Plan as it is
doing in the current Plan, the country would have become self-sufficient by now.
But the policy of the Second Five Year Plan was irrationally directed to industrial
development in all fields except that of the basic industries. It was then argued
that Pakistan was too poor to afford heavy industries such as the production of
steel, and that the country should not strive to attain self-sufficiency in
agriculture, because its food deficit could always be met by generous assistance
from the United States under PL-480. This was the work of a Finance Minister
who was simultaneously an Executive Director of the World Bank. His policies
brought the country to the brink of economic catastrophe. A new class of
capitalist baron, as rapacious as any in Latin America, was created to control the
national wealth. The system adopted was anything but laissez faire.
Businessmen, under government patronage, were given licences that converted
the collective resources of the nation into personal fortunes. Predatory capitalism
ran riot with all the inevitable political consequences, and the country became
more rather than less dependent on foreign assistance. That is now a thing of the
past; Pakistan today has no other alternative but to make a revolutionary break-
through in agriculture and become self-sufficient.
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The United States has shown its hand. Great Power actions are
systematic and sustained, and Pakistan should now be prepared to face a variety
of interconnected pressures, overt and concealed. The coming years are going to
be of crucial importance. Following the termination of military assistance, the
United States will try to bring matters to a head in the subcontinent, provided the
situation in Vietnam permits. Pakistan might have to counter further pressures on
her economy and essential supplies. Already a decline in the economic buoyancy
is evident. The foreign exchange position has become unsatisfactory, and the
drain on our meagre reserves is likely to increase with the repayment of foreign
debts and in meeting the country's growing economic, military, and food
requirements. As it is, approximately $90 million were spent last year on the
import of food-grains. With the stoppage of military assistance and the
enforcement of stringent conditions for the supply of spare parts, the Government
would be called upon to meet the country's new and additional defence
requirements by utilizing its own foreign exchange. The price of jute, Pakistan's
main foreign exchange earner, has fallen sharply. The closure of the Suez Canal
for an uncertain period will not only raise freight and insurance rates, but also
cause delays in the import of industrial goods and food-grains. This in turn, will
influence prices of essential commodities. It is doubtful whether the present
agricultural yield is capable of wiping out a substantial part of the 2-5 million ton
deficit. The United States' attitude to demands for food-grains would be some
index of its thinking.
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CHAPTER 16
Deterrent against Aggression
Pakistan's security and territorial integrity are more important than

economic development. Although such development and self-reliance contribute
to the strengthening of the nation's defence capability, the defence requirements
of her sovereignty have to be met first. Pakistan will have to pay equal attention
to the attainment of self-reliance through economic development and to her
defence requirements. A non-industrialized country, without even the basis of a
heavy industry, cannot depend entirely on the traditional defence system of a
small, though highly efficient, armed force equipped with conventional weapons.
The country being poor, the size of the armed forces cannot be large, nor can it
be expanded beyond a certain limit; and it is doubtful whether that limit, even if
reached, would be high enough should Pakistan be again confronted with an
aggressor many times larger, stronger, and better equipped, not to speak of the
numerical strength of its armed forces. The economic strain created by the
expansion of a standing force would be great, and it would be unwise to think in
terms of competing with India in size of forces and quantity of equipment.
Pakistan has so far been unable to establish an industrial war-base, for a number
of regrettable reasons: one of them being the greed of those for whom the import
of steel was more profitable than the production of steel in their own land. It is not
possible for Pakistan, within the next few years, to develop a local industrial
potential for equipping its armed forces with the more sophisticated weapons; nor
can we depend entirely upon ingenious diplomatic initiatives. Indeed, the effect of
a nation's diplomatic activities is often related to the weight of its fighting
capacity. Many clever things may be said and done, but in the face of real danger
a country has to depend on its own strength. International circumstances will
change. Therefore, too much reliance upon diplomatic support, without sufficient
backing of national security measures, cannot be considered safe. Again, there
are set limits to diplomacy on account of certain deficiencies in the structure of
Pakistan's economic and political organization. It must be made clear that
aggression against Pakistan is a very dangerous affair for the aggressor, and we
have this means to find an effective deterrent.
All wars of our age have become total wars; all European strategy is
based on the concept of total war; and it will have to be assumed that a war
waged against Pakistan is capable of becoming a total war. It would be
dangerous to plan for less and our plans should, therefore, include the nuclear
deterrent. Difficult though this is to employ, it is vital for Pakistan to give the
greatest possible attention to nuclear technology, rather than allow herself to be
deceived by an international treaty limiting this deterrent to the present nuclear
117
Powers. India is unlikely to concede nuclear monopoly to others and, judging
from her own nuclear programme and her diplomatic activities, especially at
Geneva, it appears that she is determined to proceed with her plans to detonate
a nuclear bomb. If Pakistan restricts or suspends her nuclear programme, it
would not only enable India to blackmail Pakistan with her nuclear advantage,
but would impose a crippling limitation on the development of Pakistan's science
and technology.
We are, however, not immediately concerned with the question of a

nuclear stalemate. Our problem, in its essence, is how to obtain such a weapon
in time before the crisis begins. India, whose progress in nuclear technology is
sufficient to make her a nuclear Power in the near future, can provoke this at a
time other own choosing. She has already received foreign assistance for her
nuclear programme and will continue to receive it. Pakistan must therefore
embark on a similar programme, although a nuclear weapon will be neither a real
deterrent nor can it be produced in a few years. We must therefore write it off as
a practical deterrent in any conflict with India in the near future.
The Vietnam war has proved that a small poor nation can fight the most
powerful nation in the world despite its inferiority in technique, wealth, and
numbers. Admittedly, the terrain of Vietnam aids the defenders, but there are
other overwhelming factors which more than neutralize this advantage. For us
the lesson of that war is that a people armed can resist any aggressor; for the
Great Powers the lesson is not to get bogged down in such a quagmire.
Pakistan's best deterrent would be a national militia, trained and led by
professional officers, to support the standing forces in the event of total war.
Military training in the universities should be obligatory; in every village there
should be created a cadre of active and courageous young men well trained in
the use of the primary weapons. In Switzerland every household has to maintain
a firearm in good order. The people must defend themselves, and the prospect of
a whole nation armed and trained is as powerful a deterrent as an
underdeveloped country can hope to possess. The age of gunboat diplomacy
has not yet passed away, but not even Global Power military blackmail can be
effective when the existence is known of a force determined to resist intervention
throughout the whole extent of the territory. Even if the heavy weapons of the
regular forces were destroyed by an aggressor's concentrated attacks, there
would still remain the resolute fighting units of an armed people. Diffused warfare
is extremely costly for the aggressor and offers no hope of a speedy victory. A
victory in the old military sense cannot be won against a nation fully armed.
Devastation may be achieved, but not victory, and the aggressor, however
powerful, must eventually retire disgraced and weakened. Such is the lesson of
Vietnam. The knowledge that an attack upon Pakistan would lead to total warfare
against a fully armed nation can be the only real deterrent for a relatively more
powerful aggressor. Such a deterrent, moreover, would have a strong political
value and would give our diplomacy scope for manoeuvres more extensive than
have hitherto been possible.
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This proposal may be objected to on the ground that such a widespread
distribution of weapons would increase crime, but the incidence of crime has
increased alarmingly over the years, proving that the criminal elements already
have the arms. It is the innocent victims of crime who are left defenceless. The
fault lies not with the people or with the proposal, but with the social conditions
which require radical alteration. If the Government undertakes corrective
measures and explains the need to arm the people for self-defence, and if the
people are given adequate safeguards, the crime rate will fall and the innocent
will be protected, as will every inch of national territory. The distribution of
weapons should, of course, be made with discretion and the disciplined militia
spread out over the country, rather than concentrated in a few places. Every
militiaman's name would be known and criminal elements would not be recruited.
In fact, practice in the use of firearms and close-combat methods would assist
the people of Pakistan against unruly individuals to whom even the middle class
is today hopelessly exposed. The formation of a well-organized and well-
supervised militia can only contribute to the maintenance of law and order, by
inculcating civic sense.
119
CHAPTER 17
How to Face the Looming Crisis
A national crisis is a call to national greatness, and must be met with a

spirit of dedication. Muslim s cannot be better inspired to face such a challenge
than by heeding the words of the Holy Koran:
Fighting in defence of Truth and Right is not to be undertaken light-

heartedly, not to be evaded as a duty. Life and Death are in the hands of God.
Not all can be chosen to fight for God. It requires constancy, firmness and faith.
Given these, large armies can be routed by those who battle for God.
At the time of the Consortium crisis in July 1965, the Government took the
issue directly to the people of Pakistan and, with their support, the country
successfully surmounted that crisis. The current crisis is more serious and the
people must be told the truth: what is wanted of Pakistan and why Pakistan is not
in a position to oblige. Underdeveloped countries cannot, by material means,
resist the pressures of Great and Global Powers, which can cause havoc by
silent diplomacy. They have only to bring into operation a host of devices which
wreck the economic and social equilibrium of dependent states and overthrow
regimes. Great and Global Powers prefer to operate in silence behind the
scenes, and a variety of reasons would be given why discussions on the
differences should not be made public. The dependent state would be told that
exposure and agitation would further vitiate the atmosphere of the talks. Such
states, however, lacking levers to operate directly against Global Powers, have
no choice but to expose these machinations and mobilize their people to offer
resistance. For this reason, underdeveloped nations seek international platforms
like the General Assembly of the United Nations to inform the world of the
difficulties involved in their struggle for emancipation and a better life.
It would be a fatal mistake for Pakistan to believe that her existing

differences with the United States can be resolved by secret diplomacy and by
keeping her people uninformed. These differences and the fundamental
problems they raise effect the people's future and must be explained to them. If
they have faith in their leaders and confidence in their judgement they would
welcome resistance and sacrifice and would stand behind the Government as an
invincible force to overcome all national difficulties. The Deputy Chairman of the
Planning Commission has said that we are making efforts to diversify our
economic dependence. Diversification began about three years ago. It should
have taken place earlier, but we were then living in the illusion that, by some
minor adjustments, resulting in greater dependency Pakistan would be able to
120
overcome her external difficulties. Pakistan might now lose its final opportunity if
we continue to indulge in reveries.
The course of history cannot be changed. We live in Asia and have to take
into account the Asian situation, which in less than ten years is likely to undergo
revolutionary changes. If we hold firm and take unhesitating steps in the right
direction, the crisis will be resolved. There will, of course, be new problems,
many appearing insurmountable, but with unity of purpose, there is none that
cannot be resolved. The poor people of Pakistan have always risen to the
occasion unhesitatingly; now the privileged class must do the same. We cannot
escape the responsibilities of leadership. It is for the leaders to hold high the
banner of independence and march forward with confidence in a spirit of
dedication. Our choice is whether to face the struggle or succumb to external
pressures and become a tombstone of the cold war. It is written in the Holy
Koran:
And we shall give the joys of victory to those who are oppressed, and who
struggle to uphold justice and freedom on the face of the earth; it is they whom
we shall raise to be leaders, and it is they who shall be the heirs who shall build
up and develop the equal well-being of Man.
The writing on the wall became clear beyond doubt in 1964, when the
United States decided to give long-term military assistance to India despite
earlier decisions, made in deference to Pakistani fears, to provide India with ad
hoc assistance subject to review. In taking this new decision the United States
took the risk of further straining relations with its most committed Asian ally.
When Pakistan swallowed this unpalatable decision and chose not to shirk her
cold war commitments in the interests of her own security, the United States
concluded that she would not take any counter-measures and accordingly
accelerated the rate of aid to India. Pakistan has lost many excellent
opportunities to redress her position, and the time for action is slipping past.
Timing and initiative, essential ingredients of successful political action, have
been as little evidenced in her policies as sound political judgement.
If Pakistan is not prepared to endure sacrifices in overcoming her present

difficulties, she will have to come to terms with the United States by co-operating
with India by freezing the Kashmir dispute and assuming a different attitude to
the People's Republic of China. In return, she would qualify for United States'
military assistance and increased economic aid. The food problem would no
longer haunt us. The acceptance of such terms, however, would result in the
surrender of vital national interests and, moreover, incur the permanent animosity
of China. Pakistan would be condemned without any corresponding benefit; it
would lead to greater frustration and result in our encirclement. This would
encourage further aggression from India, who seeks joint economic ventures or
other concessions only to obtain Pakistan's complete subordination. If relations
do not improve with Afghanistan, it would give that country some openings as
121
well. In the event of aggression from India and trouble from Afghanistan, the
United States will not assist Pakistan because both are non-Communist
countries. The Indo-Pakistan war of 1965 was sufficient proof of the United
States' attitude on this point. Conversely, in the event of conflict with China or the
Soviet Union, American military assistance would not be sufficient to prevent
Pakistan from ultimate defeat.
From every consideration, the only correct course is to establish normal

relations with these three Global Powers and to work for the further improvement
of relations with all Powers with whom we have a common interest. Three years
ago I said, in the National Assembly of Pakistan, that our relations with the
United States were abnormal and those with China and the Soviet Union were
sub-normal. Our policy should be to normalize relations with all the three Great
Powers. We knew that in the interim period there would be difficulties, but we
were confident that once the process of normalization was completed, our
relations with all three would become cordial.
Pakistan wants to have friendly and normal relations with the United
States, a Global Power that has contributed considerably to Pakistan's
development. When displeasure with India brought the United States closer to
Pakistan, we came to the hasty conclusion that it was our permanent, natural
friend; but in international politics the phrase 'natural friend' has no meaning. Its
use betrays a romantic outlook on world affairs. Common interest between states
exists, but no permanent, natural friendship. The Nehru days are over; India is no
longer recalcitrant; and the Indo-Pakistani situation has entered a new phase. It
is now in the global interest of the United States to bring Pakistan and India to
terms so as to complete the encirclement of China from Japan to the
subcontinent. The opportunity exists and the United States will do everything in
its power to seize it. After the changes in the Middle East, the American
Government might consider that the achievement of its objective in the sub-
continent has been considerably facilitated. For a long time Pakistan was not on
cordial terms with the two Global Powers who are its immediate neighbours and
that was without a conflict of interest with them. Now there is a difference with
another Global Power and Pakistan should face it bravely. It has been said by a
spokesman of the Foreign Office that a chapter in Pakistan-United States
relations has come to an end. I would say that it is more than a chapter. I would
say a whole book has been written and it is now on the shelf of history. Let us
write the first pages of a new book on the basis of equality and friendship and
without false assumptions and without interference in each other's internal affairs.
There should be no rancour in our relations. We have helped one another in the
past. It cannot be said that Pakistan has not exposed herself to enormous risks
and some suffering for the sake of the global policies of the United States, but
Pakistan has also derived some advantage from the association and we can still
be of service to one another in another context. In inter-state relations the
Rubicon is never crossed. In time the hankering after a special relationship will
abate, enabling the two countries to co-operate on a more realistic plane where
122
false assumptions, interference, and intervention have no place. Should the
United States really desire peace with justice in the conflicts in which it is
involved, Pakistan might have an opportunity to lend its efforts. Our relations with
the United States have suffered partly because we refused to enlarge the
Vietnam war by bearing arms on their side. A time may come when the United
States wishes to leave the battlefield in search of peace and Pakistan might then
have a notable contribution to make.
Disputes between China and the United States cannot last for ever. Either
they will lead to the total destruction of Asia and perhaps countries beyond, or
they will subside. If the latter, both will value Pakistan's resistance to Great
Power pressure. What appears today to the United States to be an unfriendly
attitude might tomorrow appear to be in the interest of lasting peace and, thus, in
the higher interests of the United States itself. If our cause is just we can face
any situation, even, if need be, complete isolation—though a just cause is
seldom isolated.
Pakistan should strive to avoid a political confrontation with the United

States over its disputes with India, but it should not shrink from this if, in spite of
everything, the United States continues to pursue a policy directed against our
interests. We should attempt to disengage the United States in our disputes with
India and establish normal relations with it, unqualified by preconditions, on the
understanding that it would not interfere in our internal affairs and coerce
Pakistan to come to a settlement with India prejudicial to Pakistan's vital
interests. If such an attempt fails, it would be preferable to pursue a policy of
collective confrontation with the support of the countries of the Third World, most
of which support Pakistan on the issue of self-determination, and with that of
those Great and quasi-Great Powers which are in sympathy with us.
In late 1958 and early 1959 unsuccessful efforts were made to persuade
India and Pakistan to co-operate in defence. One of the main reasons for the
failure of that plan was that the ground was insufficiently prepared in advance by
the United States. Circumspect efforts are now being made in the light of past
experience. There is talk of an exchange of visits between the leaders and
journalists, and of a relaxation of travel restrictions between the two countries. At
the same time emphasis is placed on the need for joint projects and the reduction
of armed forces. The idea is to stabilize the status quo and to sanctify it one day
by an accord, or a series of minor accords, ending with the final solution.
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CHAPTER 18
The Origins of Dispute with India
Relations between India and Pakistan should resemble those between

Sweden and Norway, countries which had to break apart in order to come closer
to each other. India and Pakistan have so much in common that the rest of the
world sometimes finds it hard to understand why they are in a state of perpetual
confrontation. The dictates of reason, the compulsions of geography, and the
influence of international forces require them to live in peace, but their poverty-
stricken masses have been denied the benefits that ought to have accrued to
them from political independence. There are many reasons for this state of
affairs: the legacy of history, superstition, and prejudice. The Hindus of the sub-
continent have borne a thousand years of subjugation and the Muslims have
been victims of foreign domination for over 150 years. The mental outlook of all
peoples of the sub-continent has been distorted by alien domination. They have
still to find their bearings as independent nations. They still need to acquire
confidence to break with the past.
To the end of his life, Mr. Nehru maintained that the resolution of the
Jammu and Kashmir dispute would not bring peace and amity to the sub-
continent, because Indo-Pakistani disputes were only the symptoms of the
bigoted attitude of theocratic and reactionary Pakistan to secular, progressive
India. Pakistan, on the other hand, maintained that only by a resolution of the
disputes, to which the Indian Government and Prime Minister Nehru were
internationally committed, would it be possible to determine whether the disputes
were the causes or the symptoms of Indo-Pakistani differences. It is obvious that
only by the resolution of territorial and other essential disputes could it be
possible to attain normal conditions. It is strange logic to usurp the territorial and
economic rights of a country on the grounds that enmity with that country is
unavoidable. There is no such thing as eternal enmity. Once disputes are
equitably resolved, tensions give way to normal conditions. The chief dispute
between Pakistan and India hinges on the future of the state of Jammu and
Kashmir, to whose people India is in honour bound to give the right of self-
determination. It would be wrong, however, to think that Kashmir is the only
dispute that divides India and Pakistan, though it is undoubtedly the most
significant. There have been others of considerable gravity, such as the dispute
over the canal waters, that over the future of the Ganges waters, and that
occasioned by the persecution of Muslims in India, resulting in their emigration to
Pakistan in large numbers. Other problems again, for historical and other
reasons, have not been properly taken up, but remain nevertheless of
124
fundamental national interest. One at least is nearly as important as the Kashmir
dispute: that of Assam and some districts of India adjacent to East Pakistan. To
these East Pakistan has very good claims, which should not have been allowed
to remain quiescent. India has never ceased to take an unpleasant interest in
East Pakistan and continues to support certain irredentist movements in West
Pakistan. At a time when the Nagas and the Mizos have revolted and thousands
of Muslims been ejected from Assam, which did not have a majority Hindu
community at the time of Partition, it would be wrong of Pakistan to ignore these
problems. The eviction of Indian Muslims into East Pakistan and the disputed
borders of Assam and Tripura should not be forgotten. The future of Farrakah
barrage and the general problem of the uses of rivers have yet to be equitably
settled; and, although the Nehru-Noon agreement was concluded ten years back,
Beru-bari has still to be transferred to Pakistan. Both wings of the country have
legitimate grievances against India and until the principal disputes are resolved, it
would be futile to expect relations to improve.
Nehru's thesis that these disputes are a symptom of Pakistan's eternal

hostility towards India is as sinister as it is baseless, for it is India and not
Pakistan that harbours ill-will. Pakistan achieved equality with India in the
struggle for independence. The Indian Congress Party resisted the partition of
the country, but failed to prevent the establishment of Pakistan. It is thus natural
that some Indian leaders should continue to nurture grievances against Pakistan.
Only because India persists in not permitting the completion of Pakistan have
relations between the two countries deteriorated into their present hopeless
deadlock. The philosophy of Pakistan is based on the equality of man and on the
concept of Islamic justice; and it would be a negation of this philosophy for
Pakistan to harbour animosity towards her principal neighbour.
Muslims ruled the sub-continent for over 700 years and eventually
succeeded in establishing their separate homeland. Unfortunately, the Indian
mentality is troubled with historical complexes and the obsession of defeat. In
order to go to the roots of Indo-Pakistani relations, one must examine the nature
of Indian nationalism.
From the time of the Rig Vedas, the dominant features of the Indian
genius have been its religious temperament and an exclusiveness derived from
the caste system. Although Indian civilization is considered synonymous with
Hindu culture, it has shown, over the centuries, a remarkable capacity for
assimilating alien cultures. An impressive pre-Aryan civilization lies buried in the
Indus Valley among the ruins of Mohenjo Daro and Harappa. It is often forgotten
that it was on the ruins of this civilization that the Aryan invaders established their
new order, which led to the birth of Hindu-Brahmanism. As the Aryan invaders
spread from the plains of the north-west to the upper regions of the Ganges, the
historical centre of gravity shifted from the Indus Valley and the Panjab to the
Gangetic Valley, and the Vedic age gave place to the era of Brahmanism.
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The Rig Vedas record the existence of the two races: the high-spirited
Dravidians, who were engaged in a life-and-death struggle to defend their
homeland; and the invading Aryans, the fair-skinned aliens. The Aryan rulers
arrogated to themselves _ the attributes of Dewas or gods, and the indigenous
people were classified as Rakhasas or devils. The caste system was a product of
the Brahmanic concept of superiority, which came to be accepted as a way of
life. Even the Shudras, or low-caste Hindus, were accorded some distinction from
the Malech or non-Aryan; although both categories were excluded from
domestic, civil, and military honours in this life and denied Mukti or salvation in
the life hereafter. With the advent of the Scythian invaders, Brahmanism suffered
a setback. The Scythian rulers were content with the nominal subjugation of the
local population. They did not establish their own code of exclusive prerogatives
in the domain of religion. The Brahmans continued to flourish, bowing before
their new masters, but stoutly refusing to admit them within their social or
religious domains. At this time was born the great Buddha, a Scythian prince. 'All
men are equal, and salvation is equally open to all', declared Lord Buddha, to the
horror of the Brahmans. Buddhism had to pay later the price of banishment from
India. Jainism, which followed in the wake of the decline of Buddhistic influence,
nearly met the same fate at the hands of the Brahmans.
A cursory examination of Indian history reveals how Hinduism has

handled the incursions of external elements. Minor inroads have been repaired
by assimilation; conquerors have been seduced by subservience; and those
among the conquerors who have remained in India have escaped assimilation
only by assiduous efforts to retain their separate identity.
This proud Indian order was broken by the Muslim conquest. The blow
had to be endured, but defiance was offered consistently in the name of Dharma.
The Indian order was not slow to perceive that, unlike other invading tribes, the
Muslims were no barbarians to be readily assimilated. They did not consider
admission to the indigenous polity a promotion, and so began the tragic Hindu-
Muslim confrontation. Throughout the period of Muslim domination, the Hindu
exhibited an intense pride of race and culture, which developed into violent
xenophobia. All the hatred and fear associated with the notion of Malech— the
unclean and uncivilized foreigner—were invoked in the struggle against the
Muslim alien. Even when the Muslims sought compromise by adopting Indian
ways and by marrying Indian women, they could not be accepted as equals
because the faith of Islam was a challenge to the fundamental concept of the
Hindu dogma. This militant spirit was freely invoked in countless uprisings
against the Muslims.
One of the earlier attempts on the part of a conqueror to come to terms

with Hinduism was made by Akbar, but his objectives were neutralized by the
sheer weight of Hindu dogma, which prevented a modus vivendi between the two
communities. His policy of co-operation, however, gave the Hindus the
opportunity to influence and encircle the Muslim elite. Aurangzeb thought it
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necessary to react by reversing the process, but came too late to complete his
mission. By the time he ascended the throne, the Mughal Empire was in the
throes of decay. He had to save the Empire, fight the Marathas, and face many
other harassing problems.
It was to fight the colonial domination of the British that a more consistent
policy of assimilation was instituted by leaders of the National Congress. In both
the 185 7 War of Independence and the Khilafat Movement Hindus and Muslims
fought side by side against British domination to achieve their common
objectives. In each case, however, when the struggle reached a critical stage,
their unity could not be sustained, with the result that the movements were
suppressed. Neither the Mughal attempt to work out a relationship of equality nor
the common cause against imperialism was able to sustain co-operation leading
to a lasting unity.
Eminent historians, who have exercised a powerful influence over the

Indian mind, have elaborated the concept of Mother India as not only the
Motherland, but also the Holy Land of the Hindus from the Himalayas to Cape
Comorin. This veneration for Bharat-Mata, which is Arya-Varta (Aryan
homeland), is the central theme of Hinduism, the strangest welter of mythology,
philosophy, cosmogony, and religion that the world has ever seen. The Aryans,
from whom the Brahmans claim their descent, lived for many centuries in the
Panjab before they advanced eastwards across northern India, conquering the
indigenous Dasyus. The earliest Hindu holy scriptures, the Rig Vedas and the
Upanishads, were composed by the Rishis, or ancient sages, in the Panjab.
In the Hindu national consciousness, as inspired by many great Hindu

writers of the last century, the sub-continent is conceived as a unity—one and
indivisible from the Khyber Hills to the far south, with the North-West, which is
now Pakistan, its heart and soul. Geographical India was never completely united
under one rule, except that of the British and nominally for a few years under the
Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb. Before that, the first Indian Empire, that of the
Mauryas, had extended over the whole of northern India, reaching into
Afghanistan and some parts of the southern peninsula. Indian influence spread
eastwards across the ocean to Cambodia and Java. Brahmanical religious and
cultural influence was more extensive than the frontiers of any single Indian
Empire in the past. The Hindu religion expressly extols the concept of
Chaptrapati or the Lord Paramount, a ruler who conquers and dominates his
neighbours and extends his sway from ocean to ocean. This kind of
consciousness of past greatness, regenerated by Indian writers to inspire Hindu
cultural and political revival, has been the mainspring of twentieth-century Indian
nationalism. Nehru's Discovery of India shows how the most westernized of
Hindu minds fell captive to this spell of the 'essential Hindu-ness of India'.
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The advent of Islam in force in the eleventh century brought not only a
loss of political power, but also outrage to the dominant religion. An Indian
author, analysing the reasons for the Hindu-Muslim conflict, observes:
The Muslim conquest of India could not be made innocuous for the Hindus
through the caste system. The conquest was an extension into a new country of
a well-established and mature society, with a fully developed way of life and a
living culture. The final conquest of India was the adventure of a Muslim King
whose main territories lay outside India, but even when the subordination of the
new Muslim empire to an external Muslim Kingdom was ended, as it very soon
was, Muslim rule in the country remained the rule of a colonizing people who
never forgot their affiliation with the wider Islamic world.
What was even more important was the fact that the Muslims were not
barbarians at a low level of culture who would consider admission to the Hindu
fold as a promotion. On the contrary, not only were they themselves the creators
and defenders of a new and aggressive culture, they had a fanatical conviction of
its superiority to all others, and thought it was their duty to propagate it even by
force. Their religion did, in fact, make this one of the essential, though optional,
duties of a Muslim. They were the first people in history to put forward the idea of
an irreconcilable conflict between a particular way of life and all others, and to
formulate a theory of permanent revolution. There could be no peace on earth,
they declared, until the whole world was converted to their faith.
As if that was not enough, the Hindus on their side had an almost equal
contribution to make. By the time the new invasions began, they had, as I have
noted, completely lost whatever assimilating power and adaptability they had and
hardened into a closed society with a conviction of its own superiority which
amounted to megalomania. There could thus be no question of absorbing even a
neutral foreigner, let alone a Muslim.
Fed on centuries of hatred, their sense of injury received at Muslim hands

reinforced by religious dogma, all Hindu movements have conceived the
assimilation of the Muslim minority as part of their political objective; differing only
as to their methods. The Hindu Mahasabha and the RSSS (Rastriya Swaya
Sevak Sangh) were committed to violence and the forcible conversion of Muslims
into the lowest strata of Indian society. Gandhi's methods were more subtle. He
frequently spoke of Muslims as blood-brothers and held out innumerable
assurances that their rights would be safeguarded under a Congress-governed
India; but whenever called upon to define their rights and share of political power
in an independent India, he invariably evaded a clear answer. Nehru, with his
background of association with Muslim culture, not to speak of his Cambridge
education and avowal of Marxist philosophy, dismissed the fact of a separate
Muslim culture in the subcontinent. He asked, 'What is this Muslim culture? Is it
Persian-Aryan culture or the Arab Semitic one?' The only difference between a
Hindu and a Muslim that he could discern was that the Hindu wore the dhoti and
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the Muslim a pajama and a Turkish fez. Nirad C. Chaudhuri writes of Hindu
militancy:
Life-long observation has convinced me that there is a streak of insanity in

the Hindus and that nobody will arrive at a correct appraisement of Hindu private
and public behaviour on the supposition that they have a normal personality. This
madness lurks within their ordinary workaday self like a monomania, and the
nature of the alienation can even be defined in the psychiatrist's terms—it is
partly dementia praecox, and partly paranoia. In all Hindu activities, especially in
the public sphere, can be detected clear signs of either a feebleness of mental
faculties or a perversion of them.
If anyone scouts this hypothesis I would ask him to remember the recent
history of the German and the Japanese people when they forced disastrous
wars on mankind. No other supposition except temporary collective insanity can
account for the Nazi phase of German history or the courting of a war with the
United States by the Japanese. These examples led me to the conclusion that
human groups, like individuals, can go mad. I have only extended the view to the
Hindus. But the Hindus show two important differences in their collective
madness: first, their insane behaviour is feebler in expression and therefore less
catastrophic for the rest of mankind, though very harmful to themselves;
secondly, it is continuous and permanent, and cannot be expected to pass off as
the German and the Japanese madness has done.
The Muslim League was founded in 1906, significantly, during a period of

extremist ascendancy in the Congress. A key-Congress word during the IQSOS
and 1930s was Sangatan, solidarity, integration, consolidation. The RSSS was
founded in Magpur in 1925. In 1923, when the late Maulana Mohammad Ali was
collaborating with Gandhi in the famous Khilafat Movement, V. D. Savarkar
published Hindustava, a book which has influenced Hindu nationalists up to the
present day. Savarkar's definition of 'Hindu' is revealing: 'A Hindu means a
person who regards this land of Bharatvarsha, from the Indus to the Seas as his
Fatherland as well as his Holy land, that is, the cradle or land of his religion.
"Hindustava" embraces all the departments of thought and activity of the whole
being of our Hindu race. The Hindus were a nation; the Muslims only a
community.
Now that the Muslim has succeeded in carving out a home for himself, he
poses a greater challenge to Hinduism. Pakistan is considered a cruel mutilation
of Bharat-Mata, and Hindu militarism is straining at the leash. Patel once
declared that if India so desired she could sweep up to Peshawar. Between 1947
and 1954 she was prevented twice, if not three times, from undertaking such an
adventure for fear of international censure and repercussions. In 1965, however,
came the treacherous attack; Indian militarism being under the chauvinistic
illusion that it would be able to overwhelm Pakistan.
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The Indian leaders agreed to Pakistan only when it became clear to them
that partition was inevitable and that they had to concede to this division as a
price for the transference of power from British to Indian hands. Even while
agreeing to Pakistan, Gandhi, Nehru, Patel, and the others never really
conceded the two-nation theory. They accepted partition as a matter of bitter
expediency, in the hope and expectation that the new State would not be viable
and would collapse under pressure from its larger and more powerful neighbor.
India's attitude towards Pakistan since Independence is well known. The

seizure of Junagadh, Kashmir, and Hyderabad is too fresh in our memory to
need recapitulation. It has never seemed to India a contradiction that, while she
laid claim to Junagadh and Hyderabad by reason of the overwhelming Hindu
composition of the population, she rejected the same criterion in the case of
Jammu and Kashmir with their overwhelming Muslim population. Instead, Indian
leaders introduced the falsely applied concepts of secularism and democracy
and the hostage theory to deny to the people of Jammu and Kashmir their
inalienable rights.
In the light of these historical and psychological factors which govern the
Indian attitude towards Pakistan, it is clear that Indian leaders have come to
tolerate Pakistan, because they do not have the power to destroy her. If they
could forge this power, as they are endeavoring to do by the augmentation of
their military forces, they would end partition and reabsorb Pakistan into the India
of their dreams. They have pronounced Pakistan their chief enemy. The whole
aim of Indian diplomacy under Nehru and his successors has been to isolate our
country so that, when India has built up sufficient strength, she could overwhelm
and absorb us as quickly and quietly as possible.
The founder of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, was known as 'The

Ambassador of Hindu-Muslim Unity' and the Indian National Congress regarded
him as an apostle of their movement. At the height of his career he did his
utmost, with all the fervor and enthusiasm of his earlier days, to promote the
cause of Indian independence, so that Hindu and Muslim could live side by side
within a single polity and find their emancipation under one roof. The fact that he
failed is in itself significant. Failure as such would have depressed a lesser man.
Mr. Jinnah, whose single mindedness and stamina have become a legend, could
hardly have been deterred by failure alone. Experience had shown him that the
Indian leaders sought the co-operation of Muslims not as equals, but only as a
means to eliminate their identity. For some years he remained abroad, aloof from
the tortuous course of Indian politics. Only when approached by such Muslim
leaders as Maulana Mohammad All did he return to fulfill his historic mission.
Enriched by his earlier experience, he then adopted the only logical course open
to him: exposure of the Congress ambitions to subjugate the Muslims of the sub-
continent. For the Muslim League he formulated a policy of total confrontation,
steadfastly refusing to succumb to the lures and promises of co-operation with
which Congress sought to distract or entice him. He was relentless in the pursuit
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of his objectives and would not be deflected from his course by either the sweet
words of Sarojini Naidu or the hypnotic dialectics of Gandhi.
In abandoning his advocacy of Hindu-Muslim unity, the founder of

Pakistan left us a lesson which has, with the passage of time, become clearer in
its relevance. The fact that the Hindus and Muslims of the sub-continent
constituted two separate nationalities formed the foundation of the edifice of
Pakistan. When this was first propounded as the Muslims' political objective, the
leaders of the Muslim League were ridiculed not only by the Indian National
Congress and the British, but also by many eminent Muslims. It seemed to them
preposterous that, after nearly two hundred years of united existence under one
yoke as the most precious gem in the Crown of the British Empire, the country
should be rent asunder. Subsequent events are now a part of history. Pakistan
was achieved as a result of an overwhelming popular decision, in which the
Muslims of the sub-continent, including those who knew that they would not form
a part of Pakistan, cast their votes for its creation.
At this stage, it might be useful to examine the considerations which

influenced the abdicating power. Britain had decided that it was no longer
feasible to continue her colonial rule, but was not unaware of the need to protect
her own considerable interests after the liquidation of the Empire. The partition of
British India had to be consistent with British residual interests, successor states
being established in a manner favorable to Britain's post-imperial objectives.
Through India's devoted spokesman, Lord Mount batten, Britain succeeded not
only in bringing about a truncation of Pakistan, but also in furnishing India with
massive advantages against Pakistan. Referenda were held in the North-West
Frontier Province and in the district of Sylhet in East Pakistan. The results in both
cases were overwhelmingly in favor of Pakistan. Kalat was advised to declare its
independence along with the adjacent territories of Baluchistan. The British
Government, however, took every possible opportunity to increase the imbalance
against Pakistan. The Punjab was partitioned and, in violation of the principle of
partition according to the composition of population in contiguous regions, vast
Muslim-populated territories stretching up to the fringes of Amritsar and including
Gurdaspur and Ferozepur were arbitrarily handed over to India. Assam was
relinquished, Bengal partitioned, and India was granted corridors allowing access
to Jammu and Kashmir in the north and to Assam and Tripura in the east. In
North Bengal, such a corridor leading to Assam provided India with an
uninterrupted contiguity with the southern boundaries of Nepal and gave her
access to the Himalayan states of Sikkim and Bhutan bordering on China. In no
instance was the benefit of doubt given to Pakistan in the division of territory or
its other claims.
In the circumstances prevailing in the sub-continent at that time, the British

Government could not have done more to tilt the balance of advantage in India's
favor. The transfer of power was peacefully determined as a result of agreement
between the British Government, the Indian National Congress, and the Muslim
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League; but the manner in which the transfer was effected by the ruling power
betrayed prejudice against Pakistan. No attempt was made to provide Pakistan
with the minimum requirements for administration, defence, and finance. The
country was left to fend for herself. In the maintenance of law and order, the
division of assets, military stores, and sterling balances, and even in the transfer
of funds, India was given a stranglehold over Pakistan. It was intended to punish
the Muslims for winning self-determination by giving them a weak and
emasculated state which would quickly wither away in the non-Marxian sense.
It is not difficult to see why India has been strengthened in the belief that
an isolated Pakistan would be to her advantage. When almost the entire Muslim
population of the sub-continent voted for Pakistan, it voted in fact for a Pakistan
consisting of the Provinces of Panjab, Sind, Baluchistan, and the North-West
Frontier Province in the west, and for Bengal and Assam in the east, together
with the Princely States having Muslim majorities. India felt she could liquidate, in
the course of time, the truncated Pakistan that finally emerged. East Pakistan
was considered particularly vulnerable and so forces of disruption and
subversion were let loose there, but India had not bargained on the
determination, patriotism, and pride of our nation. Indian economists made a
cynical assessment of the economic viability of Pakistan. They believed the
country could not survive the rupture of its trade and economic relations with
India. On the basis of this assessment India forced an economic blockade on
Pakistan, but Pakistan reacted bravely. Foreign trade was boosted, the
processing of indigenous raw material was undertaken and, having withstood the
initial dislocation, Pakistan was able to move on to a new era in which her
economy became progressively more capable of withstanding India's economic
aggression. In surmounting these problems, it was the single-mindedness of her
people that saved the country. If Pakistan had weakened in her resolve, India
would have tightened her grip in many other ways. Fortunately, Pakistan did not
weaken, and not only broke the economic blockade, but took positive steps to
make its economy more independent of India.
Every conceivable situation in our internal affairs continues to be exploited

by India with the aim of aggravating our difficulties and weakening our national
integrity. It is no coincidence that the genesis of every Indo-Pakistani dispute lies
in a definite act of Indian hostility. The origin of the Jammu and Kashmir dispute,
the events leading to the United Nations resolutions of 1948 and 1949, the
numerous mediation attempts by the United Nations and others, bilateral
negotiations, India's repeated attempts to frustrate any settlement and, finally,
her renunciation of solemn international commitments, tell a tale of consistent ill-
will.
Her policy of evictions leaves no doubt that India's principal objective is

the obliteration of Pakistan. The meanest intellect in the sub-continent must now
be aware of the vicious circle of communal disturbance, exodus, repercussion,
and exodus in the reverse direction. It is axiomatic in our circumstances that
132
oppression of minorities in one country has inevitable ramifications in the other.
Moreover, it is highly probable that, if as a result of such oppression, any
significant migration ensues, it would provoke the majority community, cause
unrest among members of the minority community and create a law and order
crisis of grave magnitude. India formulated a deliberate and well-planned policy
of harassing and evicting the Muslims of Assam. Thousands were torn from their
homes and pushed across the border with a complete disregard not only for their
fundamental human rights, but also for the resultant turmoil. The long series of
communal riots in India have kept more than sixty million Muslims in the country
in a state of perpetual fear. In the winter of 1963-4, the outbreak of rioting,
looting, and arson cost many Muslim lives in West Bengal alone and set in
motion a fresh wave of exodus of Muslims into East Pakistan. Notwithstanding
every possible precaution of the Government of Pakistan, there were lamentable
episodes in which enraged Muslims wreaked their vengeance on members of the
minority community.
The fact that India carried out a deliberate policy of evicting its Muslim
minority, causing untold misery both to the direct victims and to the Hindu
minority in Pakistan, is a matter of special significance. The objective is not
difficult to understand. East Pakistan, which India failed to subvert, was to be
kept under constant pressure from the outside. By evicting Indian Muslims they
would not only subject East Pakistan to the physical pressure of having to
rehabilitate thousands, but it would also confront Pakistan with the
responsibilities of ensuring the protection of its Hindu minority. This dual pressure
was designed to weaken East Pakistan and keep things perpetually on the boil.
More than five million Muslims from India have been forced into East Pakistan in
this process, which has strained our economy considerably and caused new
tensions and problems of law and order. The war which was launched across the
international frontier against Lahore on 6 September 1965 is a landmark in the
history of Indo-Pakistani relations. On this date India finally passed the point of
no return.
From time immemorial the exponents of Greater Bharat have maintained

that its political, cultural, and economic hegemony should extend from the
Hindukush to the Mekong. Throughout Indian history political philosophers have
propounded this theme at such length and with such frequency that it has
become a part of the tradition which modern India has inherited. The fact that it is
nearly a thousand years since India was in a position to take any step towards
that glorious objective has not diminished either the intensity or the extent of this
unwavering ambition. As a first step towards its realization, Pakistan must be
neutralized, but ultimately the semi-religious concept of Akhand Bharat demands
the end of Pakistan itself.
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CHAPTER 19
Confrontation with India
The principal objective of Indian foreign policy has been to isolate

Pakistan. In the early days, recognizing the fact that Pakistan had affinities with
the Middle East, India concentrated her diplomatic activity against Pakistan in the
Arab World. When, in self-defence, we moved towards the United States, India
denounced our mutual Defence Agreements with that country.
Taking advantage of Soviet hostility toward GENTO, India embarked on a

comprehensive plan for co-operation with the Soviet Union in political, economic,
and military matters, firstly, to counteract Pakistan's alliance with Western
countries, and, secondly, to put further difficulties in the way of Soviet-Pakistan
relations. India's initial objective was the promotion of grandiose designs in
south-east Asia and the total isolation of Pakistan from the People's Republic of
China, In international organizations, such as the United Nations, India continued
to operate on an over-ambitious scale and, for the benefit of the Afro-Asian
world, sought to portray Pakistan as a client of the Western Powers and,
therefore, unsuited to play an important role in Afro-Asian matters. Perhaps the
excess of zeal with which India pursued this objective helped Pakistan to
maintain her standing in the international arena. It became increasingly clear to
other countries that it was India's malice towards Pakistan and not the substance
of Pakistan's domestic or foreign policy which motivated Indian policy. Her
obduracy over the Jammu and Kashmir dispute did more than any other factor to
expose the true nature of her policies towards Pakistan. This unconcern for
international morality led India to a position in which, during the war between
India and Pakistan, her leaders were forced to lament their isolation and the lack
of support from any part of the world.
On the one hand, India preached peace, while on the other, she continued
to increase her defence expenditure to unprecedented levels. On the one hand,
she preached non-alignment as the moral basis for her external policies, while on
the other, she continued to exploit both power blocs for her own purposes. She
professed herself a friend of the underdeveloped world, but at the same time
continued to clothe herself in the mantle of the receding colonial powers. Such
contradictions exposed her in her true colours. All evidence points to the fact that
it is India, not Pakistan, that cannot arrive at a fair reconciliation. Whereas
Pakistan maintains the confrontation only to resolve the outstanding disputes,
India seeks the absorption of Pakistan for the return of normal conditions.
It has been suggested that Pakistan should become realistic and seek
rapprochement with India without the settlement of outstanding disputes. Even
this would not resolve the dilemma. Pakistan has already lost valuable territories
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to India under pretext of realism and, if applied to Jammu and Kashmir and other
disputes, this process would involve the territorial attrition of our country. It would
mean capitulation by instalment and eventual liquidation. By settlement of a
dispute we mean a solution designed to achieve lasting peace. Only through an
equitable settlement can such an honourable peace be secured and, if it is our
fundamental objective to achieve this, as it should be, then we must consider
how it is to be achieved. Can it be achieved on India's terms? Certainly not;
because if India's terms were to prevail, there would be no viable Pakistan. If the
worst were to come to the worst, what would be the consequences of Pakistan
abandoning Jammu and Kashmir? It is clear that a compromise of this nature
would whet but not satisfy India's appetite and, with her growing military power
and possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, she would use these territories as a
rallying point to integrate the remaining parts of Pakistan.
At the time of partition, Pakistan lost Gurdaspur, Ferozepur, and certain

other parts of the Panjab as well as valuable territories in the eastern part,
notably in Assam and Tripura. Likewise, in Amritsar district, Muslim majority
areas spread from Lahore district to the suburbs of the city of Amritsar. All these
extensive and valuable territories were arbitrarily and unjustly given to India to
further strengthen that country at the cost of Pakistan. These areas were the
granary of the north and were very important strategically. By giving them to
India, the defence of Lahore and other parts of West Pakistan became badly
exposed. At that time, it was argued that such were the anomalies of the
upheavals of partition and revolution, that it was better to accept and consolidate
a truncated Pakistan than fight for territories lost through an iniquitous foreign
award. India's occupation of Junagadh and Hyderabad created political and
psychological conditions which were of incalculable advantage to her. She was
confirmed in her belief that, by the threat and use of force as a deliberate
instrument of her foreign policy, she could make Pakistan submit to all her
policies. The Jammu and Kashmir dispute has continued for over twenty years,
and the question is now whether Pakistan has the courage and endurance to
continue to uphold the right of this subjugated people, or whether its stamina is
weakening under heavy external pressure. When we are told that India is too
large to be resisted, that fifty-five million people in East Pakistan should not
sacrifice themselves for the five million people in Kashmir, or that the people of
West Pakistan should not resist the Indian occupation of Kashmir, thereby
exposing their limited territorial depth to a military onslaught, it indicates erosion
of the national resolve.
The argument of comparative numbers can be reduced to a logical

absurdity. Let us say that the population of Pakistan is one hundred million.
When would a nation of this size be prepared to risk liberating territory and a
related population from the enemy? Would it be prepared to take the risk only
when the population to be liberated becomes one hundred and one million? But
then it would not be a war of liberation, but rather a war of conquest, in other
words a colonial war. The argument that numerical disparity justifies inaction is
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patently false and ignores the many other causes of discord between India and
Pakistan. Our countries must ultimately live in peace, but only when the conflict
has been resolved. Such peaceful co-existence, however, remains out of the
question so long as India strives to impose a cultural, religious, and linguistic
uniformity upon all its minorities. The surrender of Pakistan's interest does not
resolve the conflict. If we are not prepared to expose our people and territory to
risk, then we must expect our frontiers with India to be eroded, each erosion by
itself being too small to provoke a suitable response. In international politics, as
in science, the so-called commonsense argument is not always valid. Science
began to progress when a priori arguments from commonsense ceased to be
honoured; as, for example, when Galileo proved, against all the rules of
commonsense, that light and heavy bodies fall to earth at the same speed. In
international politics, so many factors are involved that an ideal solution is rarely
found, since variables of the kind that involve human beings are subject to
human decisions. When France was overrun in the Second World War, had the
British been devotees of commonsense arguments, they would have yielded to
the Germans; but Churchill did not do so. He offered his country blood, toil, tears,
and sweat, and Britain won the war.
On the basis of the argument that a struggle for a part of the nation's
territory is not worth the sacrifice of the whole nation, India might be permitted to
take over Karachi and Sind as a result of some territorial usurpation. Would it be
prudent for the rest of the population of Pakistan to sacrifice what remains of their
country for the ten million people of Karachi and Sind? Next might come the turn
of Baluchistan; then that of the remaining parts of East and West Pakistan, to
complete the country's piecemeal liquidation. If this premise is to be applied to
Jammu and Kashmir which, to the people of Pakistan, is as much a part of their
country as is Rawalpindi or Chittagong, it can be applied to all other territories as
well. The issue is not a complicated one, nor should we allow it to become so.
India is the larger country, but it is beset with terrifying problems; we, though
smaller, have in our hands the potent weapon of a just cause. On balance, our
advantages and disadvantages are equally divided or, if anything, incline in
Pakistan's favour. The sub-continent is not likely to face another blood-bath.
Internal and external conditions cannot permit it, but this does not mean that we
should not be prepared to make sacrifices. Even without the solution of the
Jammu and Kashmir problem, blood is being spilled there every day. There are
cease-fire violations. Muslims are being tortured and evicted in the eastern
region of India. People are suffering and dying needlessly despite the Tashkent
Agreement and the United Nations.
Why does India want Jammu and Kashmir? She holds them because their
valley is the handsome head of the body of Pakistan. Its possession enables her
to cripple the economy of West Pakistan and, militarily, to dominate the country.
India retains Jammu and Kashmir because she wants to increase her strategic
importance by having common borders with the Soviet Union and China, and
correspondingly denying Pakistan these frontiers. Above all, she retains the state
136
against all norms of morality because she wants to negate the two-nation theory,
the basis of Pakistan. If a Muslim majority area can remain a part of India, then
the raison d'etre of Pakistan collapses. These are the reasons why India, to
continue her domination of Jammu and Kashmir, defies international opinion and
violates her pledges. For the same reasons, Pakistan must continue
unremittingly her struggle for the right of self-determination of this subject people.
Pakistan is incomplete without Jammu and Kashmir both territorially and
ideologically. Recovering them, she would recover her head and be made whole,
stronger, and more viable. It would be fatal if, in sheer exhaustion or out of
intimidation, Pakistan were to abandon the struggle, and a bad compromise
would be tantamount to abandonment; which might, in turn, lead to the collapse
of Pakistan. If, however, we settle for tranquil relations with India, without an
equitable resolution of disputes, it would be the first major step in establishing
Indian leadership in our parts, with Pakistan and other neighbouring states
becoming Indian satellites.
It has taken twenty years and two wars to establish the separate identity of
our state with its population of over a hundred and twenty million, yet there are
people who still lament the partition of the sub-continent, portraying Pakistan as
the prodigal son who will some day return to the bosom of Bharat-Mata. Either
under external influence or in the light of her experience, India has, after the
September war of 1965, begun to talk of co-operation with Pakistan. What does
she seek to gain from this change in tactics? To improve her economic position
by reducing her heavy defence expenditure; to gain a breathing space in which to
deal firmly with dissident elements. She would like to crush the Nagas and Mizos,
who are close to East Pakistan, suppress the south and the Sikhs, contain
pockets of discontent in Rajputana, and break the spirit of sixty million Indian
Muslims.
It has often been said that the future of Indian Muslims would be
endangered if relations between Pakistan and India remain in a state of
confrontation. This argument is used to blackmail Pakistan and to hold the Indian
Muslims in perpetual fear as hostages in India's policy of aggression and
aggrandizement. A deeper study of the problem reveals that the reverse is closer
to the truth. A strong and determined Pakistan, refusing to surrender one
millimetre of her legitimate rights, is their best protection. The Muslims of the sub-
continent voluntarily voted for Pakistan. The massive vote in favour of partition
was cast as much by those who were to remain in India as by those in territories
which were to form Pakistan. The confidence of the Muslims reached a climax
when Mr. Jinnah confronted the Indian leaders with the two-nation theory. India
turned on her own Muslim citizens only after Partition; only when she believed
that a weak and unstable Pakistan was in no position to retaliate. There can be
no doubt that a weakened Pakistan would embolden India to discriminate further
against Indian Muslims. Conversely, a strong Pakistan is their strongest
guarantee of protection, since India would hesitate so to provoke an alert,
vigorous Pakistan. It is not at all fortuitous that now, for the first time since her
137
independence twenty years ago, at the height of the confrontation, and as a
consequence of the war, India has elected a Muslim as her President. If,
however, the sovereign State of Pakistan were to weaken, the Indian
Government would feel freer to deal as it pleased with its minority groups. In
such a situation the Indian Muslims would suffer gravely, but the immediate and
worst-treated victims would be the Muslims of Jammu and Kashmir. The moment
co-operation begins with India, without an equitable settlement of disputes, the
people of Kashmir will naturally conclude that Pakistan has abandoned them,
leaving them no option but to surrender to Indian aggression. If Pakistan, as a
sovereign and well-armed state, destroys her power of resistance, how can the
unarmed people of Jammu and Kashmir be expected to resist? After Pakistan's
submission, India would feel free to bring the Himalayan states of Sikkim and
Bhutan to heel and would coerce Nepal and Ceylon as well. With her hegemony
spread from end to end of the sub-continent, India would then attempt to destroy
for all time the possibility of another movement for Muslim self-determination.
With Pakistan co-operating on terms of inequality and submission, India

would, in the first instance, turn her attention to the rich and alluvial portion of
East Pakistan, which would be assailed with propaganda and subjected to
economic and cultural encroachments. India would attempt, by threats and
seduction, by insidious cultural infiltration, by sheer weight of proximity, to absorb
East Pakistan into West Bengal. The present theme of Indian propaganda is that
the fifty-five million people of East Pakistan should not sacrifice their future and
be exploited for the sake of the five million of Jammu and Kashmir, who are, it is
said, as close to East Pakistan as are, say, the Muslims of Iran and Iraq. Were
India to succeed in absorbing Kashmir, she would advise East Pakistanis to
regard the people of West Pakistan as concerning them as little as the people of
Kashmir. Incessant appeals would be made to East Pakistan to end the
'domination' of West Pakistan. Influential people would be found in West Pakistan
to argue in favour of East Pakistan's separation. Such agents provocateurs, who
are to be found in any country, would propagate the idea that East Pakistan is a
'liability' and that its 'blackmail' should be put to an end by a final parting of the
ways. Once the national resolve to liberate Jammu and Kashmir is broken,
subversion to break the link between them would increase in both wings. If, in
this way, Pakistan were to be divided, each wing would immediately lose its
importance by half. Instead of being two mighty pillars of strength in the sub-
continent, Pakistan would be reduced to two weak states. The process of
disintegration would continue until East Pakistan were absorbed into West
Bengal and would provide an encouraging example to separatist movements in
West Pakistan.
India tried to prevent Pakistan's coming into being, but failed. After
Independence, she imposed an economic blockade in order to destroy our
economy, a manoeuvres that not only failed to break, but actually strengthened
Pakistan. The September war of 1965 has now convinced India that she cannot
destroy Pakistan by confrontation. Her policy will therefore shift from
138
confrontation to co-operation, to the 'Spirit of Tashkent'. She will now seek to
convert Pakistan into her satellite by holding out inducements of peaceful co-
operation. It is a more subtle approach. How can any sensible person object to
it? It would appear unreasonable to ignore the extended hand of friendship. India,
however, plans to enter by the back door, like a burglar. In this she would be
aided and abetted by foreign Powers. The point of departure between India's
objective to absorb Pakistan and the United States' objective is reached the
moment the latter presses for aggressive confrontation with China. India's own
efforts would be directed to obtaining the submission of Pakistan for her own
greater glory and not as prelude to a provocative encirclement of China. India's
objective and that of the United States in seeking Pakistan's submission have
one interest in common, but are in conflict in respect of another. If Pakistan
assesses the situation correctly, she can bring them to cancel one another; if, on
the other hand, Pakistan yields to pressure, the result would be greater co-
operation between India and the United States, which would remove the
contradictions, to the extent at least of hastening Pakistan's submission to India.
Thus, India would welcome the proposals for joint ventures, yet hesitate to
adopt them. She would welcome the proposals for the purpose of absorbing
Pakistan, but would be inhibited if the object is to bring about the co-operation in
order to confront China. History holds no precedent of successful joint economic
ventures between states with unresolved territorial and other fundamental
disputes. It would be like asking UAR or Syria to embark on joint ventures with
Israel in their region. Some foreign experts have, on the other hand, said there
are two economies in Pakistan and, on the other, emphasis is placed on the
complementary nature of the economies of East Pakistan and West Bengal. In
other words, internally, as a nation, Pakistan has two economies, but externally
the eastern part of Pakistan has an indivisible economy with a part of India!
Without the settlement of disputes, and in disregard of the principles relevant to
the protection of sovereign rights, the World Bank wants to intervene high-
handedly to impose a solution for the utilization of the waters of the Ganges. It
wants to bring about cooperation between the two countries by making East
Pakistan share its waters with West Bengal and vice versa. The analogy of the
Indus Basin Treaty does not hold. This was intended to divide the waters
between India and Pakistan to decrease interdependence. In the case of East
Pakistan, efforts are being made to impose a solution which would make East
Pakistan dependent on West Bengal. Such a solution would place Pakistan at
the mercy of West Bengal with inevitable and disastrous consequences. With this
precedent, other projects would follow for joint participation in hydro-electric
schemes leading to collaboration in agriculture and industry. The proposal for the
reduction of armed forces has already been dealt with, but, even in this case,
apart from all other drawbacks which have been discussed, India could always
circumvent such an agreement by exaggerating the threat of China, in
connivance with the United States. If that becomes difficult, efforts would be
made to supply India with arms from other satellite countries to make the
agreement inapplicable to India.
139
140
CHAPTER 20
Epilogue
No country in the world can in principle oppose universal disarmament in

face of the ever-present risk of the employment of thermo-nuclear weapons on a
scale to destroy life on this planet. When people everywhere are anxious to
improve their living conditions, no nation has the right to oppose the demand for
using available resources for economic development instead of defence.
However, in order to be effective, disarmament must be on a multilateral,
universal basis, so that no one nation has an advantage over another, or one
group of nations an advantage over another group of nations. But the proposal
for the reduction of forces between India and Pakistan does not contain a single
element of equity. India is in possession of Jammu and Kashmir and eastern
enclaves belonging to Pakistan. In such circumstances, bilateral disarmament
between India and Pakistan would mean the victory of the state possessing the
disputed territory and the defeat of the dispossessed.
We should not be daunted by the powerful support India is getting. By

herself she is a menace to the security of Pakistan and, aided by powerful
external forces, she will be a greater menace. But no matter how great the
menace, it cannot break the united resolve of a nation with a just cause. The
present situation cannot last indefinitely. The attitudes of Global Powers, as we
have seen, are capable of changing. In international dealings there is no such
thing as an 'irrevocable constant'. That is why India is afraid when she hears talk
about bridges of understanding between China and the United States. With the
passage of time, when a modus vivendi is struck between the United States and
China, or between China and the Soviet Union, India will find herself in isolation.
The war in Vietnam is of decisive importance. It has a direct bearing on future
developments in the sub-continent and in Asia as a whole. Let us hope that it
does not extend, giving us the respite to resolve our problems satisfactorily. The
growing United States-China confrontation over Vietnam appears, at first sight, to
have an adverse effect on Pakistan, but a closer examination dispels this notion.
We could find the situation in Vietnam of help in overcoming the mounting
pressures if we are able to resist those that are already felt. If that war ends
satisfactorily, it might lead to a reduction in the tensions between the United
States and China, which would be to Pakistan's advantage. If the war continues,
the United States is likely to become so completely involved as to be unable to
exert further pressure on Pakistan; nor, in the prevailing conditions, will it want to
precipitate another serious crisis in Asia.
In any event, whether the United States is or is not capable of imposing its
conditions, there should be no doubt that Pakistan will hold its ground, reject all
141
obnoxious conditions, and resolutely resist foreign interference. She should
continue to confront India until there is a satisfactory settlement of territorial and
other fundamental disputes bearing on East and West Pakistan.
It would be wrong, however, to conclude that under no circumstances

would Pakistan want to co-operate with India. The bonds of geography, history,
and culture are not to be denied. In view of our eagerness to improve our
relations with remote countries and neighbours alike, it would be natural to try to
improve relations with India. However, in order to be productive, co-operation
must be on the basis of true equality between nations which have no prejudices
against each other and no territorial or other fundamental disputes. Co-operation
cannot co-exist with injustice. Would it have been possible for the British to co-
operate on the basis of inequality and domination with the India people before
Independence or for France to co-operate with Algeria under colonial conditions?
India does not have genuine co-operation in mind when she talks of
collaboration. She uses the slogan as propaganda designed to mislead world
opinion and deceive Pakistan.
Is the quarrel with India eternal? Eternal quarrels do not exist, but eternal
interests do. Pakistan can maintain her vital interests only by confronting India
until all disputes are equitably resolved. It is an article of faith of the people of
Pakistan that the day will come when the people of Jammu and Kashmir will link
their destinies with Pakistan and that Pakistan's other fundamental disputes with
India, affecting the eastern parts of the country, would also find a just solution.
The people of Pakistan want relations with India without entanglement.
Confrontation which means neither peace nor war must be continued as a
measure of self-defence until India realizes the need to settle all important
disputes with Pakistan on the basis of recognized international merit and in a
spirit of equality. India is not a Great Power. She has territorial and other disputes
with Pakistan, and she seeks Pakistan's liquidation but not the encirclement of
China unless it serves her own ends. Confrontation with India is, therefore,
unavoidable and the only present answer to the solution of Indo-Pakistan
disputes, the only way to achieve lasting peace between the two sub-continental
powers. It is not a struggle between unequal powers as it would be in the case of
confrontation with a Great or Global Power. Admittedly, there is a relative
inequality, but not absolute inequality. Besides, this relative inequality is
counterbalanced by the justice of Pakistan's cause, the spirit of her people, the
collaboration of the people of Jammu and Kashmir who resent India's occupation
of their land and seek to join Pakistan in a common brotherhood, and the
overwhelming support she has received from other countries, including that of
the People's Republic of China. The roots of confrontation between India and
Pakistan go deep into our history and will have to continue until the cause of
justice triumphs, no matter how heavy the odds. Peace, denied to the six
hundred million people of the sub-continent for centuries, can return only when
the disputes are resolved. Peace, so necessary to eradicate poverty, ignorance,
and disease, cannot come by the surrender of legitimate rights, but through their
142
attainment. A policy of confrontation is not a policy of militarism; indeed, it often
has the effect of averting a physical conflict. The only known means by which a
nation can avoid military conflict is by total preparedness, not only in a military
context.
Asia being in the midst of a great revolution, local unheavals and changes
are to be expected and the leaders of Asian countries must learn to live with
revolution, knowing that there is no going back and that the status quo is not for
purchase. If they are unable to ride the storm of revolution, they have no
business to lead. It may be that only out of a clash of conflicting interests will a
final synthesis be found in Asia and with it a tolerable peace. A long and arduous
road has to be covered from confrontation to co-operation.
Small nations have always struggled against more powerful ones for their
freedom. The whole history of mankind is a struggle of the oppressed against
exploitation and domination. The contemporary history of Pakistan is nothing but
an example of such a struggle. The struggle before Independence was against
an alien racial domination; today it is for preserving independence. The wheel of
change has come full circle, bringing us face to face with the same ancient
menace. We are no more a subject people; we have the attributes of an
independent nation and the will to remain free; though peace is our ideal, the
defence of our rights continues to be the supreme objective of the people of
Pakistan.
143

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Myth of Independence

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The Myth of

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto

The Struggle for Equality

In less than a quarter of a century, Pakistan's relations with the United

We have concluded an extensive review of our policy with regard to the

We have also decided to remove present U.S. Government restrictions on

This decision was of far-reaching consequence to the future of the sub-

The one-dimensional approach to diplomacy is wrong. Although it is a

Significant decisions which seem to affect Pakistan only have, in reality, a

Oppressed people everywhere, bound by the chains of colonialism, were

Since Independence, Pakistan's foreign relations have evolved in stages;

Global Powers and Small Nations

1. The United States of America

The main purpose of imperialism was to exploit the resources of the

The end of imperialism and the emergence of Global Powers have

Should the smaller nations therefore obediently follow the dictates of

It would be inexpedient, and perhaps dangerous, for smaller nations to

A policy of drift is fatal. Confrontation with a Global Power should be

It would be a dangerous over-simplification to assert dogmatically that, on

In practical terms, the smaller states should evolve a policy to maintain

It is essential for the nations of the Third World to continue to develop

Franco-German collaboration, which began promisingly under Konrad

Underdeveloped nations always find it a difficult and anxious business to

Afro-Asian solidarity must be pursued resolutely within and outside the

As the weapons capable of destroying whole continents are brought

The North-South polarization of the underdeveloped nations' struggle for a

A new kind of relationship is evolving between Europe and Asia. In the

The importance of a universal, intercontinental understanding and

This chapter has attempted to present in simple terms a very complicated

American Attitudes towards Partition and Indian

For a fuller assessment of the problems of Pakistan and its domestic

Germany had already been destroyed and France, humiliated by her

We are earnestly considering whether a declaration of Dominion Status

Later, the rapid Japanese advance in south-east Asia prompted President

The United States had shown an increasingly direct interest in Indian

On 11 March 1942 President Roosevelt sent his views on the Indian

During the Cripps Mission to India Colonel Louis Johnson, President

I am confident that if the Indian leaders show the magnanimous spirit

Inevitably she [India] had to consider her foreign policy in terms of

While taking advantage of American unilateral overtures, India remained

The refusal of the Indian Government to accept this country's

Mr. Raymond Cartier has written:

There is certainly not a country in the world where America is more

The prestige of the alliance suffered particularly from the unwillingness of

Russell H. Fifield maintains that

I recognize that there are important political differences between our

Neither during the darkest period of United States-Indian relations, nor

Although the United States' decision to extend military assistance to

We believe that India's great effort to achieve economic progress should

On 10 March 1956 Mr. Dulles stated in a Press Conference in New Delhi

In a special foreign aid message on 31 March 1959, President Eisenhower

India seeks American Support against

The magnitude of the change can be measured, in economic terms, by the

1. Use of bilateral aid to stimulate co-operation among the developing

2. Re-examination of the role of local military forces and US bases in Asia

3. Inclusion of the countries concerned to undertake regional accords

With a population now estimated at 415 million and increasing by seven

In considering the economic future of India, we shall do well to recall that

Shall these new powerful States emerge to maturity from a totalitarian

In his conversations with John Fischer, the following question and

But in his speech in California on 1 November 1959, when Sino-Indian

Whatever battles may be in the headline, no struggle in the world

It is not enough that we participate on a crash basis, for temporary relief.

With regard to military pacts, he reiterated on 9 February 1959 that they